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RÉSUMÉ 
Ce mémoire de maîtrise porte sur la problématique que pose la représentation de 
l'ISKCON (Société internationale pour la conscience de Krishna) par ses adeptes et 
exégètes traditionnels d'une part et par les observateurs et chercheurs spécialistes de la 
question d'autre part. Le discours sur la conscience de Krishna, qui comporte à la fois des 
aspects religieux et séculiers selon l'entité qui le représente, pourrait très bien se prêter à 
une analyse comparative. 
S'agissant des nouveaux mouvements religieux, la tension entre le discours théiste 
d'un côté et le discours séculier moderne de l'autre est habituellement alimentée par la 
question du contrôle s'exerçant sur les membres de tels mouvements. On considère très 
souvent que les disciples des nouvelles pratiques religieuses sont l'objet d'un lavage de 
cerveau et manipulés pendant leur recrutement à titre de néophytes; le contrôle qu'ils 
exercent sur leur propre vie ne serait plus crédible. Les adeptes de l'ISKCON affirment le 
contraire: il n'est véritablement possible de contrôler sa vie personnelle que grâce à la 
conscience de Krishna, la société laïque moderne en général et la science profane 
moderne en particulier ne parvenant pas à fournir un but et un sens à l'existence humaine. 
La méthode d'analyse comparative choisie est fondée sur L'ordre du discours 
(1971) de Michel Foucault. Dans ce traité, Foucault présente les processus rattachés aux 
discours religieux, médical, politique et littéraire ainsi qu'au discours profane moderne. 
Ce penseur français est également connu pour sa métamorphose personnelle, de 
philosophe militant niant la subjectivité « anthropologique» (Foucault, 1970) en ardent 
défenseur de cette théorie (Foucault, 1981-1982). Des thèmes foucaldiens comme les 
relations de pouvoir, le sexe, le contrôle et les techniques de soi traditionnelles peuvent 
être considérés comme des aspects fondamentaux de la controverse entourant l'ISKCON. 
Espérons que l'analyse discursive de cette controverse saura contribuer à une meilleure 
compréhension de l'aspect ethnolinguistique de ce débat et de la nature du besoin qu'a 
l 'homme de vivre dans une société différente de la société dominante. 
MOTS-CLÉS: 
Anthropologie, ethnolinguistique, discours, religieux, séculier, ISKCON, techniques de 
sOl 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose ofthis thesis is to address the problem of the representative of ISKCON 
(International Society for Krishna Consciousness) both by its traditional followers and 
interpreters from one si de and scholarly observers and researchers on the other. Krishna 
Consciousness discourse, which demonstrates both theistic and secular aspects, 
depending on the representing agency, appears as a potentially good candidate for a 
comparative analysis. 
When new religious movements are concerned, the tension between theistic 
discourse on one si de and the modem secular one on the other is usually fuelled by the 
issues of control concerning the members of the movements in question. Quite often the 
followers of the new religious practices are considered as brainwashed and manipulated 
in the process of being recruited as neophytes by their adoptive institutions; their control 
over their personallives is no longer credible. The ISKCON's followers though c1aim the 
opposite: the real control over one's personal life is possible only with Krishna 
consciousness, because modem secular society in general and modem secular science in 
particular fail to provide goal and sense of meaning for human existence. 
The method of comparative analysis will be based on the Foucault's treatise L'ordre 
du discours (1971). In this work Foucault outlined the procedures relevant to religious, 
medical, political, literary, and modem secular discourses. The French thinker is also 
known for his personal metamorphosis from a militant philosopher denying 
"anthropological" subjectivity (Foucault 1970) into someone fervently defending it later 
(Foucault 1981-82). Foucaultian topics like power relations, sex, control, and traditional 
self-techniques can be recognised as salient features of the ISKCON controversy. The 
discourse analysis of such a controversy will hopefully promote a betler understanding of 
the ethnolinguistic aspect of the ISKCON's debate and the nature of the human need of 
living in a society different from the mainstream one. 
KEYWORDS: 
Anthropology, Ethnolinguistics, Discourse, Theistic, Secular, ISKCON, Self-techniques 
Table of contents 
Chapter 1: Introduction ...................................................................... 1 
Chapter II: Foucault's discourse analysis ................................................. 6 
2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................... 6 
2.2 Foucault's archaeological discourse analysis ................................................ 8 
2.3 Politics of Discourse - contextualization as Power and ControL ....................... 15 
2.4 Genealogical analysis as a historical dimension of the knowledge archaeology ...... 16 
2.5 Regularity and discontinuity .................................................................. 17 
2.6 Conclusion .............. , ........................................................................ 20 
Chapter III: Analysis of the sources expounding and interpreting the Krishna 
Consciousness ..................................................................................... 21 
3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................... 21 
3.2 Early development of Bhakti tradition ...................................................... .23 
3.3 Bhakti tradition under the star of Chaitanya ................................................ 28 
3.4 Later development of Chaitanya' s Vai1?t:tavism ................................................ 30 
3.5 The Gauçli:ya Vai1?t:tavas and the ISKCON .................................................. 31 
3.6 Conclusion ....................................................................................... 33 
Chapter IV: The notion of the subject in the traditional theistic and the modern 
secular thought .................................................................................... 35 
4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................... 35 
4.2 Western notion of the self-governing subject .............................................. .36 
4.3 Indian concept of subjectivity according to Vedic and Vai1?lU).ava traditions ......... .3 7 
4.4 Epimeleia heautou and gnothi seauton ..................................................... .43 
4.5 Yoga process, self-control, sadhana ......................................................... .45 
4.5a Patanjali A1?taIi.ga-yoga ............................................................................. .45 
4.5b Srïmad-Bhagavatam, Bhagavad-Gïta and self-discipline ............................... .47 
4.6 Conclusion ....................................................................................... 48 
Chapter V: Procedures for discourse control: the ISKCON and the modern secular 
perspectives....................................................................................... 50 
5.1 Introduction ..................................................................................... 50 
5.2 External procedures or procedures of exclusion ............................................ 51 
5.3 InternaI procedures for discourse control .................................................... 59 
5.4 Discourse control as regulations of access ................................................... 62 
5.5 Conclusion ....................................................................................... 66 
Chapter VI: Analysis of the field data - sermons, questionnaires, interviews ... 68 
6.1 Introduction ...................................................................................... 68 
6.2 Questionnaires................................................................................. 69 
6.3 Interviews ......................................................................................... 72 
6.3a Presentation of the ISKCON movement as an ideal society. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 
6.3b ISKCON as an alternative society ........................................................... 74 
6.3c ISKCON represented through the regime of Self-control ................................ 77 
6.4 Discourse as hermeneutics of self-techniques .............................................. 82 
6.4a Philosophy versus Spirituality in Self-technology analysis .............................. 83 
6.4b Subjection and subjectivation in Self-technology analysis .............................. 85 
6.4c Basic elements of self-technology ............................................................ 86 
6.5 Bhagavad GUa classes (or sermons) ......................................................... 88 
6. 6 Conclusion ....................................................................................... 94 
Conclusion ........................................................................................... 96 
Bibliography ....................................................................................... 102 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
From delusion lead me to Truth 
From darkness lead me to Light 
From death, lead me to Immortality. 
Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 1.2,28 
1 
On the 8th and 9th of July 2006, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness 
(ISKCON) celebrated both The Festival of Chariots and the 40th anniversary of its 
foundation. For 40 years the activity of ISKCON has been a common sight in most of the 
major cities of the world, yet the true nature of that society is largely unknown. Founded 
by His Divine Grace A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada, ISKCON is often perceived 
as a cult movement even after the demi se of its charismatic' leader. The movement, 
deprived of the guidance of its bona fide guru, was expected to naturally die out, 
nevertheless it is alive and in noteworthy health. The turbulent sixties might he gone 
together with the 20th century, but sorne oftheir main actors are here to stay. Why is that 
50? Is the idea of an alternative consciousness and lifestyle only a dream, or there is a 
general misunderstanding and misrepresenting of the ISKCON movement? 
The purpose of this thesis is to address the problem of representing ISKCON by both 
its traditional followers and interpreters on one side and secular observers and scientific 
researchers on the other. It is important to note that the modem interpreters and 
researchers could belong to either of both camps - theistic or secular. Science and 
tradition are not necessarily separate; secularity is not mandatorily modem. Antiquity 
testifies to the secular materialistic attitudes of Greek Atomists or /onians (Leucippus, 
Democritus), their Roman follower (Lucretius), Indian Cltrolika1:z or Lokiiyatal) (Brihaspati), 
Jains (Mahavira) and certainly Buddhists such as Dharmakirti and Dignaga. Idem f<:>r the 
schol,arly approach; it is part of the tradition as weiL 
Thus the need of an operative discursive distinction for this thesis is indispensable. 
For the sake of clarity modem will be identified with secular, while traditional will stand 
for theistic. If sorne particular author, treatise or approach related to secularism or theism 
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vis-à-vis Krishna Consciousness will eventually need additional contextualisation, the 
same will be duly done. The thesis originated due t9 the general consideration of the 
following basic question: 
Since the subject of this research is Krishna Consciousness discourse, what kind of 
discursive analysis proper will satisfy the purpose of the thesis? 
U sually while one deliberates the idea of a discursive analysis the initial association 
cornes to the fore under the name of Michel Foucault. That modern, or rather Post-
Modern French philosopher was first to coin the term "discourse formations" in 
L'Archéologie du savoir (1969), which term was later reduced in circulation to the simple 
"discourse". As far as Post Modernism is concemed, it was defined by François Lyotard 
in La Condition postmoderne: Rapport sur le savoir (1979) as being an "incredulity 
towards meta-narratives". Science, Religion, Marxism etc. are the grand theories that fit 
the qualification meta-narratives, describing the world through a range of absolute values 
and ideas. 
While Nietzsche ("On truth"; 1873) is considered the grandfather of Post modernist 
thought, Foucault could be nominated as his most famous successor. 80th authors 
relativize the canons of truth; there is no universal all-pervading truth, but only 
multiplicities of truths. The post modernist attitude of Foucault makes his methodology 
especially attractive. when a comparative discourse analysis is concemed. Krishna 
Consciousness discourse, which demonstrates both theistic and secular aspects depending 
on the representing agency, appears as a potentially good candidate for a Foucaultian 
analysis. 
Given the difficulties of separating ontology from epistemology and respectively 
method from analytical strategy, for this thesis it will be useful to stress a prevalence of 
epistemological issues. The intention is to focus mostly on the analysis of the 
observations and conclusions of the others regarding Krishna Consciousness, rather than 
dealing with the immediate behaviour of those others; in a similar vein the goal will be to 
test presuppositions, without directly generating knowledge of subjects. 
Once the analytical. strategy is adopted, the choice of a specific method of analysis 
becomes pressing. In L'ordre du discours (1971), Foucault outlined the procedures 
relevant to religious, medical, political, literary, and modern secular discourses. That 
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treatise seems promising in terms of its nearly universal application, and the question that 
follows is: 
How well will the procedures outlined by Foucault in L'ordre du discours (1971) fit 
the anaIvsis of the literature on Krishna Consciousness and to what extent will that 
~ . 
analysis be productive? 
The specific procedures for discourse control can be tested on both theistic and 
secular Krishna Consciousness discourse formations. The results of the analysis will be 
summarised in terms of efficiency and productivity. 
When new religious movements are concemed, the tension between the theistic 
discourse on one side and the modem secular one on the other is usually fuelled by the 
issues of control concerning the members of the movements in question. Quite often the 
followers of the new religious practices are considered as brainwashed and manipulated 
in the process of being recruited as neophytes by their adoptive institutions. Once 
somebody is identified as a follower of a certain new religious movement like ISKCON 
his control over his personal life is no longer credible. Thus the next question regarding 
the ISKCON's discourse is the following one: 
What is to be in control of your own life and how the same notion of control is made 
tenable through the modem secular diScourse on Krishna Consciousness from one side 
and traditional Va~l).ava discourse from another side? 
To begin with. we need to fmd out what the foundation of the western notion of a 
self-governing subject is. It is necessary to know how the idea ofindividuality took shape, 
and what the procedures of establishing self-control were. This is the frrst analytical 
stage, given that the issue of self-control could be defined as ''western'' with respect to the 
ISKCON being perceived as cult and its followers as brainwashed. 
Logically the second stage should involve delimiting the Indian concept of 
subjectivity, in particular according to the Vai~1J,O.va tradition. In that case, the interest of 
investigation focuses on the different attitude toward the same concept demonstrated by 
Indian thinkers. 
The third step will be to question the beliefs and practices of ISKCON followers vis-
à-vis the notion of subjectivity in the new modality of the Indian Vai~1J,O.va tradition 
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adapted to the western cultural milieu. The critical gaze will search for the possible nodes 
of cultural syncretism on the practicallevel of everyday life in the ISKCON community. 
In view of the fact that this thesis adopts discourse analysis as a method of 
investigation, Chapter II is dedicated to the theoretical premises of Foucault's approach 
and scientific strategy. The chapter elaborates on the early works of Foucault and his 
pronounced interest in the issue of power relations permeating different institutionalised 
discourses. The focus is on genealogical analysis, although fuis cannot be separated from 
the archaeological one. 
Foucault assumes Nietzsche's critique of history and defines the genealogical 
strategy as opposed to traditional historiography. Foucault is not concemed with a 
description of actual events. The intention is to query contemporary' discourses and 
practices by referring them back to the hegemonic conditions under which they are 
originally established and to uncover "the hazardous play of dominations" (Foucault 
1991: 83). 
Chapters III, IV and V deal with the analysis proper of the sources expounding and 
interpreting Krishna Consciousness as a credo and practice for its followers. Chapter III 
deals mainly with genealogical issues, chapter N elaborates on the notion of the subject 
in the traditional theistic and the modem secular thought, chapter V expounds the 
ISKCON's and the modem secular perspectives on the procedures for discourse control, 
while chapter VI treats the questionnaires, interviews and sermons. Chapter VI is meant 
to illustrate and back up the interpretations on the already institutionalized discourse of 
Swami Prabhupada. 
This thesis is a kind of crystallization of a long process of self-search and 
questioning, initiated by my first encounter with some ISKCON representatives at the end 
of the 1970s. That took place in the former People's Republic of Bulgaria in its transitory 
existence as an Eastern Block country, which is now only the Republic of Bulgaria, but 
part of the bigger formation of the European Union. Understandably, my frrst 
acquaintance with the Krishna Consciousness movement happened some good dozen 
years after its initiation in North America. The • Iron Curtain' at the time allowed only a 
slow und intermittent trickle of information from the West as a side effect of the intense 
rivalry aiming to fmally prove whose democracy is better - "ours" or "yours"; people's or 
liberal one. It is hard to imagine a better illustration of Foucault's concepts vis-à-vis 
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~'power relations" and "discourse formations." Reality almost always exceeds any attempt 
at description or analysis to the point of being grotesque, but not entertaining. 
For similar reasons 1 was exposed to the thinking of Foucault shortly àfter the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of the whole Iron Curtain affair. That was a 
memorable experience. It was literally elucidating to realise that sorne practices, such as 
the merucalization of madness (Foucault 1965), are quite recent and their rationale rather 
questionable than self-evident. 
Foucault made me aware of the origins of modem discoursivity, "the excluding 
procedures and forms of reason, and hence of society, including inclusive forms of 
exclusion" (Foucault 1970). That challenged severely the certitude ofmy ownjudgements 
and transformed my intellectual constitution into something quite close to the Buddhist 
notion of "aggregates" or "dependently originatitig" states of self-awareness (Rahula 
1959). Yet 1 am not so receptive to the Buddhist epistemology, fmding it quite exclusive 
and one-sided with respect to the treatment of the 'Selfor the • Person , (Ibid.). Thus, 
Foucault put me into the difficult task of defining my personal ontology as an 
anthropological researcher. 
The context of ISKCON development as a discursive formation with the related 
issues of autonomy, alternative forms of society, brainwashing and control, appealed to 
me as a good testing ground for modem analytical strategies. That happened mainly 
because of the traditional approach of the movement towards the contemporary science, 
values and social practices, which provides a perfect reference point for an incursion into 
modem discoursivity. 
The personal metamorphosis of Michel Foucault ~m a militant philosopher denying 
the "anthropological" subjectivity (Foucault 1970) into someone fervently defending it 
later (Foucault 1981~82), only reinforced my motivation. 1 will argue that Foucaultian 
topics like power relations, sex, control~ and traditional self-techniques are salient and 
well recognisable features of the ISKCON problematic. 1 will also argue that the 
ISKCON members and representatives proactively advocate their autonomy and 
consciously share in the critical discourse involving their activities in the capacity of 
equal participants. 
Chapter Il. Foucault' s discourse analysis 
2.1 Introduction 
Foucault has become a kind of impossible object: 
non-historical historian, an antihumanist hum an 
scientist, and a counter-structuralist structuralist. 
Clifford Geertz 1992 
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" Foucault always rejected being structuralist or poststructuralist. He is sometimes 
thought one (White 1994), due to the fact that he developed his discourse analysis in an 
environment of structuralists, especially his teachers, the Marxist and ideology theorist 
Louis Althusser and the philosopher Georges Canguilhem (Eribon, 1991 &Andersen, 
2003). The truth is that Foucault qualified himself as structuralist, but later carefully 
denied that fact (Eribon, 1991). Niels Andersen chose to read Foucault as a 
phenomenologist, "without consciousness as the origin of meaning - a subjectless 
phenomenology" (Andersen, 2003: 2). According to David Carroll (1994) the assumption 
shared by most of the prominent theoreticians in France (Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, Althusser, 
Foucault, Deleuze, etc.) is that "the subject is not original but derived~ not a presence but 
an absence, and that the text, discourse, language, or the unconscious (the Symbolic) i"s 
primary and determ.ining (present)" (Carroll 1994: 157). 
The logical gaps on the manifest level betray the presence of a hidden and latent 
• 
structure beneath. There is a clear signal of a logical breach when the visible text pro vides 
answers without questions being asked, and when questions are left without answers. The 
invisible text could be compared to a regime that condemns specific questions. By 
directing attention toward those logical gaps in the manifest text, structuralism can raise 
questions regarding the underlying text, which must exist so that the apparently 
incoherent and meaningless makes sense after all. In Althusser, this is called symptomatic 
reading, that is, a reading of the logical breaches of the visible text as symptoms of an 
underlying and controlling structure (Althusser & Balibar, 1970). 
Poststructuralism maintains the notion of structure but sees the structure as much 
more 100 se and undefmed. Both positions are unacceptable for Michel Foucault - there is 
only one level, which is one of appearance. The focus is on the statements as they emerge 
7 
and as they appear; they should not be reduced to anything else. It is crucial to Foucault 
that discourse is not a structure. But what is it then? 
According to Andersen (2003) it is rather the writer' s reconstruction of the historical 
relationship between discourse and institution. If we were to associate Foucault with 
structuralism, he could be called a transformation structuralist: 
First, he would not define the notion of structure within a synchronous 
perspective as, for example, in the works of de Saussure, Lévi-Strauss and 
Althusser. Structure would then be transferred into a diachronic analytics, precisely 
as a transfonnational structure, asserting itself at moments of change and rupture. 
Hence, structures would not be an attribute of the world but of the diachronic story 
(Andersen 2003: 3): 
The fundamental concern of Michel Foucault is the critical mvestigation of 
discursive assumptions. Individual will and reason are questioned by demonstrating how 
every statement is a statement within a specific discourse to which certain rules of 
acceptability and exclusion apply. Foucault targets the humanities and the social sciences 
in particular as responsible for establishing regimes of knowledge and truth. As such, they 
not only elucidate our approach to ourselves, each other and our environment but make 
themselves available for moralising projects. 
In The arder of things, Foucault (1970) shifts the focus onto his own scientific 
discourse and its historical conditions. His archaeology of human sciences studies the 
ways in which people accept the taxonomies of an epoch without questioning their 
arbitrariness (Kermode, 1994). Foucault sets out to examine the historical conditions of 
structuralism and investigates how language replaces man as the object of knowledge. 
According to White (2002) Foucault views the Structuralist movement ironically, as the 
last phase of a development in the human sciences which began in the sixteenth century. 
In that period Western thought fell prey to the illusion that "the order of things" could be 
adequately represented in an "order of words," if only the right arder of words could be 
found: 
The illusion on which all of the modem human sciences have been founded is 
that ''words'' enjoy a privileged status among ''the order of thlngs" as transparent 
icons, as value-neutral instruments of representation. The ascription to words of 
such an ontologically privileged status among "the order of things" is a mistake 
which modem linguistic theory at last has permitted to be identified. What modem 
linguistic theory demonstrates is that words are merely things among other things in 
the world, that they will always obscure as much as they reveal about the objects 
they are meant to signify, and that, therefore, any system of thought raised on the 
hope of contriving a value-neutral system of representation is fated to dissolution 
when the area of things that it consigns to obscurity arises to insist on its own 
recognition (White 2002: 28). 
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Foucault simultaneously studies the origin and disappearance of the humanities as a 
result of the repression of human heings by language. Man is defmed by the "hum an 
sciences" (sociology, psychology, philology, economics, history) as the subject in a 
double extension of, on one band, a transcendental being charged with will and reason, 
and, on the other hand, an empirical being (observable one). This provides the possible 
conditions of the humanities as humans observing humans. The point is that through 
structuralism, language is made subject by a similar dichotomy into empirical and 
transcendental being. Now structures speak instead of humanity. While 'if speaks as 
Lacan formulates it, the conditions of the humans recede. In other words, discourse 
becomes central: "Where there is a sign, there man cannot he, and where one makes signs 
speak, there man must fall silent" (Foucault, 1998a: 266). 
2.2 Foucault's archaeological discourse analysis 
Do not ask who 1 am and do not ask me to remam 
the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our 
police to see that our papen are in order. At least 
spare us their moraüty when we write. 
Foucault 2002 
Soon after the publication of The Order of Things (1970) the critics introduced 
Foucault as Sartre's successor. The master launched a harsh counterattack and Foucault 
knew right away that the stakes were considerable. The fight was on and if Foucault 
wanted to make off with the winnings, he could not disappoint the expectations of an 
eager crowd awaiting thenext heated exchange. Foucault was hard at work on The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (1972). He wrote furiously and struggled violently with 
notions of enunciation (statement or énoncé), discursive formation, regularity, and 
strategy (Eribon, 1991: 191). 
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According to Andersen (2003) the archaeology of knowledge installs a distinction. 
between statement, discourse and discursive formation. These three concepts provide a 
- . 
joint foundation for discourse analysis: 
• statemenl is the atom of discourse - its smallest unit; 
• discourse is the final, actually demarcated body of formulated statements - it 
is the archive of the discourse analyst; 
• discursive formation is a system of dispersion for statements; it is the 
regularity in the dispersion of statements (Andersen 2003: 8) 
Brown and Cousins (1994), though, do not view the statement as the smallest unit of . 
discourse. For them ~'it is part of Foucault's insistence that the statement is not a thing, an 
elementary partic1e of a discursive formation" (Brown & Cousins 1994: 193). To Said 
(1994)-the archive is not limited to discourse; it is "the place of discourse, its setting, in 
which statements occur" that is ~pecified by Foucault as the archive (Said 1994: 72). As 
for the discourse itself, it is not a structure and does not exist on a level different from 
statements. As for statements, they do not represent a discursive structure. A discursive 
formation is actually the regularity of the irregular distribution of statements. Simply 
stated, the fundamental guiding difference in Foucault's archaeology of knowledge is the 
regularity/dispersion of statements: 
Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of 
dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statements, concepts, or thematic choices, 
one can define a regularity, we will say, for the sake of convenience, that we are dealing 
with a discursive formation (Foucault, 2002: 41). 
According to Foucault, a discourse does not consist oftexts and discourse analysis is 
therefore not a textual analysis. Texts are much too boundless to function as the basis for 
discourse analyses. That "material individualization" of a book, which. occupies a 
"determined space", has limits indicated by a number of signs and an economic value, 
does not necessarily mean the book is only the object that one holds in one's hands: 
The frontiers of a book are nevet c1ear-cut: beyond the title, the first Hnes, and 
the last full stop, beyond its internaI configuration and its autonomous form, it is 
caught up in a system of references to other books, other texts, other sentences: it is 
anode within a network (Foucault 2002: 25-6). 
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There is a general tendency to perceive literary works (oeuvres) as the embodiment 
of one writer' s thoughts, experiences or unconscious. The fundamental problem consists 
of treating texts as the indication of a who le, which is not obvious in the textual fragments 
but must be ascribed through interpretation. According to Foucault the works of authors 
are not bound who les in the sense of "a collection of texts that can be designated by the 
sign of a proper name" (Foucault 2002: 26). How about the authorship oftexts signed 
under a pseudonym? How about hasty notes or a sketch that is discovered posthumously 
in the form of an unfmished draft, and another that is merely a notebook? What, for 
example, asks Foucault, should be considered as belonging to the work of Nietzsche? 
The youthful autobiographies, the scholastic dissertations, the philological articles, 
Zaratustra, Ecce Hommo, the letters, the last postcards signed 'Dionysos' or 
'Kaiser Nietzsche', and the innumerable notebooks with their jumble of laundry 
bills and sketches for aphorisms (Ibid.)? 
The critique of Foucault aims not only at literary analysis. His discourse analysis 
comprises any textual analysis "which professes to referthe statements of the text back to 
the author and his intention, concems, unconscious, circumstances and so on" (Ibid.: 10). 
Statements do not stand for a tacit structure that secretly animates them. The discourse at 
band is more than the disturbing presence of the unspoken. A discourse analysis cannot. 
be reduced to a structural one. Foucault explains discourse analysis as "pure description 
of discursive facts" (Foucault, 1972: 234). The spirit of such a discourse analysis is a 
"felicitous positivism" (Ibid.). Foucault's desire is to construct a discourse analysis 
capable of escaping the fate of commentary by presupposing that the stated only exists in 
ilS historical rise and emergence (Foucault, 1986b: 17). 
According to Foucault, a statement is a function of existence that enables groups 
of signs to exist (Foucault, 1986a:86-8). We are thus able to recognise the statement by 
its momentary creation rather than by its appearance as a sign, sentence, book or 
argument. Statements are positive events that produce existence through enunciation. This 
function of existence contains at least four aspects: objects, subjects, conceptual network 
and strategy (Ibid.). 
The statement constructs discursive objects that are classified and identified by the 
state~ent itself. The statement creates the object to which it refers through enunciation. 
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The enunciation of the object implies that it is brought to life as a social and discursive 
fact and can therefore be articulated (Ibid: 88-92). 
It is not enough for a statement to create objects to be regarded as such - they should 
relate to a subject (Foucault 2002). To Andersen (2003) the subject positions should be 
assigned to individuals, while for Brown and Cousins (1994) recourse is not being made 
to human persons either as authors, speakers or actors in the conventional sense. That 
function of a statement rather "designates a position of the subject, a controlled space 
from which the signs may function as a statement in their enunciation" (Brown&Cousins 
1994: 193). These are the discursive positions from which something can be stated. 
Similarly to discursive objects, subjects do not stand outside of the statement; conversely, 
the statement articulates the space and possibility of subjects. 
According to Foucault, all statements re-actualise other statements in sorne way. 
Linguistic elements such as signs and sentences are only statements if they are immersed 
in an associative field, in which they simultaneously appear as unique elements. This is 
how Foucault summarises it: 
There is no statement in general, no free, neutral, independent statement; but a 
statement always belong to a series or a who le, always plays a role among other 
statements, deriving support from and distinguishing itself from them: it is always 
part of a network of statements, in which it has a role, however minimal it may be, 
to.pIay (Foucault 1986a: 99). 
A statement becomes a statement only if it both reactualises and extends other 
statements. A statement can be defined as a statement only if it is integrated into 
operations or strategies in which the identity of the statement is maintained or effaced 
(Foucault, 1986a: 100-5). A statement always chooses a materiality, at Ieast in the form of 
a medium for its creation, for example speech, writing, report, arrangement or image. It 
always seeks support in a context; it appears with a status derived from the strategic . 
context of its origin: 
Could one speak of a statement if a voice had not articulated it, if a surface did 
not bear its signs, if it had not left sorne trace - if only for an instant in someone' s 
memory or in sorne space? Could one speak of a statement as an ideal, silent figure? 
The statement is always given through sorne material medium even if that medium 
is concealed, even if lt is doomed to vanish as soon as it appears (Foucault 2002: 
112). . 
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Since the statements are aIways parts in sorne discourse, the field of discourse 
analysis should be "the compilation of all actua1 statements (spoken or written) in their 
historicaI dispersion and in their specifie momentary vaIue" (Ibid.) It is difficult to decide 
in advance which discursive formation regulates the dispersion of particular statements. 
ln order to make evident that which ultimately regulates what has been said and not been 
said in a particular society, the discourse analyst should construct the archive of 
staternents and discourse formations. In Foucault's words: "One ought to read everything, 
study everything. In other words, one must have at one's disposaI the generaI archive of a 
period at a given moment. And archaeology is, in a strict sense, the science of this 
archive" (Foucault 1998a: 263). By reading "everything" Foucault means the following: 
First, that one cannot limit one's reading to a theme such as, for example 
surveillance, simply because it is not possible to defme the discursive formation 
beforehand. Themes change over time and relate to each other in unpredictable ways; 
therefore we have to follow the references of the statements and the references of the 
references in time 'and space in the broadest sense. There is no shortcut without 
consequences, thus the references should' be followed until they appear to fonn a 
completed who le. 
Foucault maintains secondly that it does not suffice to read the canonicaI works of 
the history of ideas. It is cruciaI that the reading also includes the statements of the 
institutions able· to demonstrate practice. Unravelling the history of madness includes 
readings of philosophical works as weIl as scientific dissertations and the statements, 
regulations and accounts of the institutions themselves. Third, and fina!ly, we must be 
careful not to insta1l a preconceived distinction between officiaI and more private and 
individual sources, as if the private and persona! sources exist outside the discourse 
(Andersen 2003: 13). 
In his studies of the self-relation of the self, Foucault frequently used diaries and 
personaI notes from Rome of the 1 st and 2nd centuries; likewise he addressed many 
novels, paintings and other personaI documents from later historicaI periods. 
Understandably, we cannot weigh up the types of statement against each other in 
advance, as if a text by' Voltaire' is of greater importance than documents written by an 
historica1ly anonymous person, which, in turn, are more important than the diaries of a 
doctor, and so on (Ibid: 14) .. 
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We can start asking questions about regularities appearing in the irregular dispersion 
of statements only when the entire body of statements has been pieced together. The 
fundamental question to the statements posed by discourse analysis in the attempt to 
defme discursive formations is: "Why did this and no other statement happen here?" The 
aim is to detect the rules that govem the way different statements emanate in discourse 
formations. Rules about when a statement is accepted as a logical and reasonable one 
represent rules of acceptability (Ibid.). 
Foucault identifies four levels in a discursive formation, that is, four bodies of rules 
for the formation of statements (Foucault 2002: 23-78). These are the leve1s of formation 
of objects, formation of subjects, formation of concepts and formations of strategies. To 
Foucault (2002) different questions apply to the different levels of discursive formation. 
For example the questions applicable to the formation of objects are: 
• What rules the existence of statements as objects of discourse? 
• According to what particular law of emergence does the object of discourse fmd 
its place in a defmed discursive formation? 
• According to which rules are the objects ordered and classified? 
• Why this enumeration rather than another? 
• What detined and closed group does one imagine one is circumscribing this 
way? 
• What relations exist between objects of discourse? 
• Which hierarchy of objects does the individual object form a part of? 
• How are the objects specified and characterised (Foucault 2002: 45-7)? 
The fundamental question regarding the formation of subjects is why the statements 
create subject positions the way they do. The questions pertaining to these subject 
positions are the following: 
• Who is speaking? 
• Who, among the totality of speaking individuals, is accorded the right to use 
this sort of language (langage)? 
• Who is qualified to do so? 
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• Who derives from it (this sort of language) his own special quality, bis 
prestige, and from whom, in return, does he receive if not the assurance, at least the 
presumption that what he says is true? 
• What is the status of the individuals who - alone - have the right, sanctioned 
by law of tradition, juridically defmed or spontaneously accepted, to proffer such a 
discourse (Ibid.: 55)? 
Furthermore the enunciation of subject positions and discursive objects implies the 
association to concepts and the ensuing questions: 
• Why does the statement actualise particular concepts and not others? 
• How do concepts organise and connect statements? 
• What are the rules for conceptualisation and how do specific discur~ive 
formations draw on concepts from other formations, including the rules of transcription, 
which seem to exist between different discursive formations (Andersen 2003: 15)? 
• Should the dispersion of concepts (on a broader scale of different disciplines 
such as grammar or economics) be left in its apparent disorder? 
• Should the same dispersion be seen as a succession of conceptual systems, 
each possessing its organization, and being articulated oruy against the permanence of 
problems, the continuity of tradition, or the mechanism of influences? 
• Could a law not be found that would account for the successive or 
simultaneous emergence of disparate concepts? 
• Could a system of occurrence not be found between them that was not a 
logical systematicity (Foucault 2002: 62)? 
The fourth level in a discursive formation is the formation of strategies. Strategy is 
about rules of selection for the completion or actualisation of the rules of acceptability 
and mutual exclusion of the discursive formations. Here is what Foucault has to sayon 
this: 
Such discourses as economics, medicine, grammar, the science of living beings 
give rise to certain organizations of concepts, certain regroupings of objects, certain 
types of enunciation, which form according to their degree of coherence, rigour, and 
stability, themes or theories .. .like the theory in nineteenth-century philology, of a 
kinship between all the Indo-European languages, and of an archaic idiom that 
served as a common starting-point; a theme, in the eighteenth century, of an 
evolution of the species deploying in time the continuity of nature, and explaining 
the present gaps in the taxonomic table ... Whatever therr formal level may be, 1 
shall calI these themes and theories strategies(Foucault 2002: 71). 
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Regarding ~e level of strategies Foucault admits that he could not be as precise as he 
is with the preceding three levels of discursive formations. Thus the questions he applies 
to the formation of strategies bear the sign of heightened theoretical uncertainty: 
• How are strategies distributed in history? 
• 1s it necessary that (the mode of distribution) links them together, makes them 
invisible, calls them to their right places one after another and makes of them successive 
solutions to one and the same problem? 
• Are the chance encounters between ideas of different origin, influences, 
discoveries, speculative climates, and theoretical models that the patience or genius of 
individuals arranges into more or less well-constituted wholes? 
,. Can one fmd regularity between them (the wholes) and define the common 
system oftheir formation? 
2.3 Politics of discourse - contextualisation as Power and Control 
According to Foucault (1980) between every point of a social body, between a man 
and a woman, between the members of a family, between a master and his pupil, between 
every one who knows and every one who does not, exist relations of power which are not 
purely and simply a projection of the State's power over the individual. Those relations of 
power are the fertile soil in which the State's power isgrounded, the conditions which 
make it possible for it to function. The family, even now, is not a simple reflection or 
extension of the power of the State; it does not act as the representative of the State in 
relation to children, just as the male does not act as its representative with respect to the 
female. The State is able to function in the way it does due to sorne quite specific 
relations of domination which have their own configuration and relative autonomy. Here 
is how Foùcault understands the relation of the State to the others social units: 
State is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that 
invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology and so forth. 
True, these networks stand in a conditioning-conditioned relationship to a kind of 
. 'meta-power' which is structured essentially round a certain number of great 
prohibition functions; but this meta-power with its prohibitions can only take hold 
and secure its footing where it is rooted in a whole series of multiple and indefmite 
power relations that supply the necessary basis for the great negative forms of 
power (Foucault 1980: 122). 
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The mechanism of power must be perceived as a chain. Power should be analysed as 
something, which circulates - it is never precisely localised, "never in anybody's hands, 
never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth" (Foucault 1980: 98). Power is 
employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. The individuals are not only inert 
or consenting targets of power; they are also elements of its articulation. Individuals are 
the true vehicles of power, not its points of application. They are not simply subdued or 
crushed like inert material. The individual is an effect of power and an element of its 
articulation. To demonstrate the workings of power Foucault developed the genealogical 
analysis. That analysis seeks to open up the discursive field through tracing practices, 
discourses and institutional.1ines of descent, including the lines of connection to different 
historical conflicts and strategies of control (Lash 1994; Jacques 1994; Visker 1994; 
Andersen 2003). 
2.4 Genealogical analysis as a historical dimension of the archaeology of knowledge 
It is impossible to separate genealogical analysis from the archaeological one. Their 
relationship is frequently described, in Foucault, as two periods in his writings in which' 
the genealogical breakthrough is called upo~ by the article 'Nietzsche - genealogy and 
history' (Foucault, 1991). Even before this publication Foucault had already used the term 
'genealogy', at times together with the word 'archaeology'. In addition to that, the 
majority of the questions discussed in the Nietzsche article had already been addressed in 
The archaeology of knowledge (Foucault, 1986a), in the chapter 'Discourse and 
discontinuity', and in different introductory problem formulations in his historical works. 
According to White (1994), Hoy (1994), Andersen (2003) and Visker (1994) 
genealogical analytical strategies should be construed as the historical dimension of the 
archaeology of knowledge, therefore conducting a knowledge-archaeological analysis in 
separation from the genealogical one appears illogical and impractical. The framework 
for the gaze of archaeology of knowledge is the distinction between regularity and 
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dispersion of statements, while the framework for the genealogical gaze is the distinction 
continuity/discontinuity (Andersen 2003: 17). 
The designation of genealogy as a particular historical analytical strategy was 
initially developed by Friedrich Nietzsche, primarily in his dissertation On the genealogy 
of morality (Nietzsche, 1998). There Nietzsche explains how he started by looking into 
the origins of good and evil but how he gradually realised that this manner of questioning 
was extremely problematic by dint of the question's implicit supposition about an 
archetypal essential morality that would appear increasingly clear as one approached its 
source while tracing it back through history (Ibid.) 
By redeflnition of his question Nietzsche ascribes to it the characteristics of 
genealogy. The question is: "Under what conditions did man invent those value 
judgements - good and evil? And what value do they themselves have (Nietzsche, 1998: 
2-3)?" Subsequently the genealogy of morals revolves around ''the conditions and 
circumstances out ofwhich [these values] have grown, under which they have developed 
and shifted (Ibid.: 5)." That way appears the necessity to question the value of values in 
aIl possible aspects. Therefore the genealogy of morals could be qualifled as a critique of 
morality. 
2.5 Regularity and discontinuity 
According to Andersen (2003) and Megill (1979), Foucault maintains distinction 
between life and death. Megill refers to the tension between Apollo (the god of light, 
knowledge, the arts and civilisation) and Dionysus (the god of wine, mysteries, darkness 
and death) as a fundamental tension in Foucault's analytical-strategic development 
. (Megill, 1979: 459). That tension is tangible in Foucault's works as the tension between 
archaeology as systematic analytièal strategy (Apollonian), concemed with regularity of 
the irregular, and genealogy as analytical strategy, concemed with discontinuity, which 
brings on life and undermines presuppositions (Dionysian). Foucault, therefore, tries to 
apply Dionysian thinking in his genealogies. Genealogy in Foucault comprises three 
critical forms of application that serve life: 
1. Reality-destructive use, which opposes the historical motif recollection-recognition. 
Historiography in Foucault is reality-destructive when, as in Madness and Civilization, it 
challenges the way the present recognises itself in historical texts (Andersen 2003: 19). 
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2. Identity-destructive use, which opposes the historical motif continuity-tradition. 
Foucault's historiography is identity-destructive when it denounces humanist identity as 
in Discipline and Punish. This is done by showing that the history of punishment does not 
consist in one act of movement towards a humanisation of the penalty system since the 
Middle Ages. Conversely, the modem means of punishment indicate an intensification of 
punishment, since the aim is no longer simply to torment the body but also to control the 
psyche. Thus history in Foucault is employed for the purpose of undermining the 
humanist complacency of the present. He wants, says Andersen (Ibid.), professional 
practitioners of humanism in the institutions to feel uncomfortable. This is how Foucault 
perceives the identity-destructive application of genealogy: "The purpose of history, 
guided by genealogy, is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit itse1f to its 
dissipation" (Foucault, 1991: 95). 
3. Truth-destructive use, which opposes the historical motif of knowledge. This 
application could be found in Foucault's critique of psychology and psychoanalysis. 
There Foucault demonstrates how the truth about insanity can never be found· in 
psychology itself, for the simple reason that society is responsible for creating the 
conditions for insanity and madness to emerge. Therefore the truth about insanity should 
be located in the society itself, which implies a solution that is far from being a facile one. 
Because for Foucault "al 1 knowledge rests upon injustice" (Ibid.), the goal of the 
destructive use of genealogy is to create in history a counter-memory (Foucault Ibid.: 93). 
According to Foucault the purpose of genealogy is not to describe actual events. 
Genealogy is rather a history of the present designed to outline the historical conflicts and 
strategies of control by which knowledge and discourses are constituted and operate, and 
to use these descriptions as a counter-memory (Andersen 2003: 19). Foucault is mostly 
concemed with the redescription of "not the anticipatory power of meaning, but the 
hazardous play of dominations (Foucault, 1991: 83). 
The aim is to query the discourses and practices of the present by referring them back 
to the hegemonic conditions under which they have been established, which also includes 
pointing out ruptures in the grounds on which strategies, institutions and practices are . 
shaped. The presuppositions of the present are to be dissolved by means of history 
(Andersen 2003: 20). Here is the Foucault's own formulation of the genealogy's goals: 
The isolation of different points of emergence does not conform to the 
successive configuration of an identical meaning; rather, they result from 
substitutions, displacements, disguised conquests, and systematic reversaIs. If 
interpretation were the slow exposure of the meaning hidden in an origin, then only 
metaphysics could interpret the development of humanity. But if interpretation is 
the violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules, which in itself has no 
essential meaning, in order to impose' a direction, to bend it to a new will, to force 
its participation in a different game, and to subject it to secondary mIes, then the 
development of humanity is a series of interpretations. The role of genealogy is to 
record its history: the history of morals, ideals, and metaphysical concepts, the 
history of the concept of liberty or of the ascetic life; as they stand for the 
emergence of different interpretations, they must be made to appear as events on the 
stage of historical process (Foucault 1991: 86). 
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The tool for obserVation in Foucault (1991) is the continuity and discontinuity of 
difference. That tool is applied in order to distinguish discontinuity in that which presents 
itself as continuity and to examine possible continuities in what is presumed to be 
different and unique. Characteristic for the genealogical method is the ongoing openness 
of the object. There is no preliminary definition of the object of examination. How the 
object bas been construed historically in different ways and in different circumstances is 
something that needs investigation. 
The focus should be not only on those events that stand out c1early as seen from the 
present, but as weIl on those practices, constructions, and strategies that, for sorne reason, 
never made themselves conspicuous and remained disintegrated or changed into 
something else. Ergo we should not just trace that which became history, but also very 
much that which has been defmed as mistalœs, antiquated, unrealistic and so on. Foucault 
names the perspective constituted by the difference continuity/discontinuity a glance of 
dissociation, a glance that distinguishes, separates, and disperses; that is capable of 
liberating divergence and marginal elements - the kind of dissociating view that is 
capable of decomposing itself, capable of shattering the unity of man's being through 
which it was thought that he could extend his sovereignty to the events of his past . 
(Foucault 1991: 87). 
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2. 6 Conclusion 
The greatest preoccupation of Foucault as a discourse analyst is to challenge. popular 
discursive assumptions. He is adept in demonstrating how every statement is a statement 
within a ~pecific discourse, thus questioning individual will and reason through the 
specific rules of accessibility pertaining to the same discourse. His goal is to explore 
scientific discourse from the point of view of the rules that come into play in the very 
existence of such discourse. For him it is important to know whether the subjects 
responsible for scientific discourse "are not determined in their situation, their function, 
their perspective capacity and their practical possibilities by conditions that dominate and 
even overwhelm them" (Foucalult 1970: XIV). 
Foucault Ïnsists that as long as humanities and social sciences in particular are 
inseparable fro~ different moralising projects, knowledge cannot provide a neutral 
discursive position. Humanities and social sciences not only interpret and exp Iain out our 
world, but they establish and maintain regimes of knowing and truth able to regulate the 
ways we relate to each other, to our environment and to ourselves as well: 
Discourse in general, and scientific discourse in particular, is so complex a 
reality that we not only can, but should, approach it at different levels and with 
different methods. If there is one approach that 1 do reject, however, it is that (one 
. might calI it, broadly speaking, the phenomenological approach) which gives 
absolute priority to the observing subject, which attributes a constituent role to an 
act, which places its own point of view at the origin of all historicity - which,. in 
short leads to a transcendental consciousness. It seems to me that the historical 
analysis of scientific discourse should, in the last resort he subject, not to a theory of 
the knowing subject, but rather to a theory of discursive practice (Ibid.). 
To Foucault the important point is that any given discourse applies excluding 
procedures, which in their turn produce outsiders on one hand, disqualified as abnormal 
or irrational, and legitimate groups on the other band, which possess the right of judgment 
over the outsiders. The excluding procedures deny legitimate access to discourse mainly 
through disqualifying certain arguments, themes and speech positions. 
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Chapter III. Analysis of the sources expounding and interpreting Krishna 
Consciousness. 
3.1 Introduction 
Thereafter, at the conjunction of the two yugas; 
, the Lord of the creation will take His birth as 
Kalki incarnation becoming the son of Vishnu 
Joshi, when the rulers of the earth shan convert 
into almost to the rank of the plunderers. 
Shrimad-Bhagavatam (1.3.164) 
When searching for the reasons why westerners have taken with such alacrity to the 
new eastern religions we usually look to Western societies and their problems, rather than 
to the East. According to Angela Burr (1985) those reasons could be found in the 
practical philosophies of eastern religions proper. They are highly attractive themselves to 
the westemers by dint of offering an ideal framework for dealing with the existential and 
social problems confronting them in their daily lives. 
ln addition to the attractlveness of the eastem philosophies and religions, the post war 
western societies of the 60s were already largely secularised, thus providing a mild 
receptive c1imate for new influences. According to Danièle Hervieu-Léger (1996) the 
process of secularization was mostly representative for, the west, but not that much 
regarding India, China, or the Arab world. Hervieu-Léger backed up her opinion with 
Max Weber's (1964) elaboration on Protestant ethics and capitalism. Nevertheless, the 
biographer of Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada, Goswami (2002), demonstrates 
something else for India of the 60s: 
Somehow Abhay (Prabhupada) realised that the golden era of preaching that 
had flourished in the days of Srila Bhaktisiddhânta Sarasvati was no longer. He also 
noticed during his extensive train travels in India more and more people smoking 
cigarettes and more and more women traveling alone. "India was becoming 
westernized. And the national leaders were paving the way - the blind leading the 
blind" (Goswami 2002: 139). 
When communist China is concemed it is difficult to perceive the state atheism as 
promoting something else but secularism, while the Arab's petro-dollar affluence does the 
same, only expressed in different terms: economic growth and consumerism. The German 
sociologist Weber (1964) bas a good reason to consider the individualistic Protestantism 
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as conducive to rational behaviour, but the same applies to the four principle goals in 
Hindu life (Dharma, Artha, Kama and Mo~a), let alone many of the Buddhist practices 
(why not in China?) with their c1early stated non-theism. Islam is practiced differently 
across the Arab world, but it also promotes rational behaviour even to the point that the 
alms giving (zakiit), which is one of the pillars of the Muslim faith, is specified to 
"consists of 2.5 per cent of the value of all accumulated wealth" of the donor (Ayoub 
1996). Thus, it is problematic to explain 20th century secularism as something really 
particular to a specific religion. 
The one's failure to find the meaning of life in the social sphere often shifts one's 
attention to the personal internaI space. Since the 1960s, people's investigating of their 
inner psyches, in order to uncover meaningful significations and deeper understanding of 
existential phenomena, has gained new momentum and scope. People have ventured to 
explore and transcend the boundaries of their consciousness with the hope of achieving a 
radical transformation of the· self; a self which will better respond to the new requirements 
of technocratic modernity. 
ISKCON is only one of many oriental religious movements which prioritize the 
importance of an ecstatic and mystical experience at the expense of modem technocratic 
rationalism. According to Pace (1993), there is a great variety of ideological approaches 
adopted by the new oriental religious movements with regards to worldview and practical 
application in life. To him the main three attitudes in terms of alternative practice are 
exemplified by the corresponding movements of Rajneesh, Sai Baba and ISKCON. These 
three attitudes can be differentiated on the basis of radicalism vis-à-vis the mainstream 
lifestyle of the adoptive society. 
ISKCON·tak.es the middle ground by being motivated to experiment with a different 
mode of salvation through individual asceticism, while remaining receptive to the rest of 
the world. At the one extreme is the practice of the Rajneesh followers with their total 
denial ofwestem culture; at the other the adepts of the Sai Baba's teaching, accepting that 
one can keep on living peacefully in this world, as long as its prevailing rationalism is 
abandoned in the name of spiritualism and,healthy naturism. 
The new eastem religions significantly reinforce the unfolding tendency of 
westemers to explore new forms of spirituality. Traditionally eastem religions consider 
the altered states of consciousness attained through difIerent kinds of yoga, mental 
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concentration and meditation as the primary means for achieving knowledge, self-
realisation and personalliberation. For the same reasons the spiritual leaders of ISKCON 
refer to Krishna Consciousness as "The Science of Self Realisation." 
3.2 Early development of Bhakti tradition 
The Hindu tradition as we know it today emerged following a major development . 
around 2nd century BC (Ratnakar 1996). The ideal that prevai1ed was that of bhakti or 
ecstatic devotion to a personal god. Bhakti involved an entirely new view of the Absolute 
and an entirely new way of realising it. 
Historically the earliest evidence of bhakti is to he found in the Up~ads. The usuaI 
word employed for expressing devotion in the Up~ads is upllsana (service, devotion). 
Bhakti is mentioned explicitly for the tirst time in Svetasvatara Up~d (6.23): 
To one who has the highest devotion (bhakti) for Gad, 
And for his spiritual teacher (guru) even as for God, 
To him these matters which have been dec1ared 
Become manifest [if he be] a great soul (mahlltman)-
Yea, become manifest [ifhe he] a great soul! 
, (Hume 1968: 411) 
The single-most important text that firmly established bhakti as the dominant Hindu 
mode of relating to the gods was the Bhagavad Gua.. The scholarly understanding is that 
the ritual and mystical traditions of Hinduism are rooted in ideas and values structurally 
opposed to each other (Eliade 1958, Krishnamurthy 1994, Ratnakar 1996). While the 
ritual tradition insists on the involvement with the world and its hierarchical organisation, 
the mystical one points towards renunciation of the world and emphasises universalism 
and monism. Ratnakar (1996) believes thatthe Bhagavad Œta was composed sometime 
about 250BC. Sargeant (1994) refers to the same period, specifying that the book was 
conceived in Epie-Purru:uc Sanskrit (500B.C. - 400A.D.), the language of the Epies, 
Purat:tas and Up~ads, and "it was probably first written down in the early centuries of. 
the Christian era through like many other works which are embodied in written fonn, it 
undoubtedly dates from an earlier word-of-mouth version (Sargeant 1944: 3)." Sargeant 
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further elaborates that Epic-PuraJ:Ùc Sanskrit is in many ways the simple st form of the 
language. Sorne occasional aorists remain (eight or ten of them in the whole Gîta) and 
sorne occasional use of the prohibitive "mll" in place of the "na" ("not") of Vedic 
Sanskrit. The typically long compounds of Classical Sanskrit, though, have not yet 
appeared. Here follows the conclusion of Sargeant: 
The Bhagavad GUa, in its written form at any rate, is generally thought to date 
from the second or third century A.D., being considered a later interpolation in the 
long Epic, the Mahabharata, most of which describean India of an earlier period, 
possibly 800B.C (Sargeant 1994: 4). 
Ratnakar (1996) compares the two competing philosophies (or traditions) at the time 
of the composition of the Bhagavad GUa to clashing armies on a battlefield, disputing the 
right to rule over the Hindu mind and heart of future generations. According to Mircea 
Eliade (1958) Krl?IJ.él attempts to solve the dilemma by showing that the two traditions, 
previously opposed, are equally valid: 
.. .it being possible for each individual to choose the method - he it action or be it 
knowledge and mystical contempation that his present karmic situation permits him 
to practice. It is here that Krl?IJ.él turns to "Yoga" - a Yoga that was not yet 
Pataftjali' s darSana, but that was equally far from being the ''magical'' Yoga referred 
to in other passages in the Mahabharata (Eliade 1958: 155). 
The resolution of that opposition offered by Lord Krl?I).a gives rise to new 
speculations and practices in which the two seemingly irreconcilable principles come to 
. coexist. Today the Bhagavad GUa is a pan-Hindu text; its authority and influence are 
based on its capacity to resolve the most essential ideological conflict of Hinduism and in 
this way to eclipse all sectarian and regional considerations as weIl. 
The context in which Krl?I).a delivers his lessons to Arjuna is the impending Battle of 
Ku.rukl?etra between the PâI).Qhavas and Kauravas, both heing cousins of one and the 
same clan. While the two great armies of cousins face each other, Arjuna realizes that his 
duty as a KJ?atriya prince to fight in righteous warfare somehow confronts his desire to 
renounce the world, rather than killing his friends, relatives and teachers. The hero-prince 
is caught between the claims of dharma of his cast and the seductive pull of renunciation, 
and he desperately turns to Krl?I).a for advice. In the spirit of Upanishadic tradition Krl?I).a 
is the charioteer of Arjuna. The popular image of the charioteer expresses the function of 
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the spiritual guide (look at Kathop~ad3.3, 4, 5). At this battle of dharma the spiritual 
guide is personified by the human form of Lord K:rl?I).a. 
Lord K.r.;;I)a himself introduced a new message in Hindu theology, the message of an 
affectionate personal God, delivered directly to the devotee. The essential framework of 
orthodox Brahmanism is preserved, but at the same time revolutionized from within. In 
the GUa (18: 47), K.r.;;I).a expounds the traditional logic based on a hierarchical social 
structure: 
Better one' s own duty, though imperfect, than the duty of another weIl performed; 
Performing the duty prescribed by one's own nature, one does not incur evil. 
(Sargeant1994: 708) 
The acceptance of social hierarchy is asserted right from the beginning and 
maintained to the end of the Gna. But then ~ puts forward the remarkable new 
propositic:)fl, which is the essential message of the GUa - the doctrine of motiveless action. 
One should observe one's dharma, with complete disregard for the consequences: 
. 
Your right is to action alone; never to its fruits at any time. 
Never should the fruits of action be your motive; 
never let there be attachment to inaction in you. 
(Sargeant 1 ~94: 132) 
Finally Kr~I).a argues that the disinterestedness he is advocating is possible only through 
an unconditional surrender of the self to a God from whom all things and all beings have 
emanated and through whom they subsist and perish. The purity of the motive itself 
should not he guaranteed by vigilance, introspection, and ascetic austerities~ but by the 
surrender of the ego in the abandon of devotion, to a personal deity who is nevertheless 
responsible for everything in the world. If bhakti is sufficient to remove one' s own ego 
and one's desires as motives for action, then whatever one might do will be in fact God 
acting through him: 
. He who is free from wants, pure, capable, disinterested, free from anxiety. 
Who has abandoned all undertakings and is devoted to Me, is dear to Me. 
(Sargeant 1994: 523) 
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The most important purâ..t).ic source for the GaU(;iIya Vai~J).avas and the 'Rare Krishna 
Movement by far is the Bhagavata Pur~a. The setting of the Bhagavata Purru:aa precedes 
the famous battle described in Bhagavad Gita when ~J).a expounds bis message of 
Yoga. The most popular and influential part of this work for the Hare Krishna Movement 
is the tenth canto, wbich gives in detail the early life of ~J).a during bis descent to earth. 
In the eroticism of the expression of love for ~l)a is found one of literature's most 
impassioned symbols of souls searching, longing for, and finding the love of God (Judah 
1974: 30). 
The growth in popularity of Va~J).avism can perhaps be measured by the increase of 
Va~t:lava inscriptions during the Gupta period, wbich began in the fourth century A.D. 
The epigraphs range from invocations to V ~J).ava deities to grants made to various 
temples for their repair or maintenance. At the same time, images of V a~l)ava deities, 
which had begun to appear about the second century S.C., began to increase in 
complexity of iconographie forms, as though in rhythm with the developing philosophy. 
The blending of tantric and Sakta elements into V a~J).avism, which had also begun in the 
KW?ana period, continued. These elements, emphasizing the female energy of the deity in 
personalized form, received veneration of devotees. Not until the late fifth century A.D., 
however, did Sri L~nü appear as the power (SakÙ) of V~t:lu, through whom he acts to 
create and destroy the worlds (Judah 1974: 31). 
It was also durîng the Gupta period that epigraphic evidence reveals the great cosmic 
proportions that Kr~J).a had attained. The earliest ofVa~J).ava inscriptions (A.D. 404), 
after giving an invocation to V~J).u, describes Vasudeva (~J).a) as the abode of the 
whole universe, immeasurable, unbom, and all powerful. Coins of this period bearing 
symbols and emblems of a religious nature are evidenee that a number of the Gupta 
monarchs patronized one or another of the Va~J).ava deities; sorne took the title parama 
blulgavata, highest or chief bhiigavata (divine). 
By the sixth eentury A.D .. Va~J).avism had spread to Assam and Bengal. Bengal 
became one of its greatest strongholds; one finds there many sixth - to ninth-century 
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sculptures depicting the various sports (Wil) of Kr~t:ta (JaiswalI967: 29-30, 108, 192, 195, 
198). 
In expanding into the Tamil's land in the South,. Va~t:tavism was influenced by a 
group of gurus known as the Alvars, whom modem scholarship has placed in the period 
between the middle of the seventh and the middle of the ninth centuries A.D. The 
traditional date for the earliest Alvars is 4203 B.C. Their doctrine that all beings should 
regard themselves as women in their love for God was later to be echoed in the 
philosophy and devotion of Chaitanya (Dasgupta 1940: 64, 68). Thus SaUtakopa, one of 
the Alvars, "conceived himself as a woman longing for her lover and entirely dependent 
on him" (Ibid.: 70). His feelings of anguish and longing over being separated from God 
are echoed in sunilar expressions by Chaitanya. 
At sorne point of the twelfth century, Ramanuja originated the Sri V ~t:tava sect, the 
first of the important V ai~t:tava groups that have continued to the present day. His 
philosophy, known as Visi$tâdvaita Vedilnta, is a qualified monism, in opposition to the 
advaita Vedonta, which is best characterised by the popular school of 5at:tkara. Ramanuja 
viewed the soul as an individual part of God, which retained its individuality when 
liberated, rather than becoming merged into the Absolute, as the system -of Sat:tkara would 
imply. The system also requires a complete surrender to God in his personal aspect, a 
doctrine that Ramanuja derived chiefly from the Alvars (Judah 1974: 32). 
In the thiiteenth century appeared the sect founded by Madhva, who propounded a 
philosophical dualism. It was the first to be based on Kr~t:ta' s lïlil at V rindavan. As it 
depended heavily on the Bhagavata Purat:ta, there was no place for Radha in his system. 
The next sect to develop, the V~t:tuswamins, have almost disappeaied today. Although 
their views were basically similar to those of Madhva, they extended their devotion to 
Radha as weIl as to Kr~t:ta (Ibid.). 
Nimbarka formed a new Va~t:tava sect in the thirteenth century. His philosophy was 
dvaitâdvaita or a dualistic monism; like the bhedâbheda system of Chaitanya, it held that 
God was at the same time one with and yet separate from each soul. Nimbarka moved 
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one step doser to Chaitanya's philosophy by conceiving ofRadha as the consort of Kr$1)a 
(Ibid.). 
3.3 Bhakti tradition under the star of Chaitanya 
Chaitanya Mahaprabhu was bom in F ebruary, 1486 to the pious VaÏ!?1)ava family of 
Jagaimath MiSra and his wife, Sacru Devi. Although affectionately known in his youth as 
Nirnai, his given name was ViSvambhara. As a boy he was full of mischief, but showed 
himself to be of above average intelligence. He became proficient in his studies, while 
enjoying the social privileges ofhis Brahmincaste (Ibid.: 33). 
When his father died Chaitanya was fourteen or fifteen years old. The boy assumed 
responsibility for his mother, became a householder, and married Lak$nü, the daughter of 
a Brahmin scholar. Then he started his own school, and attracted many pupils. Chaitanya 
was successful as a promising scholar, but according to his early biographers had no 
inclination toward religious studies and appeared to be rather proud and arrogant. The 
death of his tirst wife by snakebite may have been the turning point in his life, because 
despite the quickly arranged second marriage by his mother, his union to ViS1)upriya was 
short-lived as he renounced the life of a householder completely. 
During a pilgrimage to Gaya, made when he was twenty-one or twenty-two, he met 
the famous ascetic, ÏSvara Puri, who became his guru and gave him a ten-syllable Kr$1)a 
mantra to chant. Chaitanya retumed coinplete1y changed - he was a bhakta, a devotee, 
entire1y dedicated to Kr$1)a. He no longer cared about his persona! appearance or about 
his work. Sorne considered him mad, so intense was his devotion for Kr$1)a. Often he 
would go into mystic trance; at tirnes he raved and chanted Kr$1)a'S name continuously. 
Sometimes he would cry or faint, and his teaching suffered to such an extent that he had 
to discontinue the school. He next organized saitkïrtans, often dancing and singing on the 
village streets, and he preached a message of univer~al love (Adhikary 1995: 49; 
, . . 
Mukherjee 1970: 4-9; Kennedy 1925: 11-29; De 1961: 76-77). 
The saitklrtans were received with mixed emotions by the townspeople. Sorne of the 
Brahmins were very jealous, so they fma1ly took the matter before the Kazi, the Muslim 
magistrate of Navadvipa, presenting the saitklrtans as a public nuisance. The magistrate 
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took the complaints . of the Brahmins seriously and at first warned the followers of 
Chaitanya not to chant the name of Krl?l)él loudly. The Vall?IJ.avas disobeyed the order of 
the Kazi and he was forced to send constables who interrupted a sailkïrtan and broke sorne 
of the kilO/es (drums). The magistrate also threatened to punish anybody who would host 
the party of nl1masailklrtana in his house. Then, Chaitanya quietly organized a mammoth, 
non-violent mass demonstration, without breaking the law. He is the pioneer of the civil 
disobedience movement not only in India, but possibly in the world; The magistrate had 
to recognize the peaceful and religious nature of the activity, got converted by Chaitanya 
and took part bimself (Adhikary 1995: 52). 
To increase bis movement, Chaitanya became initiated as a sailnyasin or holy man of 
the Bharati order, and received the name of Sri Kr~IJ.a Caitanya (Divine Krishna 
Consciousness). Having decided to leave bis native town he left Bengal, and at the 
request of bis mother he made bis permanent home in Puri in Orissa. There he converted 
the famous Vedantist, Sarvabhauma, thus gai~g the full respect and support from the 
King of Orissa and establishing a strong future for Chaitanyaism there (Judah 1974: 35). 
Shortly thereafter Chaitanya began a pilgrimage of almost two years to the south. 
During thls time he is said to have performed miracles and made many conversions 
through bis lectures and bis contagious devotion. Chaitanya spent the rest of bis life in 
Puri, leaving it only twice. Accompanied by a few chosen disciples, he spent bis time in 
. . 
devotion to K.r.?l)él, and never again saw bis wife or bis mother. In the last few years of bis 
stay in thls world, he experienced profound ecstatic symptoms. For ex ample, bis bodily 
limbs would periodically recede into bis body and then .expand again, like a turtle's limbs 
into its shell, as he cried uncontrollably in love for Krl?l)él. According to Gaudya 
taxonomy, such symptoms only manifest in the twelfth stage of mahiibhiiva - an exalted 
level of devotion, rarely acbieved (Rosen 2004: 70). 
He thus spent the final eighteen years of bis life inPuri, after wbich he left tbis world 
in 1534, at age of forty-eight. Perhaps he drowned in the sea during a trance state, as has 
been suggested. In bis Caitanya Mangala, Jayananda attributes the disappearance of 
Chaitanya to a wound in bis foot by a stone, wbich caused fever and death (Kennedy 
1925: 39, 46-51; De 1961: 84, 90-97). According to Adhikary (1995) when he was 
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dancing during singing, in the Car Festival in the month of Asharh, bis left big toe was 
suddenly pierced by a brick lying on the road. He developed a temperature, bis whole 
body was swollen, and he died two days later, during the day of Akshay tritia. From tbis 
description, it appears that he died of gas gangrene. His body was buried within the 
temple in a place called 'Kaili Vaikuntha' according to a plan made between Roy 
-
Ramananda and King Pratap Rudra and other few close advisers. The news was kept 
secret for a few reasons,' the important one of which was to avoid the political tension 
between Bengàl and Orissa. It was announced that the body of Chaitanya blended with 
the shrine of Jagannatha (Adhikary 1995: 59). 
.. 
According to another view Chaitanya was killed by Vidyadhar who wanted to 
capture power from King Pratap Rudra. Being loyal to the King, Chaitanya was perceived 
as a great political obstacle. Chaitanya was killed within the temple by Vidyadhar and bis 
close associates, bis body was buried there and for their own safety, they had to declare 
that Jagannatha bimselfwas too pleased with bis prayer and engulfed bis body (Ibid.: 60). 
3.4 Later development ofChaitanya's Vai~:r;tavism 
Immediately after the death of Chaitanya, bis Moyement declined. The sound of the 
sailkïrtan that had flooded the countryside was not heard on the banks of the Ganges for 
sorne time. During this period of decline, however, the lines of descent were established. 
Nityananda and Advaitacarya, were considered Gosw(lmis or gurus, and passed their titles 
and privileges on to their descendents. 
Although Chaitanya leftthe later development of bis movement and the formulation 
of bis pbilosophy in written form to bis disciples, bis contribution to bhakti pbilosophy is 
unquestionable. His cbief ability was to convert and inspire capable men to carry out bis 
ideas and wishes. His close disciple Advaitacarya worked to propagate the faith, but 
because of bis advanced age he was not as effective as the equally revered Nityananda 
(Judah 1974: 37). 
NityanaIida carried out to the letter Chaitanya' s injunction to regard all people as 
spiritually equal, and admitted many low caste people to the Movement (Kennedy 1925: 
61-63), thus causing rifts between himself and Advaitàcàrya. Vïrabhadra, the son of 
Nityananda, continued bis father's work of admitting low caste and outcaste devotees to 
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the Movement. Perhaps the most important of these were 2500 male and female 
mendicants, remnants of a decadent Buddhist order, the Nera-Neris, who were living as 
outcastes in the Hindu community (Ibid.). 
The seventeenth century saw a period of renewal of the Chaitanya faith, due to the 
influence of three men: Srïnivasa acarya, Narottama Datta, and Syamananda Das. AU 
three had studied under one of Chaitanya's disciples and at Vrndavan. AH of them 
converted wealthy rajas like Vira Hamvira and Rasika Murari thus providing the money 
and influence needed to aid the spread of the Movement. During this period the poems 
and songs of Acyutananda, Balarama, Jagaimatha, Ananta, Yasovanta, and Chaitanya 
popularized the work of these three men. The strong feeling of the people for Chaitanya 
there even today owe much to the work'ofthese poets of Orissa, who are known as the six 
Dosas (Kennedy 1925: 69-78). 
The next two centuries again saw a decline in V a~navism, until a graduai renewal 
began to be noticed in Bengal in the mid-nineteenth century. The popularity of the 
Brahma Samaj, a Hindu reform movement, may have contributed to this reawakened 
interest during the third quarter of the nineteenth century (Ibid.). 
3.5 The Gauc;liya VaÎl?navas and the International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness 
The GaUl;lïya V a~Dava Mission, established by Bhaktivinode Thakur in 1886, had 
the formal name of Sri ViSva Va~nav Raj Sabha. This association of Va~I;lavas is 
interested in propagating Chaitanya's philosophy and practices, and c1aims descent from 
its founder, Jïva Gosvami, one of Chaitanya's "six Gosvamis." Bhaktivinode was a city 
magistrate in the city of Puri in Orissa and the superintendent of the JagéU'matha temple. 
His son, Sri Srimad Bhakti SiddhantaGosvami, had been a prof essor of mathematics and 
astronomy before his renunciation. Thereafter, he continued his father's work of 
revitalizing VaiSI'tavism and informing the English-speaking world of Chaitanya's 
message during the first half ofthis century. He founded the Gauçlïya Math Institute for 
teaching Krishna Consciousness in 1918, and during his life established sixty-four 
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missions (Ray, 1965:64; Rack to Godhead, 1967: 28). One of his disciples was A.C. 
Bhaktivedanta Svarni Prabhupada, whose efforts have had such a marked influence on 
the American youth of the counterculture. 
A.C. Bhaktivedanta Svarni Prabhupada, or "Prabhupad," as he is affectionately 
called by his devotees, was born as Abhay Charan De in Calcutta in 1896. After being 
graduated from the· University of Calcutta with majors in English, philosophy, and 
economics, he worked as manager of a chemical finn until his retirement in 1954. His 
missionary work, however, was foreshadowed as early as 1922, when he first met Bhakti 
Siddhanta. Bhakti Siddhânta became his spiritual master, and gave him the idea of 
spreading Chaitanya's message throughout the world. After Abhay Charan De's formaI 
initiation took place at Allahabad in 1933, shortly before his spiritual master's death in 
1936, Bhakti Siddhanta ordered him to carry the teaching of Krishna Consciousness to 
the Western world (Judah 1974: 41). 
In 1947 the Gau<;lIya Va~:r:tava recognized De as Bhaktivedanta. In 1959 he took 
sarmyl1sa, the religious order marking one's total renunciation of life for devotion to God 
(Bhaktivedanta, 1968a: xiii). He also left his house to live in Vrndavan, where he made 
many friends, acquaintances and disciples, sorne ofthem,quite wealthy and influential. At 
this stage he thought seriously, about the request his spiritual master made, forty years 
ago, to spread Chaitanyas' message through the world: 
1 thought that Bhakti Siddhânta Sarasvatl Goswarni wanted me to preach this 
cult - not only he, but before that Bhaktivinode Thakur wanted this cult to be 
preached all over, especially in the Western countries. 1 did not carry out his order. 
And my brothers - God brothers - are now engaged in litigation, and they are not 
pushing forward this movement. So after my retirement 1 began thinking of coming 
to the Western countries (Judah 1974: 41). 
\ 
Svami Prabhupada was favoured by one of his disciples, the owner of a merchant 
ship company. He was given free passage in a cargo ship named 'Jaladuta' by the Scindia 
Steamship Company. He arrived at Commonwealth Pier, on September 17, 1965. On 
his arrival in New York, Swarni Prabhupada began chanting the names of Krishna while 
sitting beneath a tree in Tompkins Park on the Lower East Side. He soon attracted 
followers, many of them hippies. Conversions took place. The flrst center of the 
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International Society for Krishna Consciousness opened in New York in 1966. The 
beginning of a temple in San Francisco's Haight-Ashbwy district followed in 1967. From 
then on the movement continued to spread (Judah 1974: 42). 
3.6 Conclusion 
As it became evident from that chapter, ISKCON represents the latest development 
of Bhakti tradition, which is deeply rooted in lndia and could be traced back to the 2nd 
centwy BC (Eliade 1958, Krishnamurthy 1994, Sargeant 1994, Ratnakar 1996). One of 
the most important dates for the Krishna Consciousness movement is that of the birth·of 
Lord Chaitanya, who revitalised the Bhakti tradition during bis lifetime in the 15tp. 
centwy and to a great extent outlined the ways of active devotion and practice. Since then 
fo~ the peoples of South India the tradition of Bhakti is mostly associated \Vith the name 
of Lord Krishna. 
After the death of Chaitanya bis Bhakti movement experienced several periods of 
decline and revival. The most important renewal periods of Chaitanya' s faith are the one 
during the 17th centwy led by Srïnivàsa acarya, Narottama Datta, and Syamananda Dàs 
and the period greatly influenced by Bhaktivinode Thakur in the latel9th centwy. The 
son of Thakur, Sn SrImad Bhakti Siddhanta Gosvami, successfully kept on and passed 
the spirit of the faith to the founder- acarya of the nowdays movement in the west A.C. 
Bhaktivedanta Svami Prabhupada. 
The ISKCON movement was initiated in 1965 within the context of the 
secularization of the post-war world. The begining was in New York, San Francisco, and 
Montreal in North America; it later spread further in Western Europe and slowly in the 
rest of the world. During the last 16-17 years the process has gained momentum in East 
Europe as weIl, following the deep political and social changes after the fall of the 
comunÏsm (Burkhard 1987, Beyer 1998, Altglas 2002). ISKCON represents one ofthose 
new religious movements led by charismatic gurus and stressing an experience wbich is 
personalised on an affective emotional ~evel (Bruce 1996; Hervieu-Léger 1990). 
Nowadays the presence of ISKCON in the "global ecumene" (Hannerz 1992) is 
pronouncedly tangible (over 200 temples and farms in sixty countries [Gruson 1988]) 
and undisputable. As it is weIl expounded by Burr (1984), ISKCON's main "attraction is 
34 
that it has its feet in both camps - both eastern and western culture." The movement 
presents meaningfu1 opportunities for the global Asian community to negotiate the 
incompatibilities of its own religion and values with those of the western culture. While 
the Asian community provides ISKCON with service infrastructure, fmancial support and 
expertise, the movement pays back with prestige, recognition and legitimisation of 
cultural values. 
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Chapter IV The Notion of Subject in traditional theistic and modem secular 
thought 
4.1 Introduction . 
One must, tbrougbout one's entire 
lire, be one's own project. 
Foucault 1982 
According to Foucault (1997, 1998b) and Balibar (1994) spirituality is defined as the 
pursuit, practice, and experience through which the subject carries out the necessary 
transformations on himself in order to have access to the truth. The pursuits, practices, 
and experiences could be renunciations, purifications, ascetic exercises, conversions of 
ways of looking, modifications of existence etc., which are done not in exchange for 
knowledge, but offered by the subject as a priee to be paid for the access to knowledge 
alone. 
Foucault stresses the importance of the fact that "throughout Antiquity (in the 
Pythagoreans, Plato, the Stoics, Cynics, Epicureans, and Neo-Platonists), the 
philosophical theme and the question of spirituality were never separate" (Foucault 
2005: 17). Another important point is that there is someone, who is called "the" 
philosopher by many, to begin with by Aquinas, by dint of being "the only philosopher in 
Antiquity for whom the question of spirituality was least important; the philosopher 
whom we have recognised as the founder of philosophy in the modem sense of the term: 
Aristotle" (Ibid.). What really matters in this case is that Aristotle is not the pinnacle of 
Antiquity, but only its exception - a fact by itself being far from sufficient for 
establishing the exclusivity and importance of that philosopher. 
In the modem age, says Foucault, it is assumed that what gives access to the truth, the 
condition for the subject' s access to truth, is knowledge (connaissance) and knowledge 
alone. Foucault names that assumption the "Cartesian moment", explicitly stating, 
though, that Decartes was not the inventor of that specifie access to truth or the frrst to 
claim this. In particular the modem age of the history of truth begins when knowledge 
itself and knowledge·alone gives access to the truth (Ibid.). 
The idea is that the scientist (the philosopher or simply sorne one who seeks the truth) 
can recognise the truth and have access to it in himself and solely by his activity of 
knowing, without the necessity of any personal change, or sorne other demand being 
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imposed on him. Certainly, there are sorne conditions, but they are strictly formal, 
objective conditions, like the structure of the object to be known and the formaI mIes of 
method. However, in any case, the conditions of the subject's access to the truth are 
defmed within knowledge, while the other conditions are only extrinsic, like the cultural 
or mOl7al conditions. The cultural requirements are that we need education, and we have to 
operate within a certain scientific consensus, while according to the moral ones we must 
make an effort, and avoid deceiving our world. Further we have to combine the interest of 
financial reward, career, and status in a way that is fully compatible with the norms of 
disinterested research (Ibid.: 18) 
4.2 The western notion of the self-governing subject 
Foucault identifies Christian theology as the agent responsible for the modem attitudé 
regarding the knowing subject, founded on Aristotle by Aquinas and the scholastics. 
Christian theology claims to be a rational reflection and qualifies faith as universal 
, 
vocation. That theology also represents the knowing subject as one finding absolute 
fulfilment and the highest degree of perfection in God, who is his creator and so his 
model. There is a correspondence between an omniscient God and subjects capable of 
knowledge, conditional on faith. Thus one of the main elements leading Western thought, 
or its princip le forms of reflection, is to extricate and separate, to free itself from ''the 
conditions of spirituality that had previously accompanied it and for which the epimeleia 
heautou (caring for the self) was the most general expression" (Ibid.). 
On the other side, notes Foucault, most of nineteenth century philosophy: Hegel, 
Schelling, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Husserl and the 20th century Martin Heidegger 
consider knowledge (connaissance), or the activity of knowing, still linked. to the 
requirements of spirituality. In all the se philosophies, a certain structure of spirituality 
tries to link knowledge and the conditions and the effects of the activity of knowing to a 
transformation in the subject's being; the example given is Hegel's Phenomenology of 
Spirit (1979). Foucault points to a certain pressure or resurgence of the structures of 
spirituality quite noticeable in the field of knowledge (savoir) strictly speaking. As all 
scientist say, we can recogriize a false science "by the fact that access to it requires the 
subject's conversion and that it promises enlightenment for the subject at the end of its 
development" (Ibid.: 28). 
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The important thing to notice is that in those fonns ofknowledge (savoir) that are not 
exactly sciences, and which we should not seek to assimilate to the structure of science, 
there is again the clear presence of at least certain elements and requirements of 
spirituality. Foucault identifies as such forms of knowledge (savoir) both Marxism and 
psychoanalysis, but· warns against confounding them with religion and spirituality. In 
both Marxism and psychoanalysis we can witness the problem of what is at stake in the 
subject's being, and the question of what are the subject's aspects that might be 
transfonned by virtue of his access to the truth. The point is that neither of these two 
fonns ofknowledge has openly considered the old and fundamental question of epimeleia 
heautou clearly and willingly (Ibid.: 29). 
There has been an attempt to conceal the conditions of spirituality specific to these 
fonns of knowledge within a number of ~ocial fonns. The conditions of class position, 
school or party membership, allegiance to a group etc., refer back to the questions of the 
condition of the subject's preparation for access to the truth, but conceived of in tenns of 
social organization. What really matters, according to Foucault, is whether 
psychoanalysis poses "in its own tenns, that is to say in tenns of the effects of knowledge 
(connaissance), the question of the relations of the subject to truth, which by definition-
from the point of view of spirituality, and anyway of the epimeleia heautou - cannot be 
posed in ternis of connaissance" (Ibid.: 30). 
4.3 The Indian concept of subjectivity according to Vedic and Vai~t:lava traditions. 
In India, the first elaborate explanation of human being as structured of different 
elements of nature can be dated as far back as the TaittiIiya Up~ad. Nature is 
Brahman or Atman itself and in its unfolding materiality leads to the final manifestation 
of man: 
From this soul (lltman), verily, space (llkllsa) arose; from space, wind (vllyu); from 
wind, fire; from fire, water; from water, the earth; from the earth, herbs; from herbs, 
food; from food, semen; from semen, the person (puru~a). This verily, is the person 
that consists of the essence of food. This indeed, is his head; this, the right side; 
this, the left side; this, the body (lltman); this, the 10wer part, the foundation. 
(Hume 1968: 283-4; TaittiIiya Up~ad 2, 1). 
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Man is built of five kosas (sheaths): annamaya kosa (sheath composed of food), prii1Jllmaya 
koSil (sheath composed of vital energy), manomaya kosa (sheath composed of mind), 
vijniinamaya kosa (sheath composed of intelligence), and anandamaya koSil (sheath 
composed ofbliss). The sheaths repeat the shape of man at the level of the corresponding 
energy (Ibid.: 2, 2-5). 
Although Âtman itself, the human being IS always immersed in maya - the 
"illusionary" materiality of creation. In the Kath0panU?ad the Self is referred to as 
Âtman, who is in the position of the master of a chariot (the human body), while the 
"pure discriminating intellect" is the charioteer, the mind serves as reins; the senses are 
harnessed as horses, and their sense objects are the roads to travel (Kath0panU?ad 3, 3-4). 
The goal of man is to transcend worldly preoccupations and to attain the final liberation 
from the insane cycle of birth and death. The way to attain the goal is to apply "correct 
understanding" and "right discrimination" while being on the road of the material 
existence: 
He, however, who has not understanding, 
Who is unmindful and ever impure, 
Reaches not the goal, 
But goes on to reincarnation (sathsl1ra) 
He, however, who has understanding, 
Who is mindful and ever pure, 
Reaches the goal 
From which he is bom no more. 
(Hume 1968: 352; KathopanU?ad 3, 7-8). 
Io the South Asian and to the Hindu sensitivity in particular, a person represents 
itself as a flow of various streams of substances, rather than a bounded, fixed entity. The 
Hindu understanding of life does not divide the universe into separate realms of spirit and 
matter, but perceives it as composed of "coded substances" (Marri ott 1989). According to 
Marriott the South Asian person is a "dividual," who is "permeable, composite, partly 
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divisible, and transmissible" in opposition to the Western idea for the separate, 
autonomous "individual," who is distinctively apart from others (Marriott 1976b: 194). 
The South Asian person cannot be defined otherwise but in the context of permanent 
relations with others: a family, a clan, a lineage, a caste etc. The Hindu subject always 
interacts with others by "sending bits of him - or herself off in the form of gross bodily 
substances such as the voice, the gaze, or the bits of the self that are incorporated into the 
food that one cooks" (Leavitt 1988: 84). In addition ancient lndian thought c10sely 
associated a dermite pattern of behaviour or conduct with a specific place or region. 
Olive lIe (1993) gives example of that tendency with Baudhayana Dharmasütral.1.2.9-
12, which associates the region of north-central lndia called Aryavarta ("region of the 
Aryas") with customs "to be regardedas authoritative on questions of dharma" (Olivelle 
1993: 18). 
To Olivelle (1993), based on the close association between place of habitation and 
way of life, llsrama means the life of those who live in llsramas, and conversely "the modes 
of life Qf those belonging to the llsramas of student, householder, and h~rmit are often 
referred to by their respective residences: teacher's house, home, forest or wilderness" 
(Ibid.). Olivelle explains as weIl that the verb "vas ("to dweIl") is regularly used with 
reference to the pursuance of an llsrama, reinforcing again the association between 
conduct and place. The Mahabharata (3.134.10), for example, caUs the four llsramas "four 
houses" (niketana) -:- the fourth one not mentioned previously was the lJsrama of 
renouncer. 
According to the most ancient formulation of the system presented in the 
Dharmasütras, the lJsramas are not stages but rather permanent modes of life open to any 
young adult who bas completed bis period of Vedic education. Witbin this formulation 
the temporary period of studentship following Vedic initiation was not considered an 
llSrama. It was four or five centuries later, around the, beginning of the Common Er'a, that 
the classical formulation of the system appeared, and it was only within that formulation 
that the llsramas came to he considered stages of life thfough wbich a person was expected 
to pass (Olivelle 1993). 
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The totality of the BrahmaJ)ical dharmtl (order, duty) is often referred to simply as 
Van;tasramadharma, an expression that modern scholars and native interp~eters alike 
have seen as the closest approximation within the tradition to what we have come to caU 
Hinduism: "Even now," observes the eminent lndian sociologist G. S. Ghurye (1964), 
"van:tasramadhanna, duties (dharma) of castes and llsramas, is almost another name for 
Hinduism" (Ghurye 1964: 4). To the great scholar and saint in the ~~ conscious 
tradition Bhaktivinoda Thaküra (1838-1914) the van:uz system naturally occurs in all 
societies: 
When we consider the modem societies of Europe, whatever beauty exists in 
these societies depends upon the natural varn,llsrama that exists within them. In 
Europe, those who have the nature of traders are fond of trading and thereby 
advance themselves by trade. Those who have the nature of ~atriyas adopt the 
military life, and those who have the nature of südras love doing menial service 
('lhaküra 1974: 107). 
Bhaktivinoda criticises the prevailing cast system of modern lndia because of its 
insistence on birth as the selective criterion of one's van:uz. To him the original van:uz 
system was pure and based on scientific (vaijiil1nika) principles. In the following 5000 
years (roughly) after the time of Maht1bht1rata the system had become corrupt and deviated 
from its original purpose, that is, to help people gradually develop love of God. The same 
applies to the today's Western societies; their natural van:uz system is far from heing a 
scientific (vaijiillnika) varn.llsrama. Here is the brief summary of the Vedic perspective 
according to Bhaktivinoda '[haküra : 
1. Van:uz shouid be determined by studying the nature of a child after examining 
a child's associations and tendency toward learning during childhood. 2. At the time 
of selecting van.za there should he sorne consideration of the van.za of the mother and 
the father. 3. Van.za shouid he determined, at the time of education, by the family 
priest, father, respectable seniors, and spiritual preceptor. 4. In case of dispute, there 
should be a two-year trial period and a review committee to examine the case after 
thattime (Ibid.: 117). 
According to Kr$I)a Consciousness theology man's true nature is spirit. While part of 
Kr$I)a, he is in a conditioned state witha material body. Since both spirit and matter are 
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rooted in Krl?:r::ta's nature, however, they are not to be considered as unreal, but as covered 
over by illusory mIlyl1. Man bas five component parts: The Supersoul, the individual sou!, 
the material body, Time, and activities. Four of these are etemally related to Kr~t:ta 
(Bhaktivedanta 1968b). 
The Supersoul, the paramatman, exists in each living entity as Vi.:?:r::tu. According to 
Swami Bhaktivedanta, the practice of yoga is meant to discover this localized aspect of 
Vi.:?t:tu within one's heart (Bhaktivedanta 1968b: 157-158). It is in the capacity of the 
Supersou! that ~t:ta acts as the inner controller of man's actions. Although Krl?t:ta is the 
controller, as Vi.:?t:tu he allows man certain freedoms. If man wants to gratify his senses, 
he is free to do so, but he must pay the consequent priée for that. In fact it is said that 
Krt;;t:ta "created this material world for the satisfaction ofV.i:?t:tu" (Ibid.: 94). 
The individual sou! (jïva) and the source of man's consciousness is both one with and 
yet distinct from the Supersou!. Man's sou! is qualitatively one with Krt;;t:ta as part of his 
marginal energy (jïva-Sakti), but quantitatively Îs atomic in sÎZe. It is called his marginal 
energy because it is intennediate between his internaI and external potencies, his higher 
and lower energies (Ibid.). 
The sou! is the proprietor of its own material body, but Krt;;t:ta is the proprietor of all. 
The conditioned soul, although transcendental, is trapped in material existence. Its natural 
body is subject to the three modes of nature according to its karma. Man's false ego, his 
intelligence, the five senses, and the mind are all representations of material conceptions. 
Taken together they are all part of man's material body, which is a nonpennanent entity 
composed of prakriti (material nature) (Bhaktivedanta, 1972b: 622-623, 625-626, 628); 
Bhakti Siddhanta, 1967 : 99-100). 
The living entity, or soul, is composed of superior pralqiti. There is also inferior 
prakriti, which is Kr~t:ta's lower material nature. Material nature is energy that is separated 
from Kr~t:ta, while the living entities are unseparated energy, and are eternally related. 
Another difference between the higher' and lower pra1qiti is that the fonner has 
consciousness similarto Kr~t:ta' s but never as expanded (Bhaktivedanta 1972b). 
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Man's consciousness is perverted because of his material conditioning, whereas 
Krl?t:;ta even during a descent is unaffected by matter. Because of our conditioned 
consciousness we identify ourselves with our material bodies. We believe that we are 
enjoyers and are lords of the material world, when it is Krl?t:;ta who is enjoyer and creator. 
The road to liberation from this conditioned state is bhakti, which is said to purify our 
activities because devotion to Krl?t:;ta is transcendental to material conditioning. According 
to Bhaktivedanta this is the first step to be taken (Bhaktivedanta, 1972b: 8-11). 
Eternal Time is another element of man composed of the three different combinations 
of material modes or gul'Jas: goodness (sattva), passion (rajas), and ignorance (tamas). 
These modes of matter cause activities (karma), the last component part of man, to come 
into being. AlI of man's component parts, with the exception of karma, are eternally 
related to Kr1?:r:ta. Because he has this partly material nature in his present state, he is 
conditioned by these three material modes. The mode of sattva, being the purest, frees 
one from sinful reactions. It gives man a sense of happiness and allows him to develop 
knowledge. This very achievement, however, keeps him bound and prevents his 
liberation. 
The second mode of rajas develops in him a desire for material enjoyment, such as a 
wife, children, and a home, as well as honour in society; it gets him to work hard to 
achieve his goal. As a result, he again becomes attached by becoming too c10sely 
associated with the fruits of his work. The mode tamas leads to degradation and madness. 
According toBhaktivedanta this is best exemplified by people working hard to 
accumulate money with little care for the eternal spirit. The mode of goodness leads to 
rebirth on a higher planet; the mode of passion brings one back to reengage in more 
activities for their rewards; but the mode of ignorance allows the possibility of rebirth as 
an animal (Bhaktivedanta 1968: 265-268). 
Man is conditioned in life to enjoy or suffer the fruits of his actions according the 
laws of his material nature. Although the Supersoul çmploys a certain grace by giving 
him directions on how to act, the living entity being controlled by his karma forgets how 
to behave properly. Frustration is always the reward for the wrong choices made, which 
leads to endless wandering from life to life until a time arrives when he is in the mode of 
goodness and decides to end his bondage through bhakti (Ibid.: 26-28) 
4.4 Epimeleia heautou and gnothi seauton 
The art of living (biotic, hë biotiki) is more like 
wrestling than dancing, in that you must stay on 
guard and steady on your feet against the blows 
which rain down on you, and without warning. 
Mark Aurelius, Meditations VII. 61 
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According to Foucault (2005) the expression "caring for the self' emerges and 
appears in Plato with the dialogue Alcibiades, but the practice or the set of practices in 
which the care for the self will appear has actually its roots in very old techniques and 
modalities of experience established well before Plato and Socrates. Well before these 
philosophers there was "an entire technology of the self related to knowledge (savoir), 
whether this involved particular bodies ofknowledge (connaissance) or overall access to 
truth itself' (Ibid.: 46). 
First tl.lere are rites of purification: without being purified one cannot have access to 
the gods, cannot make sacrifices, cannot face the oracle and understan,d what s(he) says, 
and cannot benefit from a dream which will enlighten one through ambiguous but 
decipherable signs. The practice of purification is well attested for a long period 
extending through the Classical, Hellenistic Greece and the Roman world as well. This is 
a preliminary rite not only before contact with gods, but also with the truth they may 
vouchsafe us (Ibid.: 47). 
Another important technique is the one ~or the concentration of the soul, given that 
the soul is something mobile. The soul or the breath is something easily disturbed and 
over which the outside can exercise a hold. Needless to say this could be dangerous and is 
something to be avoided at any cost. The pneuma, or the breath, is to be protected from· 
external dangers such as something or someone attempting to have a hold over it. The 
dispersal of the breath at the moment of death is to be avoided too. One must therefore 
concentrate the pneuma, gather it up, unite and condense it in itself in order to give it a 
solidity, which will enable the sou! to last, to endure and hold up through life and not be 
scattered even at the arrivaI of death (Ibid.). 
Another procedure falling under these technologies of the self is the technique of 
withdrawal (retraite), for which the Greek tenn is anakhorësis (withdrawal or 
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disengagement from the world). This archaic technique of the self is understood as a 
particular way of detaching and absenting oneself from the world in which the self is 
immersed, but doing so "on the spot" - somehow breaking contact with the external 
world, no longer feeling sensations, no longer being disturbed by everything taking place 
around the self. One should act as if one no longer sees what is there in front of his or her 
eyes. This is the technique of the visible absence. While you are there, visible to the eyes 
of the others, you are actually absent, elsewhere (Ibid.: 48). 
Another example is the practice of endurance, which is linked, moreover~ to the 
concentration of the soul and to the withdrawal (anakhorësis) into oneself. The 
concentration and withdrawal into oneself enables one either to bear painful and hard 
ordeals or to resist temptations one may encounter. 
Most of those techniques were alreadyintegrated within the well-known spiritual, 
religious, or philosophical movement of Pythagoreanism with its ascetic components. 
One of the self-techniques practiced in Pythagoreanism was, for example, the purifying 
preparation for the dream. Since dreaming while you sleep is, for the Pythagoreans, to be 
in contact with a divine world, which is the world of immortality, beyond death, and also 
the world of truth, you must prepare yourself for the dream. Among the preparations are 
those of listening to music, inhaling perfumes, and also, of course, examination of 
conscience. Reviewing the whole of one's day, recalling the faults you have committed, 
and thus purging and purifying yourself of them by this act of memory, is a practice 
whose paternity was always attributed to Pythagoras (Ibid.). 
To Musonius Rufus, a Roman Stoic, the acquisition ofvirtue involves two things. On 
one hand there must be theoretical knowledge (epistemë theorëtikë), and then there must 
also be epistemë praktikë (practical knowledge). This practical knowledge, he says, can 
only be acquired through zealous, painstaking (philotimos, philoponos) training; and he 
uses the verb gumnazesthai: "doing exercises, gymnastics," but clearly in a very general 
sense. So taking pains, zeal, and practice will enable us to acquire the epistemë praktikë" 
which is as indispensable as epistemë theorëtikë (Foucault 2005). That virtue is acquired 
through an askësis no less indispensable than a mathësis (knowledge, connaissance) is 
obviously a very old idea. The idea is founded in the oldest Pythagorean texts. It is found 
in Plato. It is also found in Isocrates when he speaks of the askësis philosophias (Foucault 
2005: 316). 
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According to Foucault the meaning of askësis for the Ancients did not involve the 
aim of .arriving at self-renunciation at the end of the process. It involved, rather, 
constituting oneself through askësis. Or, more precisely, involved arriving. at the 
formation of a full, perfect, complete, and self-sufficient relationship with oneself, 
capable of producing the self-transfiguration that is the happiness one takes in one self. 
The nature itself of the means, of the tactic put to work to achieve this objective, is not 
primarily or fundamentally renunciation. It involves, rather, acquiring something through 
as/œsis. We must acquire something we do not have, rather than renounce this or that 
element of ourselves that we are or have. We must acquire something that, precisely, 
instead of leading us gradually to renounce ourselves, will allow us to protect the self and 
to reach it. In brief, ancient ascesis does not reduce: it equips, it provides (Ibid.: 320). 
What ascesis equips and provides us with is what in Greek is called a paraskeuë, 
which Seneca often translated into Latin as instructio. When the objective of ascesis is to 
arrive at the constitution of this full relationship of oneself to oneself, its function, or 
rather its tactic or instrument is the constitution of a paraskeuë. This is both an open and 
an oriented preparation of the individual for the events of life. In the askesis, the 
paraskeuë involves preparing individual for the future, for a future of unforeseen events 
whose general nature may be familiar to us, but which we cannot know whether and when 
they will occur. It involves, then, fmding in ascesis a preparation, a paraskeuë, which can 
be adapted to what may occur, and only to this, and at the very moment it occurs, if it 
does so (Ibid.: 321). 
4.5 Yoga pro cess, self-control, siidhana 
4.5a PataiijaliA~!5ilga-yoga 
The sage Patafijali is said to have composed the Yoga Sütras and heis considered the 
father of Af?tllitga-yoga. Af?ta means "eight," Anga means "limbs," and Yoga means "the act 
of yoking," joining"(Monier-Williams; 1970); "joining ," "union," "yoke"(Apte W.S.; 
2004); "to link together," "to bind closely," "to hamess," "to bring under the 
yoke"(Eliade M.; 1969). Etymologically the term is derivative from the Sanskrit root yuj, 
having all the above meanings, but it is extremely difficult to defme the discipline (or the 
science) of yoga itself. 
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In the context of Patafijali' s Yoga Sütras the chief aim of Yoga is ''to teach the means . 
by which the human spirit may attain complete union with ÏSvara or the Supreme Spririt" 
(Monier-Williams 1970: 856); ''to teach the means by which the human soul may be 
completely united with the Supreme Spirit and thus secure absolution" (Apte W.S. 2004: 
788). Those two interpretations express the traditional mystic understanding of Yoga. For 
the purpose of this thesis though, the secular interpretation is needed as weIl and the one. 
proposed by Mircea Eliade (1969) follows this course ofreasoning: 
Even in its "mystic" connotation - that is, even iD. so far. as it signifies union -
yoga implies 'a prior detachment from the material, emancipation with respect to the 
world. The stress is placed on man's effort (''to bring under the yoke"), on his self-
discipline, thanks to which he can achieve concentration of mind, even before he 
has invoked - as in the mystic varieties of yoga - the aid of the divinity. "To link 
together," ''to bind tightly," ''to bring under the yoke" - the purpose of all these 
actions is to unify ·the spirit, to eliminate dispersion and the automatisms that are 
characteristic of the secular consciousness. To the "devotional" (mystic) schools of 
yoga, this ''unification,'' obviously, merely precedes true union, the union of the 
human soul with God (Eliade 1969: 10). 
The limbs of Yoga are: yama (self-control), niYama (discipline of the mind), lisana 
(physical postures), prllr.zllyllma (breathing exercises), pratyllhtira (sense detachment), 
dhtiraYJ.ll (concentration), dhyllna (meditation), samadhi (profound meditation). The ethical 
foundations of a~tllnga-yoga are yama and niyama. According to Eliade (1969) yama 
means "restraint", while niyama corresponds to "discipline"; to Prahladananda Swami 
(2005) yama and niyama mean respectively "social" and "personal" discipline. 
The sage Pataftjali divides yama and niyama into ten categories: 
Yama (self-control 
or social discipline): 
ahirhsll - non-violence 
satya - truthfulness 
asteya - not stealing 
brahmacarya - celibacy 
aparigraha - non-possessiveness 
Niyama (discipline of the mind 
or personal discipline): 
sauca - sincerity 
santo!jll - contentment 
tapas - austerity 
SVlldhyllya - study 
ïSvara-prar.zidhllna - devotion or surrender to God 
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According to Prahladananda Swami we have the chance to reach the goals of yoga 
described by authorities, in case we "systematically follow a yoga process; just as to 
graduate from a school we follow its curriculum" (Prahladananda 2005: 13). We have to 
always keep in mind that the ultimate yogic goals are not health and mystic powers but 
realizing the self in union with the Absolute reality. By following yogic disciplines, our 
attachments to the modes of passion and ignorance diminish and we gradually artain the 
state of goodness, wherein we know more and suffer 1ess. 
4.5b Srimad-Bhagavatam, Bhagavad-Gitâ and self-discipline 
Disciplining of the senses and mind is indispensable to someone aspiring to spiritual 
goals in life. The process for refining one's capacity for spiritual life is explained in 
Srunad-Bhagavatam as follows: 
To concentrate the mind, one must observe a life of celibacy and not faIl down. 
One must undergo the austerity of voluntarily giving up sense enjoyment. One must 
then control the mind and senses, give chanty, be truthful, cIean and non-violent, 
follow the regulative principles and regularly chant the holy name of the Lord. Thus 
a sober and faithful person who knows the religious principles is temporarily 
purified ofall sins performed with bis body, words and mind. These sins are like the 
dried leaves of creepers beneath a bamboo tree, which may be burned by fire 
although their roots remain to grow again at the first opportunity (Bhaktivedanta 
1999: 19; 6.1.13-14). 
In Bhagavad Gîta (chapters 2 and 3) Lord Krl?J).a identifies desire as the worst enemy 
of the spiritual aspirant. The enemy is described as voracious and greatly injurious - it is 
able to obscure the knowledge and the judgement of the wisest among men. Desire is 
insatiable as fire and by ravaging the senses, the mind and the intellect leads to 
destruction of the ability for discrimination, by which the soul is finally 10st: 
For a man dwelling on the object ofthe senses, an attachment to them is born; 
From attachment, desire is born; from desire, anger is born. 
From anger arises delusion; from delusion, loss of the memory; 
From loss of the memory, destruction of discrimination; 
- From destruction of discrimination one is lost (Sargeant 1994: 147-8) 
Although being so vicious and powerful, des ire still can be subdued and vanquished. 
The body is said t.o be "inhabited by the ete mal , the indestructible, the immeasurable 
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embodied Self (Ibid.: 103) and that Self (or Atman) is said to be superior to the senses, 
mind and the intellect (Ibid.: 199). That Atman could be our best friend and ally in the 
difficult struggle for Self-realisation: 
One should uplift oneself by the Self; one should not degrade one self; 
For the Self alone can be a friend to onese1f, and the Self alone can be 
an enemy of oneself. 
For him who has conquered himself by the Self, the Self is a friend; 
But for him who has not conquered himself, the Self remains hostile, 
like an enemy (Sargeant 1994: 276-7). 
4.6 Conclusion 
The notion of the subject (or the self) in the traditional theistic thought is always 
relàted to certain processes of transformation, of self-improvement, revelation, 
enlightenment and transcendence; while for the modem secular thought the subject bas no 
specific need of such deep changes in order to have access to truth in general, and to self-
knowledge in particular. In the frrst case there is a price to be paid for the access to truth 
in the form of renunciations, conversions of looking, purifications, modifications of 
existence and ascetic exercises. In the second case, the subject (the scientist) can 
recognise the truth and have access in himself to it through knowledge (connaissance) 
alone, complying with external formal mIes of method and conditions regarding the 
structure of the object to be known. 
The traditional theistic notion of the subject was developed for millennia through 
different more or less ascetic practices both in the East and the West. The ex change of 
spiritual "know-how" must have been intense and continuous, given that many techniques 
for self-control and self-improvement cited in Stoics, Cynics, Epicureans, Pythagoreans, 
Vedantists, V~Davas and Yogis, refer to the same states of consciousness or being. For 
example the Greek term anakh6rësis (withdrawal or disengagement from the world) can 
be easily assoc'iated with the practice of pratyahllra (sense detachment) in Yoga. The same 
applies to the Y ogic dhlira1')ll (concentration), which is described as concentration of 
pneuma (breath) in the Classical Greek and Roman Stoic traditions (Foucault 2005). Later 
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in Christianity we cannot help noticing the direct application of the Y ogic prll1'Jllylima 
(breath control) and dhyiina (meditation) in the. practice of Hesychastic prayer (Eliade 
1969). 
As for the modem secular notion of the subject, Foucault recognises its inception in 
Christian theology. The specifie Western attitude to the knowing subject is based on 
Aristotle by Aquinas and the scholastics. According to the Christian theology God is a 
creator and a model for the lmowing subject; thus the subject is perceived as capable of 
emulating the omniscient God. The conditions of the subject's access to the truth are 
primarily defined within knowledge (connaissance), while the other cultural or moral 
conditions are only extrinsic. 
Chapter V. Procedures for discourse control - the ISKCON and the modern 
secular perspectives 
5.1 Introduction 
North-American culture is characterised by the co-
existence of the secular and the religious. It is the 
dialectical relationship between these forces on which we 
should focus, tracing out how each involves the other and 
how the boundary between the secular and the religious is 
eontinually negotiated .•• this process of negotiation has 
been as much a part of our past as of our present, 
oeeurring, for example, even in Puritan New England, a 
time and place when, according to conventional wisdom, 
religion was all important. 
Da"id Hall 1997 
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To Foucault (1971) there is no civilisation as much respectful toward discourse as our 
own. Discourse has never before been so honoured. never so universalised and liberated 
from an constraints. Nevertheless, it appears that behind all obvious logophilia and 
veneration of discourse there is a hidden apprehension. It seems that prohibitions. 
barrages, thresholds and limits were employed in order to master, at least, partially the 
great proliferation of discourse, so that its dangerous richness could be checked and its 
disorder organised according to expressivity. which' is able to avoid its most 
incontrollable aspects (Foucault 1971: 52). 
According to Foucault there is, no doubt, a deeply rooted logophobia in modem 
societies, a kind of suppressed apprehension and hostility to ail discourse events, to the 
aggregation of things uttered, to the eruption of all these statements and everything that 
could he violent, discontinuous and perilous; to the great incessant hurnming and disorder 
of discourse. If one wants to analyse that logophobia, in all of its conditions, games and 
effects, there are three possible solutions for its successful treatment, which our modem 
mentality is still reluctant to entertain. The fIfst solution would be to question our will to 
truth, the second to restore discourse to its status of event, and the third to divest the 
signifier of its sovereignty once and for all (Ibid.: 53). 
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In L'ordre du discours (1971) Foucault outlined the procedures for dis course control 
with remarkable punctuality and clarity, given his notoriety for being one who "makes it 
very hard" for others "to fmd out what he is saying" (Kermode 1994: 8). Here is the table 
of procedures for discoUrse control established by Michel Foucault: 
1. Externes 
1. L'interdit 
2. Le partage 
3. L'opposition Vrai-Faux 
II. Interries 
1. Le commentaire 
2. L'auteur 
3. L'organisation des disciplines 
III. Régulatrices de l'accès 
1. Le rituel 
2. Les « sociétés de discours» 
3. Les doctrines 
In the following chapter every specific procedure will be elucidated according to 
Foucault's own elaborations. AIl the procedures identified by Foucault (1971) are 
equally applicable to both secular and theistic discourses; they will be tested against the 
secular and theistic aspects of the Krishna Consciousness discourse in particular. 
5.2 External procedures or procedures of exclusion 
The external procedures for discourse control as established by Michel Foucault are 
threefold: 1. l'interdit (the forbidden); 2. le partage et le rejet (division and rejection); 3. 
l'opposition vrai-faux (the opposition true-false). To certain extent those procedures 
appear as inseparable, so the challenge will be to make them distinct as weIl as possible. 
According to Foucault (1971) l'interdit is the most explicit and familiar form of 
exclusion. It is generally accepted that we do not have the right to say everything and that 
in particular circumstances we cannot ta1k at aIl. In other words it is impossible for 
anyone to talk about anything in any circumstances: 
Tabou de l'objet, rituel de la circonstance, droit privilégié ou exclusive du sujet 
qui parle: on a là le jeu de trois types d'interdits.qui se croisent, se renforcent ou se 
compensent, formant une grille complexe qui ne cesse de se modifier (Foucault 
1971: 11). 
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ro begin with, there are mllllmUffi requirements for active participation in the 
Krishna Consciousness movement, as well as for engagement in a modem secular 
research. In the case of the ISKCON we have the four precepts or the four regulative 
principles: no meat eating, no intoxication, no gambling, and no illicit sex (Judàh 
1974, BUIT 1984, Daner 1974, Bhaktivedanta 1990). As far as modem secular research is 
concemed 1 can recognize at least four basic Iilles for justifiable presentation and 
argumentation: no plagiarism (look at p.7, 10, 36), no moral judgment (look at p.17), 
no unfounded claims (p.10), and no subjectivism (p.IO-ll, 36). Certainly the 
corresponding short lists of precepts, principles, or rules could be significantly extended. 
ln sorne cases the rules that can be added are clearly distinct; in other cases they should 
be assigned, rather, to the category of the previous principles. For example there are 'sorne 
explicit rules of exclusion in the V a~ru:tava discourse like the bans on sannyasins to 
travel in the lands of mlecchas (foreigners, barbarians or outcasts), initiating miecchas, 
access of mlecchas and women to serve the deities, and homosexual practices. In 
modem secular discourse the honourable mention could fall to the issues of racism, 
gtmder discrimination, homosexual discrimination, and the so-called ethnocentrism in 
general. 
The ISKCON's four regulative principles are in no way different from the rites of 
purification described in the chapter 6.5 regarding the epimeleia heautou. Thus the four 
precepts are actually part of the Vedic samskliras (purification ceremonies), "prescribed 
for every civilized person, from birth to death (Bhaktivedanta 1990: 52)." To 
Bhaktivedanta the purpose of samskliras is to bring a person who has no knowledge of 
spiritual ·life gradually to the spiritual level; by the purification processes, one attains, 
spiritual rebirth: 
You cannot become a devotee unless you give up sinful activity. Therefore you 
have to begin by following these four prohibitions. You have to avoid sinful 
activities like illicit sex, meat-eating, gambling, and intoxication, including tobacco, 
coffee, and tea. Then you'lI gradually become completely sinless. On one side you 
have to follow restrictions, and on the other side you have to engage yourself in 
devotional service. To engage oneself in devotional service under the order of the 
spiritual master and the stlstra (rule, teaching) is the way to remain on the 
transcendental platfonn (Bhaktivedanta 1990: 55). 
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White those four purification requirements or prohibitions are transplanted in the 
west without compromising, it is not the same with the taboos regarding the travelling of 
sannyasins in the land of mlecchas (Gosvami 2002), the initiation of mlecchas, the access 
of mlecchas and women to deity service (Valpey 2004), and homosexuality 
(Bhaktivedanta 1999). For example Bhaktivedanta, who was a safmyasin, not only 
travelled to the West, but also introduced the Hindu deities for worship there. When 
Bhaktivedanta was consecrating the images of Radha-l<+~IJ,a deities in Sydney, Australia, 
in 1971 he uttered the following appeal: "1 am leaving Vou here in this mleccha desa 
("land of barbarians"). Now, these devotees, they have come to Vou, kindly give them 
intelligence so that they can serve Vou nicely. This is my prayer" (Valpey 2004: 45.). 
Valpey (2004) also points to a notable difference between Indian temples and 
ISKCON temples outside of India - namely the participation of women as temple priests. 
As the Krishna Consciousness movement attracted women as weIl as men quite early in 
its development, Bhaktivedanta "awarded brahmanical initiation to both, authorising and 
particularly encouraging his women disciples to perform deity worship in ISKCON 
temples" (Ibid.: 52). The same ISKCON temples in India though, exclude women from 
service directly in' the deity room. Notwithstanding that they can participate in other 
services related to deity worship, including cooking, "Radhàràmana temple, for one, has 
only Brahmin men cook for the deity" (Ibid.: 58). Valpey (Ibid.) is suspicious'that this is 
the case in most public Vaiq:r:tava temples in India, though a research into that is yet to be 
conducted. 
As far as the issue of homosexuality is concerned, according to the Krishna 
Consciousness discourse, it is generally explained out as a practice of illicit sex - sexual 
practice that is self-serving (could be heterosexual also) and deviates from procreating of 
Krishna Conscious children. In my field research 1 have never witnessed an open 
discussion on the subject during a Sunday sermon in the ISKCON temple of Montreal, or , 
in a Bhagavad GUâ class at the same place. AlI 1 know about that issue is either due to the 
VaiqIJ,ava scriptures and modern books or my persona! communication with the devotees. 
Here is the authoritative narration of Srirnad-Bhagavatam with the purport of 
Bhaktivedanta: 
Lord Brahmâ then gave birth to the demons from the backside of his body, and 
they were very fond of sex. Because they were too lustful, they approached him for 
copulation. The worshipful Brahrna first laughed at their stupidity, but, finding the 
shameless asuras (demons) close upon him, he grew indignant and ran in great 
haste out of fear (Bhaktivedanta 1999: 775-6). 
Purport 
Sex life is the background of material existence. Here also it is repeated that 
demons are very fond of sex life. The more one is free from the desires for sex, the 
more he is promoted to the level of the demigods; the more one is inc1ined to enjoy 
sex, the more he is degraded to the level of demoniac life. Sexually inclined demons 
have no respect even for their father, and the best policy for a saintly father like 
Brahmâ is to leave such demoniac sons (Ibid). 
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According to Vicar (2003), which was recommended to me by one of the devotees, 
neither heterosexuality nor homosexuality can be qualified as "naturaI." His idea of 
natural is somehow significantly different: 
Heterosexual desire is a perverted reflection of our original love for Kr1?:r:ta and 
homosexuality is another twist. SrIla PrabhuPâda:"the homosexual appetite of a 
man for another man is demoniac and is not for any sane man in the ordinary course 
oflife." (Vicar 2003: 107). 
Further on Vicar (Ibid.) explains that with, the advancement of Kali-yuga, the Krishna 
Consciousness movement will have to accommodate more and more people with past 
perverse lives and give them the opportunity for purification. Extending the logic that a 
heterosexual desire can be effectively accommodated within the grhastha-asrama, Srtla 
Prabhupâda recommended marriage (to a woman!) for a disciple w.ith homosexual 
desires. No matter how unpractical this advice may seem, homosexuality and 
heterosexuality are equally treated as lust with the specification that in homosèxuality 
''the lust has increased to an abnormally high degree" (Ibid.). 
To Vicar (2003) the solution is to provide homosexuals commg to Krishna 
Consciousness with special guidance from senior devotees. This is how homosexuals 
should be accommodated: 
The homosexual must be understood as an individual person and be given 
proper facility after frank discussion. He should understand rus condition to be 
especially fallen, but should be confident that by Kr~:r:ta consciousness, aIl 
difficulties can be overcome. And other devotees should be sympathetic and 
understanding with such sincere souls (Ibid.). 
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Modem secularity shares the attitude of being sympathetic and understanding also, 
but aSsumes a kind of neutral and detached position - acceptance with no paternalistic, 
judgmental, or correctional slants. In exchange though, the gay-Iesbian communities in 
Montreal are fairly aggressive in promoting the "queemess" and "diversity" in their 
typical lambada-balloon-pride-parade style. This is precisely the kind of "obtrusive 
militancy" that kept Michel Foucault, André Baudry and other intellectuals at a distance 
sorne decades ago (Eribon 1991: 29). 
Having in mind qualifications like "demoniac," "insane," and "frank discussion" it is 
good to notice that Foucault was equa1ly disturbed by the invitations to "speak up," "to 
confess" and "come out of the closet" as if he was hiding his sexual orientation in a 
desperate attempt to confonn to the "straight" establishment. There was nothing more 
loathsome to Foucault than the very idea of "confession." As. Eribon commented, 
Foucault ~ade lots of efforts in his last books "to reject, refuse, and defuse the order to 
say, to speak, and to make someone speak" (Ibid.: 30). Here is actually what Michel 
Foucault believed homosexuality should be and what he shared with Sylvia Lacan: 
"There will be no civilization as long as marriage between men is not accepted" (Ibid.: 
154). 
The second principle of exclusion pointed out by Foucault is the one of "un partage et 
un rejet (Foucault 1971: 12)." That principle relates to the opposition of reason and 
craziness (more precisely, the stupidity, or the unreason of a mad person). Since the 
beginning of the Middle Age the discourse of the mad was not allowed to circulate like 
that of the others. As Foucault put it: 
Il arrive que sa parole soit tenue pournulle et non avenue, n'ayant ni vérité ni 
importance, ne pouvant pas faire foi en justice, ne pouvant pas authentifier un acte 
ou un contrat, ne pouvant pas même, dans le sacrifice de la messe, pennettre la 
transsubstantiation et faire du pain un corps (Ibid.: 12-13). 
At the same time the discourse of the mad was invested with the strange powers of 
expressing hidden truths, predicting the future and seeing clearly where the wisdom of 
others fails. The madness (unreason) of the mad was recognised through his (her) words, 
and the sharing or the rejection were mediated at the level of discourse: In the practice of 
the Krishna Consciousness movement, though, the principle of division and rej~ction 
applies vis-à-vis ecstatic dancing rather than talking. There were sorne incidents of drug 
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induced ecstatic dancing (Hubner & Gruson 1988), most probably in emulation of the 
. "rapturous frenzy" of Lord Chaitanya, but generally such behaviour is considered 
unacceptable. According to Angela Burr (1984) the dance form in ISKCON is to sorne 
extent controlled, reflecting in this way the constraints under which devotees live too: 
Not oruy has the dance become part of every morning and evening routine, 
there are also limits placed on the degree to which spontaneous dancing is 
acceptable. Real ecstasy is believed to be a sign of a 'pure' devotee, the sign of 
someone who is in actual contact with the Supreme Personality of Godhead. To 
show signs of extreme ecstasy, such as rolling on the ground or becoming 
hysteri cal , as did Chaitanya, would be to imply that the person was a 'pure' 
devotee. Any devotee who attempted to show such signs would be considered 
boastful and would be thought bogus and get short shrift from other devotees (Burr 
1984: 228). 
The last external prim~iple of exclusion established by Foucault is the opposition true-
false. At the level of proposition this principle seems inseparable from the previous two, 
but at another one, namely the level of will to truth, there is a historically identifiable 
principle of the kind: 
Car, chez les poètes grecs du VIe siècle encore, le discours vrai - au sens fort et 
valorisé du mot - le discours vrai pour lequel on avait respect et terreur, celui 
auquel il fallait bien se soumettre, parce qu'il régnait, c'était le discours prononcé 
par qui de droit et selon le rituel requis; c'était le discours qui disait la justice et 
attribuait à chacun sa part; c'était le discours qui, prophétisant l'avenir, non 
seulement annonçait ce qui allait se passer, mais contribuait à sa réalisation, 
emportait avec soi l'adhésion des hommes et se tramait ainsi avec le destin 
(Foucault 1971: 16-17). 
Later at the tum of the 16th and the 17th centuries (mostly in England) arose another 
will to knowledge, one that was prognosticating based on the .available, and designing 
plans with achievable goals within the scope of the observable, the measurable and the 
classifiable. That will to knowledge imposed on the knowing subject a certain position, 
attitude and function - observe rather than read; verify rather than comment. In order to 
achieve verifiable and useful knowledge, a technical methodology was prescribed and 
prevailed in the process of acquiring that same knowledge (Ibid.). 
That will to knowledge, like other systems of exclusion, relies on institutional 
support: it is simultaneously reinforced and redirected by a rich variety of practices like 
pedagogy, distribution of literature, libraries, leamed societies formerly and laboratories 
today (Ibid.). A similar mechanism for providing institutional support for the will to 
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knowledge is readily available within the structures of the ISKCON as weIl, but 
subordinated to radically different goals and based on different epistemology. 
The undisputed truth in. ISKCON discourse is that the materially conditioned soul 
can be liberated from the endless cycle of birth and death only by acquiring the eternal 
knowledge of the Vedas. That knowledge is sruti (revealed) and constitutes the absolute 
authority. Orthodox Brahmins contrast the sacred lite rature of sruti to the smrtis, the lawi 
books or traditional texts; to themthe end of the Vedic literature is marked by the 
UpaIÙl?ads. Bhaktivedanta for his part extends the authority of the sruti to the Bhagavad 
GUa and 5rïrnad Bhagavatam: 
The four original Vedas are considered sruti. But simply by hearing them, one 
cannot understand fully. Therefore, the smrtis have explained further. Purayati iti 
purt11'Jtl: by hearing the Purt11'}os and other smrtis, one makes his understandlng 
complete ... So whether you take sruti or smrti, the subject matter is the same. Both 
sruti and smrti are spiritual evidence. We cannot do without either of them 
(Bhaktivedanta 1990: 29). 
According to Bhaktivedanta (1997) every part of the srutis and, smrtis is sacred and 
what is true; false is modem impersonal science. Modem scientists are mental speculators 
who have nothing to offer but their unsubstantiated theories. The followers of Darwin are 
bluffers, who calculate a span of million or even billion years and mislead people by their 
foolish theorising (Bhaktivedanta 1998: 38). American astronauts never visited and 
walked on the moon: "In the days when the whole earth was watching man' s frrst steps on 
the moon, 5rîla Prabhupada said it was bunk:" Oayadvaita Swami1977: ~). Why is that 
so? Because according to the 5rua Prabhupada's understanding of Vedic science a 
mission like this is absolutely impossible. We are rerriinded also, that the human eyes are 
unreliable and we have already been mi sied many times. Bhaktivedanta elucidates the 
television viewers with the example of King-Kong: "On television you can see a gorilla 
climb the Empire State Building, he argued. And do we have to believe it's real? Tlte 
scientists may trust their eyes, he said. We trust the Vedas" (Ibid.:). Further on follows 
the elaborate scientific argumentation of Bhaktivedanta: 
According to the Vedas, SrIla Prabhupada said, the moon isn't such an easy 
place to land. The moon, say the Vedas, is Chandraloka, a heavenly planet. And it's 
not cold end desolate - it's full oflife. It's the abode of pious souls, born there as a 
reward for the noble deeds of former lives. And those pious souls on the moon 
aren't keen on receiving tourists, especially not low-minded beer-drinking meat-
. eating Americans on a mission to "conquer space". Even to get to America, SrIla 
Prabhupada noted, you need a visa. Try to bust your way in, and you're up against 
the American govemment. No documents, no permission, and you're blocked out. 
Then why should the moon be so easy (Ibid.)? 
The interpretation ofwhat probably happened proceeds like this: 
We didn't go. Either it was a hoax, or the space conquerors could have veered 
off course - or been purposely diverted - and had landed, bewildered, on the dark 
Vedic planet Rahu. Or who knows what. But one thing was sure: they didn't go 
(Ibid.). 
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On the account of Bhaktivedanta' s own statements he should be perceived as a 
faithful and punctual proponent of the sacred Vedic scriptures. To Lorenz (2004) though 
there are sorne good reasons for reserves in this respect: 
Bhaktivedanta Swami's work is neither text-critical nor systematic. He 
basically drew from whatever sources happened to be easily available to him at the 
time. For his English translation of the Bhagavad-Gita As it Is, he relied to a large 
extent on Dr.Radhakrishnan's English Gita translation. His English translation of 
the Bhagavata Purana is based on a number of different sources. In his translation of 
the third book, for example, there are a large number of stanzas that agree verbatim 
with C.L.Goswami and M. A. Sastri's earlier English translation of the text ... From 
the twenty-eight chapter of book 4 to the thirteenth chapter of book 10, his work is 
c1early based on the Gaudiya Math Bengali edition of the Bhagavata Purana ... His 
books, however, nowhere state the actual sources on which they are 
based ... Bhaktivedanta Swami's purports also contain a range of statements that 
sound as if they were the conclusions of earlier commentators, but turn out to be his 
personal contributions when one compares them to all the commentaries that he 
possibly could have used (Lorenz 2004: 113). 
Now it is important to mention that to Nataraja (1973) there are sorne ancient practices 
according to which the author is required to renounce his own identity in favour of sorne 
other name that is more important for the Hindu tradition itself. It might be well the case 
of Bhaktivedanta too. What really disturbs Lorenz is the fact that Bhaktivedanta Swami 
went so far as to tell his readers that Shridhara Swamin condemns impersonalist 
philosophy, ''when the fact is not only that Shridhara did not do this, but it is he, out of all 
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the Bhagavata commentators, of whom it may be said that he had impersonalist leanings" 
(Lorenz 2004: 121). 
Another disturbing fact is that Bhaktivedanta never worked with competent Sanskrit 
editors, which makes it hard to determine to what degree he was aware of such 
misrepresentations. Lorenz (2004) daims that Bhaktivedanta repeatedly criticized or 
dismissed many of his disciples who gradually achieved a certain level of proficiency in 
Sanskrit: "1 am practically seeing that as soon as they begin to leam a little Sanskrit 
immediately they feel that they have become more than their guru and then the policy is 
kill the guru and be killed himself' (Ibid.: 128). 
5.3 Internai procedures for discourse control. 
Foucault identified the internal procedures for discourse control in a tripartite way as 
weIl: 1. Le commentaire; 2. L'auteur; 3. L'organisation des disciplines. The first and the 
second procedures of that triad were already alluded to in the case of Lorenz (2004) arid 
Nataraja (1973) above . 
. These procedures could be called internal, because first of all discourses exercise 
their own control and second, because the same procedures appear as principles of 
classification, prescription and distribution as if it were a matter, this time, of controlling 
another dimension of the discourse: the one of chance and event. Probably there is no 
society where the practice of commenting does not exist. To put it otherwise, commenting 
is a major narrative that people exchange; repeat and diversify: the formulae, the texts, the 
ritualised assemblies of what is narrated, according to the circumstances; the things said 
once but preserved after, because people are suspicious of sorne secret or more intricacies 
to arise (Foucault 1971). 
The most interesting and probably the most important property of the major texts is 
to get confused and disappear, allowing commentaries to take over. It is just a matter of 
elapsing time and circulation for new commentaries to immerge, introducing an 
understanding critically different from the one of the original narrative: "Le commentaire 
conjure le hasard du discours en lui faisant la part: il permet bien de dire autre chose que 
le texte même, mais à condition que ce soit ce texte même qui soit dit et en quelque sort 
. accompli" (Foucault 1971: 27-8). 
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In the religious and philosophical traditions of India, commentaries are indispensable 
for the exegesis of scriptures and a proof of their deep understanding. Va~x:tavas of all 
schools also contributed significantly in ~rus respect, producing their share of. exhaustive 
commentaries on the Bhagavad-gUa and the Srünad-Bhagavatam. The entire literary 
work of Bhaktivedanta, . all his interviews, conversations. and sennons constitute a 
continuing commentary on the sacred origins of Krishna Consciousness. According to 
Sherbow (2004) the Va~x:tavas founded their claim that the Snmad-Bhagavatam 
(Bhagavatil. Purana) is the original commentary on the Vedanta - sütra (Brahma-sutra), on 
the verse janmady asya yata1:z (from whom the creation of the manifested universe) being 
identical for both scripttires. This is not the only common characteristic they share. To 
Bhaktivedanta (1990) both scriptures are written by the same author: 
Now, because Srtla Vyâsadeva knew that in this Kali-yuga people woWd not be 
able to study Vedanta Sütra ni cely on account of a lack of education, he personally 
wrote a commentary on the Vedanta Sütra. That commentary is Srîmad-Bhagavatam. 
Bha$yarh brahma-sütranam: the Srîmad-Bhagavatam is the real commentary on the 
Vedllnta-sütra, written by the author of the Vedanta- sütra rumself. The Vedanta- sütra 
was written by Vyasadeva, and under the instruction of Narada, his spiritual 
master, Vyasadeva wrote a commentary on it. That is Srîmad-Bhagavatam 
(Bhaktivedanta 1990 : 34). 
In the spirit of the above reasoning and according to the Hindu tradition of 
commenting, the literary works of Bhaktivedanta and rus elaborate purports to the sacred 
verses of Bhagavad GUa and SIimad Bhagavatam should be perceived as logical 
educative efforts on the part pf a missionary like rum. The fact that at som~ occasions he 
assumes a polemical stance, interprets the scriptures in a new way, or claims things never 
claimed before, does not undennine rus contribution to the Va~x:tava tradition in any way. 
In addition, his participation in Vai~t:lava discourse confonns perfectly well to Foucault's 
understanding of the nature of commentary in princip le. 
The controversy surrounding the scholarly merits of Bhaktivedanta' s literary work is 
not surprising in any way. As Smith (1963) has pointed out, one of the objections most 
often directed to any scholarsrup undertaken by the religious insider is that the work is 
inherently unscholarly because it lacks necessary detachment and critical analysis. On the 
other hand, noted Shukavak (2004), ''the religious adherent often says thatany 
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scholarship performed by outsiders lacks an understanding of the essence of religious 
faith and therefore cannot adequately comprehend the tradition" (Shukavak: 2004: 98). 
When religious and icientific discourses are compared there is a clear distinction of 
attitudes towards authority on one side and author on the other. Any traditional religious 
discourse presents authority and author as inseparable. God and bis revelation are 
sublime; the ultimate truth is there, and everything else that might be added will be an 
attribute, a commentary, or an elaboration. Till the Middle Ages scientific discourse was 
govemed by a similar principle - the attribution of an author was considered 
indispensable and the author was an embodiment of truth itself. Since the 17 th century 
that function of an author in the scièntific discourse has gradually faded away and 
authority has assumed the nature of Truth that is simultaneously abstract, conditional and 
universal. The author has been marginalized and reduced to a label of an item: "il ne 
fonctionne plus guère que pour donner un nom à un théorème, à un effet, à un exemple, à 
un syndrome" (Foucault 1971: 29). 
The ISKCON's discourse is strictly traditional in its presentation of author and 
authority. God is a person; bis name is Kr~I)a; he is the eternal creator, and he expounded 
the science of Yoga - the best way of liberation for the materially conditioned soul, fallen 
under the spell of Maya. The eternai truths revealed by the srutis (the four original Vedas, 
the Upani$flds and the Vedanta-Sütra) and revised according to the dictates of the changing 
times by the smrtis have the same divine origin: 
The smrtis are given by the Lord and. His representatives. They come from 
spiritual authorities such as Lord Caitanya Mahaprabhu. The silstra, or scripture, 
aiso gives this authority. For instance, for tbis age, Kali-yuga, the Lord has 
prescribed a special means of God-realization - the chanting of His holy name 
(Bhaktivedanta 1990: 27). 
In addition to the principles of commentary and authorship, Foucault defmes a third 
one as distinctly opposed to them. This is the principle of organization of disciplines. A 
discipline appears as different from an author by dint of being an anonymous system of' 
methods, a corpus of propositions considered to be true, rules and defmitions, techniques 
and instruments (Foucault 1971). That anonymous system is accessible for anyone 
without the need of validity related to a certain inventor. An author is different, but not 
separate from a discipline - slhe is a part of the discipline. 
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A discipline also differs from a commentary, because in a discipline there is no 
meaning to be rediscovered, or an identity to be repeated. The necessary condition for the 
existence of a discipline is the opportunity for the creation of a new statement, or more 
precisely, an indefmite number ofnew statements (Ibid.). 
The discipline is a principle of control over discourse production. The discipline 
outlines the limits of a discourse by the exercising of an identity, which assumes the form 
of a permanent reactivating of mIes. This type of control is necessary because within its 
limits every discipline recognises tme and false statements as weil: 
Bref, une proposition doit remplir de complexes et lourdes exigences pour 
pouvoir appartenir à l'ensemble d'une discipline; avant de pouvoir être dite vraie ou 
fausse, elle doit être, comme dirait M. Canguilhem, «dans le vrai» (Foucault Ibid. : 
35-6). 
Taking into consideration all of the above that is said about the organization of 
disciplines it is evident that there are not so mahy (if any) opportunities of applying this 
principle of control over the ISKCON's discourse. First of all, according to Foucault 
(l971), the principle of commentary should be associated more with religious discourse, 
while those of author and discipline fit literary and scientific discourses better. Second 
and most importantly the discourse of Krishna Consciousness is not, under whatever 
circumstances, presented as anonymous system of methods, mIes and definitions. It might 
be true that there are always opportunities of creating ne~ statements within the 
ISKCON's discourse, but those statements will always be identified with their primary 
source and author ~ the Lord(sruti; the revealed) or his representatives. 
5.4 Discourse control as regulations of access 
The last group of procedures for discourse control are those regulating the access to 
discourse. Foucault (1971) introduced them as the following triad: 1. Rituel; 2. Les 
«sociétés des discours»; 3. Les doctrines. These procedures determine the conditions 
required for a discourse to take place, impose certain rules on the individuals performing 
them, and limit the access for the majority of people. The idea is that not just everybody 
qualifies for a given discourse, and not ail the domains of that discourse are equally 
accessible: 
Toutes les régions du discours ne sont pas également ouvertes et pénétrables; 
certaines sont hautement défendues (différenciées et différenciantes) tandis que 
d'autres paraissent presque ouvertes à tous les vents et mises sans restriction 
préalable à la disposition de chaque sujet parlant (Foucault 1971 : 39). 
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The most superficiaI and the most visible form of this restrictive system can be 
labelled as rituaJ. Rituai names the required qualifications for the individuais who talk 
and who have to occupy certain positions and formulate certain statements in the 
discourse. This restrictive procedure defmes the gestures, the behaviour, the 
circumstances and the whole ensemble of signs that should accompany the discourse. 
According to the Vai!?1J.tlva tradition access to discourse is ritually regulated through 
paramparll (discipular succession) and initiation. As it was mentioned' earlier Abhay 
Charan De took his formai initiation as the saimyilsin Bhaktivedanta from his guru 
BhaktÏsiddhanta Sarasvati in 1933 at Allahabad. Here is the discipular succession for the 
transmission of the Bhagavad-Gua: 
1) Kr~I)a 2) Brahma 3) Narada; 4) Vyasa, 5) Madhva, 6) Padmanabha, 7) 
Nrhari, 8) Madhava, 9) Ak$obhya, 10) Jayatlrtha, Il) J~asindhu, 12) Dayanidhi, 
13) Vidyanidhi, 14) Râ.jendra, 15) Jayadharma, 16) PUIW?ottama, 17) 
Braluna.J::tyattrtha, 18) Vyasatirtha, 19) Lak$mîpati, 20) Madhavendra Puri, 21) 
ÏSvara puri, (Nityananda, Advaita), 22) Lord caitanya, 23) Rüpa (Svarupa, 
Sanatana) 24) Raghunatha, JIva, 25) I<n>I)adâsa, 26) Narottama, 27) ViSvanatha, 
28) (Baladeva) Jagannatha, 29) Bhaktivinode, 30) GaurakiSora, 31) 
Bhaktisiddhanta SarasvatI, 32) His Divine Grace A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami 
Prabhupada (Bhaktivedanta 1972: 29) 
The Same principle of ritualised initiation that provides an access to discourse is 
characteristic 'for jurisprudence, therapeutics, politics and acad~mia as well (Foucault 
\ 
1971). In the domain of academia the ritual function is enacted by the ceremonies for the 
acquiring of degrees, awarding of different honours, publishing by certain institutions etc. 
"Discourse societies" have the function of preserving or producing discourses and 
making them circulate in a limited space. The strict regulations for discourse distribution 
should not affect the members of the societies in question. The example for «sociétés de 
discours» given by Foucault (1971) is that of the ancient model of rhapsodes, who had the 
knowledge for the recitation of poems, but that knowledge remained ritual. It was 
protected, defended and preserved within a limited group of people by the exercise of 
complex forins of mnemonics. Apprenticeship meant participating both in a group and a 
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secret, and while the recitation was narrating it was not at aU revealing: « entre la parole 
et l'écoute les rôles n'étaient pas échangeables» (Ibid: 42). 
Nowadays there are no more societies,functioning precisely tbis way, but even in the 
published discourse, wbich is ritually free still can be found sorne forms of appropriation 
of secret and non-exchange. Practically there are still many "discourse societies" 
functioning in a regime of exclusivity and divulgation: classified military technological 
data, and the forms of diffusion and circulation of medical, economic and political 
discourses. 
As far as ISKCON discourse is concemed there is no evidence for the existence of 
sorne secret knowledge or closed "discourse society". The access to knowledge and 
discourse is regulated according to initiation, personal efforts and work for ~1).a. There 
is one specific mantra (giiyatri mantra) that is revealed to a devotee in his Brahmin thread 
ceremony, but since it is considered inauspicious to utter it aloud, it cannot be treated as a 
part of sorne secret doctrine, or a sign of belonging to a closed "discourse society." On the 
other side there are no issues within the ISKCON movement that could not he discussed, 
questions that should not be asked, or questions that will be eventually left unanswered. 
While there is no evidence for a distinct "discourse society" within the Krishna 
Consciousness movement, another mechanism for discourse control is detinitely 
outstanding and thls is what Foucault names «les doctrines». At first glance "doctrines" 
are the total opposite of "discourse societies." The number of speaking individuals in 
'''disèourse societies" tends to be limited; the circulation and transmission of discourse as 
weIl. On the contrary, "doctrine" tends to propagate itself, allowing unlimited number of 
adherents to identify themselvès through one and the same discourse. 
On the surface it looks like as though the only requirement for doctrine is the 
recognition of the same truths and rules of conformity with the valid discourse. If that 
were true, "doctrine" would not have been' different from any scientificdiscipline. 
Discourse control would have remained operative only on the level of the form or content 
of statements, but not exercised on the speaking subject. Doctrinal affiliation, though, 
involves both the statement and the speaking subject and binds them together. The 
speaking subject is involved through hislher statements in a way that entails the effects of 
exclusion and rejection, when one or more of the statements appear impossible for 
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àssimilation - heresy and orthodoxy do not differ from the fanatical exaggeration of 
doctrinal mechanisms. 
Inversely "doctrine" allows the speaking subject to signal his affiliation through his 
statements. The affiliation could be to c1ass, social status or race, nationality, interest, 
revolt, resistance, or acceptance: 
La doctrine lie les individus à certains types d'énonciation et leur interdit par 
conséquent tous les autres; mais elle se sert, en retour, de certains types 
d'énonciation pOur lier des individus entre eux, et les différencier par là même de 
tous les autres. La doctrine effectue un double assujettissement: des sujets parlants 
aux discours, et des discours au groupe, pour le moins virtuel, des individus parlants 
(Foucault 1971 : 45). 
Judging by the goals set for the Krishna Consciousness movement by 
. Bhaktisiddhanta Sarasvati and his disciple Bhaktivedanta, also by the results achieved, 
there is a salient doctrinal aspect in the ISKCON's discourse and practices. Doctrinal 
and ritual purity are always vigorously defended (Bhaktivedanta 1972, 1990, 1999) and 
the mIes of conduct followed as strictly as possible. Special attention should be given to 
the issue of MllyllVlldl Vedantists' heresy as opposed to the orthodoxy of the Caitanya's 
teaching. There is one c1ass of transcendentalists, which is called. impersonalistic, 
Mtiyâvâdl. They are generally known as Vedantists, led by Saitkaracarya, who established 
his doctrine, Advaita-Vedanta (non-dualistic Vedanta) in the 8th century A.D. 
Sailkari\icarya (1991) explained the nondual substance, Brahman, as the ultimate reality, 
which to Bhaktivedanta is something absolutely unacceptable: 
But the rascal Mâyavadis - without understanding Vedilnta-sütra, and without 
reading the natural commentary, Srlmad-Bhagavatam - are posing themselves as 
Vedantists. That means they are misguiding people. And because people are not 
educated, they're accepting these rascals as Vedantists. Really, the MayavadI 
Vedantists - they are bluffers. They are not Vedantists. They do not know anything 
of the Vedllnta-sütra. That is the difficulty. Actually, what is stated in the Srlmad-
Bhtlgavatam - that is the real Vedilnta (Bhaktivedanta 1990: 34). 
The devotees also quite explicitly discriminate between themselves and the karmi 
(one who is attached to the fruits of his actions) species belonging to the mainstream 
society. The mainstream society is usually described as materialistic, consumerist, crazy, 
demoniac, gloomy, sad and hopeless. To live in such an environment is tantamount to 
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burning in fire - the fire representing one's desires, ready to be replaced at the moment of 
their fulfilment with new ones. Karmis are obsessed with their sense gratification to such 
an extent that they are considered to be reduced to their orifices: 
. Devotees gleefully state that the soul of people in the outside 'karmi' world 
willleave at death from the anus; whilst the souls of yogis willleave fro~ the top of 
the head. Devotees constantly associate their minds with stool and urine too. 'Our 
minds, which have been bathed in stool and urine, are factually being washed clean 
in the transcendental ocean of devotional service' (Burr 1984: 176). 
Finally, keeping in mind that ''the doctrine" tends to propagate itself and attract 
unlimited number of adherents, we will have to note that the movement was successfully 
propagated abroad initially in the West, later in Africa, Australia and East Europe; the 
number of the ISKCON adherents commands respect. Efforts are constantly made 
through chanting, book distributions, public festivals and temple preaching to spread the 
message of Kr~I:ta to a wider audience. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The external procedures for discourse control (procedures of exclusion) as described 
by Foucault (1971) do not have the nature of immutable laws and they are not universally 
applicable. Depending on the nature of discourse (secular or theistic) the procedures 
could vary according to the cultural constraints and requirements, time period, gender and 
social status of the participants. The examples are numerous: the differential attitude 
toward women's participation in ISKCON temple's activities within,and outside of India, 
the choice of Prabhupada to travel abroad despite the interdict of the tradition against 
such travels for saimyiisins, the initiation of mlecchas and so forth. The modem secular 
discourse of the last two decades is also marked by a significant shift of attitude towards 
homosexuality from one of denial to another one of openness and acceptance. 
Semantic accents are also case sensitive, bearing the corresponding doctrinal 
overtones. For example Bhaktivedanta (1990) employs the sanskrit term saritsktira with the 
less popular connotations of "purificatory rite," or "sacred ceremony," while the oriental 
philosophy reader is mostly exposed to the Buddhist designation of "faculty of 
recollection," or "impression on the memory" (Apte 2004). Bhaktivedanta also extends 
the authority of the sruti (revealed) from the Vedas to the epics of Bhagavad GUa and 
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SrImad Bhagavatam. To him every part of sruti and, smrti is sacred and true, while 
modem impersonal science has nothing to offer except unsubstantiated theories 
(Bhaktivedanta 1997). For modem secular science, though, verifiable knowledge could be 
based on observation and testing only - not on reading and commenting (Foucault 1971). 
As far as internal procedures for discourse control are concerned, it is evident that the 
princip les of author and commentary should be more closely associated with theistic 
discourse, while the principle of discipline fits secular scientific discourse better. 
According to the ISKCON's discourse, the exhaustive commentaries on the Bhagavad 
GUa and Srïmad-Bhagavatarn are indispensable for the sound understanding of the 
scriptures, while the authority and the 'author of the same scriptures are inseparable 
categories. In scitmtific discourse after the 17th century, authority was relegated to an 
abstract Truth that is simultaneously conditional and universal, while the function of the 
author was reduced to a label of an item (theory, effect or syndrome). 
Modem secular .and theistic practices differ mostly with regards to regulations of 
access to discourse. The ISKCON's discourse demonstrates . salient doctrinal 
characteristics such as insistence on ritual and exegetical purity, strict rules of conduct, 
and discrimination between heresy and orthodoxy. Neither of the se characteristics applies 
to modem secular discourse, 'though. Secular discourse formations also differ from 
o 
theistic ones through being organised in closed "discourse societies" responsible for the 
forms of diffusion and circulation of statements. While the ISKCON' s discourse is open 
to the whole world, thére are still many "discourse societies" functioning in a regime of 
exclusion and divulgation: sorne forms of diffusion of political, economical, medical and 
military discourse formations. At the same time, though, both secular and theistic 
practices ritually regulate access to discourse: through initiation and discipular succession 
(paramparil) according to the Vai$I).ava tradition; ceremonies for the. acquiring of degrees 
and publishing by certain institutions in the domain of academia. 
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Chapter VI: Analysis of the field data - questionnaires, interviews, sermons 
6.1 Introduction 
Nous sommes une 
culture de l'éjaculation précoce. De plus en plus 
toute séduction, toute manière de séduction, qui 
est, eUe,· un processus hautement ritualisé, 
s'efface derrière la réalisation immédiate et 
impérative d'un désir. 
8audrillard ) 977 
The data for this thesis was collected mainly through printed material, but somehow l 
felt that my analysis of the ISKCON discourse would not be complete without sorne 
degree of field research. l already knew from the works of Michel Foucault that 
discourses are not linguistic systems or just texts - they are also practices. Thus in order 
to represent ISKCON discourse to a fuIler degree, other research methods were involved 
- questionnaires, interviews, and personal participation. 
The field research was conducted within the periogs of July-December 2006 and 
March-May 2007 at the setting of the ISKCON temple in Montreal. The participants 
involved in the questionnaires and the interviews were six women and six men. While the 
individuals were chosen at random, which is mainly due to the ethical requirement of 
volunteering, the numb~r of participants selected from both sexes was intentionally equal 
in order to avoid gender biasing. 
The questionnaire was brief and mostly regarding the demographic characteristics of 
the participants: age, sex, ethnic origin, citizenship, first religious affiliation, education, 
and profession. Sorne of' the questions, though, touched upon the nature of the 
participants' involvement with the ISKCON movement: frrst contact with ISKCON, 
initiation as a follower of the movement, attendance at the ISKCON temple in Montreal, 
and socialisation within the movement. The questionnaire was handed out in person at the 
temple, and served, actually as a preparation for the interview, which was usually 
conducted one or two days later. In two or three of the cases the devotees confirmed their 
availability right away and the interview took place immediately after the questionnaire 
was filled. 
The most important part of the field research was the interviews, since they were 
expected to provide more personal information and deeper insight into the nature of 
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devotees' involvement with the ISKCON movement. Thanks to the experience of other 
field researchers 1 was already aware that no matter how specific a question could be, "the 
desire to cooperate may lead the person interviewed to offer information s/he believes is 
wanted, rather than accurate information" (Judah 1974: 3). That particular awareness was 
responsible for the choice of broad discussion questions; in addition the respondents were 
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presented with the initiative to elaborate freely on the subject matter. 
As far as my personal participation was concemed, it was mainly limited to attending 
the Sunday services and sermons and partaking in the prasiidam (food presented to 
people after having been offered first to the deities). My ex change with the devotees 
included mainly enlisting their help in identifying sorne reference sources for this thesis 
and naturally sorne personal discussions (I made sorne friends at the ISKCON temple) 
that will not be reflected here. The devotees were really helpful and 1 was granted an 
access to the literature on the Krishna Consciousness available in the temple's library. 
6.2 Questionnaires 
The data gathered from the questionnaires allowed the composition of the actual, and 
to a great extent general profile of an ISKCON devotee. The data gathered by Rochford 
(1985) indicate that over half of the devotees joined the movement before their twenty-
fust birthday and only one in five joined over the age of twenty-six. Twenty years later 
the average age of the participants is 30, with the youngest being 22 and the oldest 57. If 
we div ide them into five age groups we will be presented with the following table of 
distribution: 
Age groups of the respondents 
18 -25 26 - 35 36 - 45 46-55 56-65 
33% 33% 18% 8% 8% 
The ethnie origin of the devotees is diverse: Russian, Canadian, Flemish, German, 
Mexican, Mauritian, and Indian. About a third of them were bom in Canada, while the 
rest are naturalised immigrants. Only one respondent was a visiting European - neither 
bom in Canada nor intending to staypermanently. During the ISKCON early days, the 
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movement drew its support almost exclusively from young Anglo-Americans. A high 
proportion (14.5 per cent in a survey Judah, [1974: 147,] carried out at the Berkeley and 
Los Angeles Temples) of devotees came from middle-class Jewish backgrounds, noted 
for the liberalism of their child-rearing practices. In fact, in the early days of the 
movement, Bhaktivedanta was nicknamed the 'Jewish guru' for this reason (Burr 
1984:12). 
In terms of educational background, given the youth of the devotees that joined the 
movernent at its very beginning, rnany had not cornpleted college (Rochford 1985) prior 
to their decision to becorne I~KCON rnembers. The majority had completed high school, 
but less than one-fourth had received a college degree or graduate degree. Whi1e most 
devotees had not completed college, most had artended for sorne period before dropping 
out. Sixty-one percent of the high school graduates in the movement had artended college 
for a one-year period or longer before dropping out. Today the level of education attained 
by the devotees is well diversified. Divided into five groups again, they form a 
distribution table like this: 
Level of education of the respondents 
primary high school college university post -graduate 
8% 25% 25% 17% 25% 
Sorne of the devotees are unable to define a particular profession; sorne of them are 
students, while the others mentioned professions like: translator, cook, plasterer, steel 
worker, model, and housewife. One of the devotees identified himself as a preacher, and 
two others as full-tirne monks. 
Most of the researchers in the field of the religious conversion have usually assumed 
that young people joining the new religious movements were coming frorn a non-
religious worldview (Judah 1974, Lofland and Stark 1965, Richardson and Stewart 1978; 
Snow and Phillips 1980). By definition conversion involves a fundamental shift in one' s 
sense of grounding (Heinrich 1977) or what Kuhn (1970) refers to as a "gestalt switch". 
The process often involves an experience by which an individual's worldview is 
transformed from a nonreligious one (materialist or secular) to a perspective where God 
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or the spiritual are operative in the world of mundane expenence. In the particular 
circumstances of ISKCON though, the process is c1early different. 
With few exceptions, ISKCON devotees at the beginning of the movement were 
.. members of one of the established churches or synagogues during their childhood. Only a 
small minority grew up in households where religion had little or no importance, or where 
no specific religion was practiced. Most of the devotees originate from Protestant or 
Catholic families, with a substantial participation of Jewish youth also. Since the time of 
IKSCON's early years in America, it appears that the number of Catholics joining the 
movement has increased. For example Judah's (1974) research in San Francisco found 
that 33 percent of the devotees surveyed were from a Catholic background. 
. Most of the Montreal respondents reported as their frrst religious affiliation 
Christianity - either Orthodox or Roman-Catholic. Only two of them did not comment on 
that and one answered with Hindu. In half of the cases they learned about ISKCON from 
the books of Bhaktivedanta, or from the pages of Back to Godhead magazine. The other 
half was introduced to the movement by family or friends. About 41 % of the respondents 
are re1atively new recruits ,- they have participated at the activities of the ISKCON temple 
since 2003. Another 41 % were affiliated to the movement during the 90s of the 20th 
century. Approximately 18% of the respondents reported being introduced to the 
movement as early as at the end of the last century' s 70s. 
Those who have opted to live permanently in the temple are 25% of the respondents, 
while the other 75% of them visit at least once a week. AIl of those living in the temple 
and 80% of the living outside are celibate versus only 20% who are non-celibate. Almost 
all of the respondents joined the movement with friends or members of their family and 
later introduced somebody else. Those who joined the temple's activities alone or did not 
introduce new members are rare. 
The mobility of respondents is impressive - 75% of them have visited other ISKCON 
temples in India and North America once, or repeatedly. The rest of them who have not 
done that yet are really enthusiastic about the idea, especially of visiting India. AlI of 
them believe that such a visit will be inspiring and uplifting. 
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6.3 Interviews 
The interviews took place at the temple of ISKCON in Montreal within the period of 
July-September 2006. The initial intention was to keep the duration of each interview 
within the limit of 30min. with the desire to avoid disturbing the usual routines of the 
devotees at the temple. That limit was respected and in two or three of the cases the 
conversation lasted between 10 and 15min. The discussion was roughly divided into three 
parts: 1) movement affiliation in its symbolic function - representation of the self as a 
member of ideal community 2) movement affiliation in its social function - being a 
member of an alternative society 3) movement affiliation in its political function - the 
power of self-transformation and self-expression. 
For the following account 1 chose not to use names (real or fictional) whatsoever. To 
satisfy the requirements of privacy, devotees will he referred to only by their sex (dasa -
male servant, or da si - female servant), by a capital letter, and by the date of the 
interview. The responses of the interviewed are presented word for word after being 
transcribed from a digital recording. 
6.3a Presentation of the ISKCON movement as an ideal society 
Michel Foucault and Noam Chomsky (1971) discussed in a televised debate the 
possibility of existence of an ideal, just, or as Chomsky put it "decent" society. To 
Chomsky the appropriate form for advanced technological society should be a kind of 
anarcho-syndicalist system build of federated, decentralised, and free associations 
incorporating economic and social institutions. His main preoccupation is that such a 
society should be able to provide conditions and possibilities for the realisation of the 
human need for a creative work, or creative inquiry- a need he considers as fundamental 
element of human nature. Briefly, human nature should be central to any quest for a just 
and decent society. 
Foucault responded sceptically that human nature per se simply does. not exist 
outside the constraints of our civilization marked by a specific type of knowledge, 
philosophy, and class system. To him the notions ofhuman nature, justice and realisation 
of human essence are derivative and subordinate to the existence of our human society in 
general. In order to develop a better society, the immediate political action that we should 
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take is to criticise the "game" of institutions that are seemingly neutral and independent, 
thus forcing the same institutions to ·let the political violence obscurely operating within 
them surface, so that it could be effectively countered. 
30th of July 2006 interview 
Interviewer: Bhaktivedanta a fondé la Société de la Conscience de Krishna 
comme une société idéal selon le model de la société Védique traditionnelle. Selon 
vous, quelles sont les caractéristiques, les principes les plus important de cette société 
idéale? 
M. Dasï: Mais dans la littérature védique, dans les Védas s'explique que le mieux 
c'est d'avoir un ashram. La signification de ça c'est la maison, mais dépend de la 
situation. n y a ashram de la brahmacms, grhasthas, vanaprasthas, and 
sannyasas. 
30th of July 2006 - second interview 
Interviewer: As we know Bhaktivedanta founded the ISKCON as an ideal society 
- that was his intention. So ... what would you say are the main features ofthat ideal 
society? 
V. Dasa: The main features of the ideal society ... Weil, the ideal society is based 
on the actual. .. the harmony, or the society on the laws of nature. So, there are certain 
laws and there is certain structure in universe according to which everything 
functions. Krishna explains in fourth chapter that there are four divisions in human 
society: Brahmal).as, k!jâtriyas, vaisyas, and sudras. And later in the eighteenth 
chapter he also explains that actually, Iike, thèse divisions are based on the qualities of 
people. 
1 st of August 2006 interview 
Interviewer: Bhaktivedanta founded the Krishna Consciousness Society, the 
ISKCON as an ideaI one, as an ideal society. So according to you, what are the main 
principles, the main features of that ideal society? 
Q. Dasa: OK weil, one thing, we try to engage everybody according to their nature, 
and their capacity. Not necessarily according to our needs, but according to the 
person's tendency ... We ail have ditTerent capacities and that is why we try to engage 
everybody according to their capacities. 
1: Could you be more specifie? Like ... 
Q. D.: 1 can think it is really detailed in our books. There are basically four types 
of people: those who have very high intellectual capacity, which we called Brahmans, 
and those who have a tendency more into management, Iike ruling, those who are 
qualified to be Iike government administrators. People who are more inclined towards 
doing business, or farming, so ... yeah. And also those who do not really have any 
specifie intellectual quality or things Iike that, they can be, they have Iike strong 
bodies, and their mentality is more into working. They are workers, like common 
workers. So these four types: the workers, those who are merchants, the 
administrators, and the intellectual c1ass, 50 these are basically the great Iines of the 
four types of people... it is not that somebody is superior; it is just that we are 
ditTerent. And if, Iike personally 1 am a worker, my personal tendency is very much as 
a worker. So once we establish ~ide community Iike the farming community, or 
something Iike this, l would be engaged in doing things Iike building houses, or 
helping for, you know, in the field, in the logging ••. things Iike that. 
20dJ of August 2006 inteniew 
Inteniewer: ... What could you say about the main principles of that ideal society? 
s. Dasi: VarJ..1.asrama system and the caste system rather. We have th ose different 
social functions that we perform in order to observe these things that we use to purify 
us as necessary. 
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According to the ISKCON theology as expounded by Bhaktivedanta (1990), the 
vart}llsrama system, or the four occupational divisions of society are set up by Kr~:t;la. 
Vedic religion means strictlyvart}llsrama-dharrnn : "Everywhere, but in India especially, 
people should know that the real religion is this Vedic system" (Bhaktivedanta 1990: 21). 
In India, an individual is born into and inherits vart}il (colour or "caste"). But 
ISKCON condemns the unconditional inheritance of caste affiliation and maintains that 
vart}Q is not inherited but achieved; while ISKCON bas a similar hierarchy, Brllhma1Jll 
status is not inherited, but achieved by demonstration of commitment to spiritual life. At 
the same time ISKCON organisation stands in opposition to the egalitarian ideals of the 
western Liberal (or Permissive) Society as weIl. Thus the ISKCON hierarchy operates 
symbolically as a buffer, which seeks to reconcile the-cultural extremes of the West and 
the Orient. 
6.3b ISKCON as an alternative society 
According to Burr (1984), to perceive ISKCON as representing 'anti-structure' as a 
reaction to the overstructuring of western society is far from realistic, "for ISKCON both 
in America and Britain, attracts its recruits generally from the most unstructured section 
of society" (Burr 1984: 289). During the sixties of the 20th century it was popular 
(Deikman 1966, Turner 1969, Prince 1974) to view movements and cuIts such hippies, . 
'beats' and new eastern religious groups such as ISKCON as transitional or "liminal" 
events, based on the fact that they recruited primarily from young people. Van 
Gennep( 1960) bas termed astate that is liminal - between and betwixt - rite de passage. 
Young people certainly love to experiment while they mature, but if the transitory stage 
between childhood and adulthood was justifiably taken into consideration at the onset of 
the ISKCON movement, now in 2006 such logic is no longer applicable. 
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ISKCON definitely offers more than an adolescent rite de passage. The Movement 
has a highly organised structure and provides the devotees with a long-term membership 
in the form of permanent full-time occupation and a life-Iong home. Again according to 
Burr (1984) ISKCON should not be perceived as a counter-culture movement for the 
following reasons: 
ISKCON indicates, with its stress on individualism, petit entrepreneurialism, 
capitalism as well as its focus around a theme basic to western civilisation, namely 
its emphasis on a body/soul dichotomy that western youth, are not so different from 
their parental generation which they claim to despise (Burr 1984: 290) 
Yet the ISKCON cannot be treated as a new religious movement perfectly 
conforming to the host culture, simply because that movement demonstrated maturity 
lately. In many ways ISKCON remains hostile to the standards of the mainstream society, 
being quite particular on the issues of blatant materialism, consumerism and hedonism. 
While it is not obvious that ISKCON is an 'anti-structure' it is certainly evident that the 
Movement is not intending to conform enthusiastically. What are the alternatives then? 
2Stb of July 2006 interview 
Interviewer: Often the ISKCON is considered like an alternative form of society. 
Could you elaborate on that? 
H. Disa: Real religion is called sana/ana-dharma - eternal religion. And this 
sana/ana-dharma exists since time immemorial. It includes certain ways of living, 
which are conducive for spiritual Iife. It is unfortunate, but most of these religious 
principles are contrary to the interest of modern society. This modern society is based 
on economic exploitation. It is not considering the well-being of the soul - only the 
well-being of the body. So it is dimcult to integrate in a society. We would not be able 
to live a spirituallife and generally ail monks ofwhatever tradition, they live separate, 
they live in monasteries, they have a very simple Iife in service to God and we are not 
different in that. We are not different in a Christian monastery from other monastic 
lives. There are sorne differences in practice in terms of Yoga process, but this is really 
the field for the connoisseur of spirituality and 1 do not feellike speaking about that. 
26tb of July 2006 interview' 
Interviewer: Usually the movement for Krishna Consciousness is considered as an 
alternative movement. What is yonr personal way of incorporating those alternatives 
in your Iife? 
G. Disa: Good question. Just considering alternatives, may be it is because of the 
purpose of it. The purpose of ISKCON is to elevate, actually to purify the conditioned 
souls, so that they can go back to Godhead, back to the spiritual world where we 
actually belong. Now we must understand the corn mon thing in everyone that we ail 
look for happiness. It does not matter whether itis a devotee of Krishna or not a 
devotee; we are ail 100 king for happiness. It is the intrinsic nature of the soul to he 
happy. So, people are 100 king for in· different ways. Before 1 came to Krishna 
Consciousness 1 was thinking that to find happiness 1 would need money. And in 
order to get money 1 need a job, a good job. ICI have a lot of money, then 1 get love. 1 
can get more things and be happier. That is the conception. 80, in order to get lots of 
money you need a good job. In order to get agood job you need an education and so 
and so on. 80, because people are grown up with this idea that money buys you 
happiness, and therefore 1 must get money. And therefore the education is not about 
learning anymore; it is about getting a good job. 80, that one can have a high paying 
salary and try to get that happiness we are ail looking for. 80, now in Krishna 
Consciousness the goal is not to be happy in the material world, bec au se we 
understand it - it is not possible. 
27tb of July 2006 interview 
Interviewer: What are the alternatives, which Krishna Consciousness is 
introducing in that society and how do you personally pradice them? 
C. Dasï: 1 personally think that this is the way reallife is. And what 1 used to do 
before was working backwards... Because 1 used to have a crazy Iifestyle, 1 live 
alternative Iife style ail my Iife trying to search for, you know, higher truth and 
pleasure, and 1 never found it ... Ali the sense gratification and ail, you know, you are 
trying to control what would the people think, trying to control the love, how would 
people love me, and trying to live, you know, a hideous lifestyle Iike what 1 used to do 
before, through you know, different types of drugs and sexual practices, ail sorts of 
things Iike that, you know. Like 1 have been alternative ail my Iife and it did not work 
for me. 1 tried it and it is a big waste of energy, but it brought me to where 1 am today, 
you know, Iike 1 could say that 1 have tried everything and 1 know that Krishna 
Consciousness is the real thing, the real deal. .. And it is Iike my eyes are opening up to 
that ... This is real. What 1 used to do is the illusion. This is the real stuff. Krishna 
Consciousness is the real thing. 
1 st of August 2006 interview 
Interviewer: Usually the 18KCON is perceived as an alternative society compared 
to the mainstream style of Iife in our western society. Could you comment on the 
alternatives and most importantly how do you personally apply them in your life? 
Q. Dasa: Nice question. It is actually an alternative because we see, you know, you 
just look in the paper, just watch TV or anything and you'lI see that the people are 
more and more frustrated. They are more and more deceived by the present society. 
We have been promised, since ... We have been promised happiness, we have been 
promised we would not die. We would not be sick, we would not get old and still these 
things happen. People get old; they get diseased, new diseases actually - more and 
more. And the people are less and less happy. Just Iike here in Québec, 1 don't know 
the latest figures, but males especially commit suicide more than anywhere else in the 
world. And coming to that point it is not exactly a sign of happiness. 80 we present 
people with the alternative that can actually bring them real happineSs, lasting 
happiness, not just temporarily flickering happiness. 
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Taking into consideration the comments of the ISKCON devotees we can identify the 
alternatives offered by their lifestyle as affecting mostlytheir inner world, and as an effort 
to improve the way they personally relate to the ultirnate realities of life. Their goals are 
rnostly related to satisfying their needs for persona! balance, happiness, and sense of 
purpose in life, rather than confronting the mainstream society with sorne kind of 
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rebelious postmodernism. Their answer to the problems of the contemporary Westem 
value system is actually what they call the Yoga process - a long, arduous, and sustained 
effort of self-improvement. And what looks like a "persona! trip" or defiance to the 
mainstream society is practically their personal struggle to cope with the human condition 
as apart of the universallife-drama. 
6.3c ISKCON represenfed throughthe regime of Self-control 
ISKCON is often perceived as a dogmatic cult and is frequently accused of 
'brainwashing' its recruits. In the past (during the sixties and the seventies) many 
organisations were set up in the West by upset parents and concemed friends such as the 
People's Organized Workshop Against Ersatz Religions (POWER) in Britain, and 
Citizens Engaged in Reuniting Families (CERF), and Committee Engaged in Freeing 
Minds (CEFM) in America. Although 1 am not familiar with similar organisations in 
Eastern Europe, the initial response to the ISKCON being officially introduced at the 
beginning of the nineties was not welcoming at all. In 1993, the permanent presence of 
only a small gfoup of devotees in a rented house at the resort town ofBankia (sorne 30km 
from the Bulgarian capital Sofia) was enough to provoke a massive protest on the part of 
the local population. ISKCON was simply perceived as part of the unprecedented wave of 
new religious movements, attracted by the temporary vacuum left by the decades of 
communist state atheism. If the intimidated Bulgarian townsfolk only knew of how the 
departed leader of ISKCON usually responded to the accusation of brainwashing, 1 am 
afraid their reaction would have been far more violent (in a non-discursive manner). 
Bhaktivedanta once commented like this: 
The whole world is under a misconception, and we are giving them knowledge. 
And they say we are brainwashing. People in generaI do not know that the body is 
valuable only as long as the soul is there. Therefore, their brain is rubbish and must 
be washed, or human civilisation is lost (BTG, Vol. 12, No.5, p. 17). 
According to Burr (1984) the prevailing majority of devotees are "dogmatic", 
"parrot-like", "uniform of their beliefs", and absolutely "uncritical" of Bhaktivedanta's 
teachings. They are unwilling to listen to criticism of ISKCON philosophy and 
immediately reject any in a very intolerant manner: "If it takes place within the temple, 
the person is generally asked to leave - 'Vou are stupid', 'Vou are a nonsense person', '1 
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don't want to talk to you, go away', are responses frequently used by devotees for dealing 
with critics" (Ibid.: 258). Thus for outsiders, who had only superficial contact with the 
devotees it would be logical to conclude that they were programmed robots. 
ISKCON's devotees appear as repetitive when one follows closely their own 
narratives explaining out the Krishna Consciousness belief system and practices. The 
repetitiveness becomes even more pronounced where the Bhagavad GUa less(ms (or the· 
sermons) are concerned. That does not necessari1y mean that the devotees are "parrot-
like" or limited in any way, because they could be also quite individual in their 
interpretations according to their education, life experience, and personal sensitiv'ity. 
They are also definitely not "uniform in their beliefs," because they adopt differentially 
even the basic four precepts for participation in the movement, admitting that sometimes 
it is really tough to follow them to the letter (from personal communication). 
The devotees are really dogmatic though; they worship their guru Bhaktivedanta, and 
they do not accept any criticism of his teaching and commentaries. It is important to note 
here that the personal example of Bhaktivedanta vis-à-vis ritual purity and fidelity to 
discipular tradition was really strong. His personal charisma and leadership qualities were 
without blemish, a fact that explains to a great extent the faithful rigour of liis disciples to 
the doctrine and practice of Krishna Consciousness. 
Devotees who . demonstra!e dramatic influences on their personality are not 
representative of ISKCON. For her three-year period of field research Angela Burr did 
not encounter a devotee who appeared brainw~shed or had lost control of his or her mind. 
As Burr (1984) testified: 
No one came to light either who had undergone a radical personality change. 
The majority of mainstream devotees seem to be only superficially influenced by 
ISKCON's mind-bending internai organisation, as their individualism bears 
witness. In ISKCON devotees' individualism counteracts and overrules the 
controlling influence of the movement' s internaI organisation (Ibid.: 269). 
It is also important to note that the nature of playing the ISKCON' 'belief game' 
requires absolute conformity with Bhaktivedanta's beliefs, and total denial of any 
criticism on them. To an outsider it is a symptom of brainwashing, but to a devotee who 
is willing to stay with the movenient it is role-playing and just acting according to the 
mIes. As Burr (1984) pointed out: "It is easy to recognise when a full time living-in 
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ISKCON devotee is about to 'bloop' (to quit). When they no longer fee! any commitment 
to the movement they start criticising ISKCON" (Burr 1984: 275). 
In my persona! communication with the devotees of the ISKCON temple in Montreal 
l focuSed my questions mainly on the issue of self-control, rather than on any possible 
institutiona! control. l did that for severa! reasons: 1. l was weIl aware of the devotee's 
psychological balance and their capacity to reason and argue confidently. 2. The 
devotee's affiliation to the Movement is nothing else but voluntary. 3. When faith is 
. 
under discussion, resistance to criticism is natural - doubt and belief are not good 
companions. 4. Bhakti is not Academia, and a sermon cannot be a seminar at the same 
time. 
24tb of July 2006 interview 
Interviewer: Yes, this isfine, because 1 know a verse of Bhagavad Gita stating 
that who really aets is not the 1 or the Self, but the material nature. So that is quite a 
good point. So going back to the material nature, being more specifie on that material 
nature again ... In what way, let's say, the celibacy helps you to better control your life 
in general, not your sexual desires, but your life in general? And in what way it helps 
you out with decision making; taking better decisions and assuming better strategies 
for life? 
F. Diisa: Nice question. So what are the benefits of the celibate liCe? There are lots 
of benefits and there is a book called Brain Games by Danavir Gosvami who cites lots 
of ditTerent quotes from lots of ditTerent philosophers and scientist speaking about the 
benefits of celibacy and 1 can just read a couple. The main benefit which celibacy can 
provide is "the person who does not waste his vital energy, his determination increases 
very much." So the celibacy gives person the determination to attain the goal he is 
aiming at. Secondly, person's ~emory increases. He can remember things and store 
more, while the person who wastes his energy, his life energy, his memory dwindles 
and th en after a while the person just can't remember anything. 
1.: How about any possible risks or dangers related to that abstention, or 
abstinence from sexual enjoyment? Don't you think it is kind of risky, because it 
happened a lot in other monastic movements and 1 believe in ISKCON movement also 
(obsession instead of liberation or mastery over senses and sensual impulses)? Could 
you elaborate on that? 
F.D.: This is a good point. So there are two types of abstinence: one abstinence May 
be caused by the mind, and the second one May be caused by ''the higher taste". But 
history has proved that in Many, Many different religions that those monks, who are 
doing that without actual taste for spirituality, then they feU short and theyengaged 
in lots of abominable activities. Also a person can have a different driving force -
driving force coming from the soul experiencing pleasure of reciprocation with the 
Super soul- the God, Lord Krishna. Moreover, when a person experiences at least a 
small drop of that reciprocation, then for him celibacy becomes not mechanical, 
becomes natural and then strength, strength to do that. However, it is coming from 
spiritual experience. 
2Stb 2006 of July interview 
Interviewer: Don 't you think that there is a certain risk and a certain danger in 
practicing tbe so-called celibacy? Because usually, not always, but tbere are lots of 
cases wben instead of acbieving Iiberation, or certain level of freedom, people are 
elapsing into obsessions? 
H. Disa: Ifyou study the Bhigavatam you'lI sec that every point explained is true. 
And MOst misenes are coming because our mind is uncontrolled. Where does tbat 
. control come from? Because the senses are controlling the mind and tbe mind is 
controlling you. 80 we are brainwashed by the senses, but becoming God-conscious 
you get transcendental knowledge, and by the power of ceUbacy (brahmacarya) you 
get to control your mind and your senses. Because mind is the cause of tbe 
unbappiness of people. Why there are so Many people going to tbe psycbiatry? So 
Many! Because tbey bave problems with tbeir minds. And tben you go back - ail tbe 
problems are because there is overindulgence with the sex life. So this is a science. 
What can 1 say more? This is confinned by scientists. But of course you have to follow 
tbe process. Knowledge... tbis is not from today tiU tomorrow and we are going to 
control our minds. Krishna Consciousness is not a process of controUing the mind. 
Tbat's a misconception. We are not bere to control the mind. We engage the mind in 
tbe service of God and by that is tbe conscious control; it is a side etTect. If you tbink 1 
am going to join this movement to control your mind that crea tes problems, because 
tbat is not possible. Controlling tbe mind means purification of consciousness, 
changing your desires.·1t takes 40 years at least, 3~40 years ••• It's a slow process. It is 
not bat:.pening tomorrow. It takes some time ... 
26 2006 of July interview . 
Interviewer: Judging by the color of your robe, and by your answer in the 
questionnaire, you are celibate. So, my next question is: "Do you think that tbere 
migbt be a bidden danger, some bidden risb in practicing celibacy, sim ply beéause 
instead of acbieving a level of freedom or liberation, you could acbieve an obsession in 
a long run"? 
G. Disa: Tbere is a verse in a Bhagavad Gita: "param dntva nivartatt!' that 
means tbat everytbing is based on taste. People, tbey ail bave different fastes, some 
people lîke to eat Many cbips, some people like ... some people Iike ketcbup. So 
cbemists, theysyntbesise tbese chemicals, tbese tastes .... In tbe laboratory, tbey put 
tbem on cbips and people buy it to get tbat taste. 80, same a1so, tbere is wbat we caU a 
bigber taste, whicb is even more pleasurable tban a sex life. Tbat bigher taste is wben 
you aclually experience your connection with tbe supreme - the God. Usually anyone 
tbat bas come to Krisbna Consciousness bas tbat some kind of experience, higber 
experience and they experience ••. As devotees we want to continue to experience that 
connection witb the divine. Yoga means connection. By practicing Yoga one can get 
connected and tbe higher taste is there. So, in this verse be explains tbat we give up 
the lower taste by experiencing the bigher taste. So, if we do not experience the higher 
faste, then as some people have done, they faU back down, because there is no higher 
faste. It is like they give up tbe lower faste, tbey give up the world, but they have 
nothing else, nothing sweeter. 
7th of September 2006 interview 
Interviewer: My question is related to that practice of brahmacarya. What do you 
think could be the benefits of being ceUbate? 1 Mean what are the benefits when 
somebody makes tbàt vow of being celibate? What are tbe intentions? What are the 
benefits? Wbat eould be tbe benefits ofbeing cetibate? 
D. Dâsï: Oh, tbe benefits. It depends. Because you see, Krisbna Consciousness is 
based in four stages. This is celibacy, married life and tben renounced, you know, first 
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is like renounced, tben completely renounced become a sanyasin too. So it is not 
necessarily everybody has to be a celibacy, or not necessarily everybody has to he a 
married couple. Not everybody has to take renouoced order of Iife. You koow 
sometimes you could be renounced, but after you thiok after 10-20 years - oops! 1 am 
a nerd, you koow. You want to change. But it depends. It is to volunteer to have 
Krishna Consciousness Movement; it's a volunteer society. We do not push anybody; 
we don't brainwash nobody. The philosophy is here; Prabhupada's book is here. 
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AU of the above interviewe es share the common trait of being ritually admitted to the 
Krishna Consciousness discourse by being initiated and by strictly following the four 
basic precepts for participation in the movement. Given that the requirement for celibacy 
is the most difficult to follow, according to the devotees' shared acknowledgment 
(personal communication), the opinions of those dedicated to celibate life areespecially 
important for that research. Sorne of those respondents participate more actively in the 
propagating of the Krishna Consciousness by giving the Sunday' s Bhagavad Gita les sons 
(or preaching on other occasions during the week). 
The benefits of celibacy as a form of self-control can be summarised as: 
concentrating and saving the vital energy, preserving and improving the memory, control 
over the mind and the sf!nses, and acquiring oftranscendental knowledge. On the road to 
self-purification and realisation the devotee should avoid mechanical abstention - practice 
that is forced upon the person by his own will only. Abstention should be done only 
according to "a higher taste," which is provided by the blissfulloving bond with the deity. 
Otherwise the devotee could elapse into "obsession with the senses" and into 
"abominable activities." Self-realisation through the Bhakti Yoga-process is a long and 
arduous journey. The process requires strong determination and patience; it takes time -
sometimes a whole life. 
The attitude of a Krishna Consciousness devotee to self-purification and self-
realisation shares a lot with the late Foucaultian elaborations on what he named "self-
techniques", or "self-technologies." The early Foucaultian insistence that the human 
bemg does not have an innate nature (Foucault 1970) gave way to a pronounced interest 
in the Self and its metamorphosis (Foucault 1981-2). The next pages offer sorne brief 
account of the later F oucaultian research in the field of the hermeneutics of the Self. 
6.4 Discourse as hermeneutics of self-techniques 
We are beings that create forms, which 
ironically imprison our creativity. This pattern 
of creation and constraint is ceaselessly 
repeated. 
Foue.ult (1988) 
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Foucault's objective, according to his own words (Foucault 1988), for more than twenty 
five years was to sketch 01:1t a history of the different ways in our culture that humans 
develop knowledge about themselves: economies, biology, psychiatry, medicine and 
penology. His main goal was to analyse these so-called sciences as very specific ''truth 
games" related to specific techniques that human beings use to understand themselves. 
Foucault distinguished four major types of "truth technologies" that serve as matrix 
of practical reason: (1) technologies of production, which permit us to produce, 
transform, or manipulate things; (2) technologies of sign systems, which permit us to use 
signs, meanings, symbols, or significations; (3) technologies of power, which determine 
the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an 
objectivizing of the subject; (4) technologies of the self, which permit individuals to 
effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on 
their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform 
themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or 
Immortality (Foucault 1988: 18). 
Since Foucault was mostly concerned with the development of the western tradition 
of thought, he chose Late Greek antiquity as a point of departure for his investigation on 
the technologies of the self. He started with the practices constituted in Greek as 
epimeleia heautou, "to take care of yourself", "the concern with self', "to be concerne d, 
to take care of yourself." In Foucault the epimeleia heautou and its connection with the 
gnothi seauton ("know yourself') remained a fundamental princip le for describing the 
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phi losophical attitude throughout Greek, Hellènistic, Roman, and later ln Christian 
culture: 
This notion was important in Plato, Epicureans, Cynics (in Cynic Demetrius), 
Stoics (Seneca, Epictetus), in Philo (De Vita contemplative), in Plotinus (Enead, II). 
You find this notion of epimeleia also and especially in Christian asceticism: in' 
Methodius of Olympus and Basil of Caesarea. It appears in Gregory of Nyssa: in 
The Life of Moses, in the text on The Song of Songs, and in the Beatitudes. 
[ ... ]Given that, for Gregory ofNyssa, freedom from marriage (celibacy) is actually 
the first form, the initial inflection of the ascetic life, the assimilation of the first 
form of the care of oneself and freedom from marriage reveals theextent to which 
the care of the self had become a kind of matrix of Christian asceticism. You can 
see that the notion of epimeleia heautou (care of oneself) has a long history . 
extending from the figure of Socrates stopping young people to tell them to take 
c~e of themselves up to Christian asceticism making the ascetic life begin with the 
care of oneself (Foucault 2005: 8). 
6.4a Philosophy versus Spirituality in Self-technology analysis 
In his course titled The Hermeneutics of the Subject (1981-2), Foucault raised sorne 
general questions about the history of thought: What is the price, for philosophy, of a 
history of thought? What is the effect in history, of thought and the events that are 
peculiar to it? How do individual or collective experiences depend on singular forms of 
thought, that is, on that which constitutes the subject in!ts relations to truth, to the rule, to 
itself (Foucault 2005: xxii)? 
According to Foucault the form ofthought that asks what determines that there is and 
can be truth and falsehood and that one can or cannot separate the true and the false could 
be qualified as "philosophy." Hence, "philosophy" could be the form of thought that asks 
what it is .that allows the subject to have access to the truth and which attempts' to 
determine the conditions and limits of the subject's access to the truth. If we calI this 
"philosophy", then we could calI "spirituality" the pursuit, practice, the experience 
through which the subject carries out the necessary transformations on himself in order to 
have access to the truth. We will calI "spirituality" the set ofthese pursuits, practices; and 
experiences, which may be purifications, ascetic exercises, renunciations, conversions of 
looking, modifications of existence, etcetera, which are not for knowledge but for the 
subject, for the subject's very being, the price to be paid for access to the truth (Foucault 
2005: 15). 
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In Foucault, the three most significant characteristics that set spirituaHty apart from 
philosophy are (1) spirituality postulates that the subject as such is not capable of having 
access to truth, and, more specifically, that truth is not given to the subject by a simple act 
of knowledge founded on bis status as subject; (2) in order to have access to truth, the 
subject has to undergo a conversion or transformation and therefore bis very being is at 
stake; (3) once the subject bas access to truth, the effects of spirituality on the subject are 
such that bis very being is fulfilled, transfigured, or saved (Foucault Ibid.: xxiv). 
Further, says Foucault, spirituality postulates that the truth is never given to the 
subject by right. Truth is not given to the subject by a simple act of knowledge 
(connaissance). Spirituality postulates that for the subject to have right of access to the 
truth he must he changed, transformed, sbifted. and become, to some' extent and up to a 
certain point, other that himself. The truth is only given to the subject at a price that 
brings the subject's being into play. For as he is, the subject is not capable oftruth (Ibid.). 
According to Foucault, what follows from that point of view is that the attainment of 
truth is impossible without some form of conversion, or transformation of the subject. 
Roughly put, that transformation may happen in the form ·of a movement that removes the 
subject from bis current status and condition (either an ascending of the subject himself, 
or else a movement by which the truth comes to him and enlightens him). That particular 
dis placement of the subject, in either of its directions, Foucault calls the movement of 
eros (love). 
Theother major mode for the transformation of the subject in bis drive for truth is a 
kind of labour. This is the enterprise of the self on the self, the tough ordeal of 
progressive conversion for wbich the 'self takes responsibility in a long labour of ascesis 
(askesis). For Foucault eros and askesis are the two major forms in Western spirituality 
for transforming the subject into one worthy for truth. 
Foucault qualifies the effects of the truth on the subject as "rebound" 
("de retour"). Once access to the truth has really been opened up, the consequences are 
something quite different and much more. The truth liberates the subject; the truth gives 
beatitude and tranquility of the soul to the subject. At the same time knowledge alone, 
without being accompanied, doubled, and completed by a certain transformations of the 
subject, could never give access to truth: 
Recall what Goethe says: "Philosophy, sadly! Jurisprudence, medicine, and you 
also, sad theology!. .. 1 have studied you in depth, with passion and patience; and 
now here 1 am, poor fool, no wiser than before". This knowledge, that is precisely 
not spiritual knowledge. It is the knowledge of intellectual knowledge. The subject 
cannot expect anything by way of his own transfiguration from this knowledge. 
What Faust demands from knowledge are spiritual values and effects, which neither 
philosophy, nor jurisprudence, nor medicine Can give him [ ... ]Star of silver light, 
silent moon, deign one last time to look down on my pain!. .. So manY nights 1 have 
kept watch by this desk! It was then you appeared to me, melancholy friend, over 
piles of books and papers! Ah! If only 1 might cli,mb high mountains in your soft 
light, wander in caverns with spirits, dance on the pale prairie turf, forget the 
miseries of science, and bathe, young again, in the cool of your dew!" 1 think we 
have here the last nostalgic expression of a· knowledge of spirituality which 
disappeared with the Enlightenment, and the sad greeting of the birth of knowledge 
of intellectual knowledge (Foucault 2005: 310). 
6.4b Subjection and subjectivation in Self-technology analysis 
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According to Andersen (2003) while knowledge-archaeological discourse analysis 
allows for studies of the way in which subject positions are created, the analysis of self-
technologies permits studies of the practical staging of the relationship between 
individual and subject position. ·At an early stage in his writings, Foucault spoke of 
practice as something that unambiguously coincides with discourse. The concept of 
practice however remained unclear. With respect to the history of sexuality, the concept 
ofpractice appears to be replaced by the concept oftechnology, although this replacement 
is not unambiguous. What is unambiguous, in turn, is the question posed by means of the 
concept of technology - it pertains to the self-relation of the subject to its self-care 
(Andersen 2003: 24). 
In rus sociology, Simmel (1971) defmes a distinction between position and vocation 
as two different ways in which a person can become an individual. In a similar vein 
Foucault differentiates between subjection and subjectivation (Foucault, 1997, 1998b; 
Balibar 1994). To Foucault, subjection means that an individual or collective IS 
proclaimed subject within a specific discourse. The individual or collective is offered a 
specific position in the discourse from which one can speak and act meaningfully in a 
specific way. Subjectivation is evident when the individual or collective has not only been 
made the subject but also aspires to be so. Thus, subjection signifies the space where one 
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receives oneself, whereas subjectivation signifies the space where one gives oneself to 
oneself(Andersen 2003: 24). 
The distinction is between two modes of subjection: two forms of discursive 
demands on the person who is to bec orne the subject. While the appropriation of a subject 
position by the individual is not observable in terms of discourse analysis, the whether 
and how the discourse demands active self-appropriation of a subject position are 
observable. What Foucault discovered in the history of sexuality was the fact that the 
individual is not only required to fill out a particular subject P9sition but also to car~ for 
herlhimself independently (Ibid.). 
The discourse itself, through the subjecting of the individual, makes a distinction 
between subjecting and subjectivation in which the former assumes a counter-concept in 
relation to the latter. As it is the individual is expected to actively give oneself to oneself, 
not to simply receive oneself passively. In such a case, the mode of subjecting is actually 
a mode of transformation. The passively receiving and subjected is invoked in a manner 
that s/he may cross the line from subjection to subjectivation, thereby making her/himself 
actively independent in herlhis own self-creation. It is an invocation to the individual to 
invoke her/himself (Ibid.) 
6.4c Basic elements of self-technology 
The question ofhow the self-transformation cornes about was opened up by Foucault 
while introducing self-care technology as meditation (Foucault, 2005). Foucault 
differentiates between four types of technology: production technologies, sign 
technologies, power technologies and self-technologies. The latter technology allows the 
individuals to influence operations that concem their own body, soul, thoughts, control 
and mode of existence, so that they are able to transform themselves and achieve a 
specific state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality (Foucault, 1997) To 
put it otherwise, the purpose of the self-technologies is for the self to address itself. Self-
technologies are procedures that prescribe how the individual is to defme, maintain and 
develop her/his identity with a view to self-control and self-awareness (Ibid.). 
Since the question is not merely theoretical, Foucault defines specific criteria in 
relation to self-technology. These criteria allow the defmition of basic questions through 
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which self-technologies can be examined (Davidson, 1986; Hacking, 1986). Here are the 
., 
four criteria: 
1. The transformational mode of subjecting. 
2. The objectification of the self. 
3. Self-activating activity. 
4. Telos. 
1. The transformationa/ mode ofsubjecting 
The fact that the individual is called upon to give itself to itself and that this is a 
transformational mode of subjecting is the tirst criterion of self-technology. The question 
is: 
• How is the individual subjected with a view to crossing the boundary between 
subjecting/subjectivation? 
2. The objectification of the self 
The objectitication of the self as a second criterion concems the form of knowledge 
that the individual can establish about itself as self. The question is: 
· As what is the self to master itself? Is the self to master itself as feeling, as desire, 
as will, or as culture? 
3. Self-activating activity 
The third criterion is the stipulation for self-activating practices. They could be, for 
example, the diary as self-activity that emerged in the 2nd century in the Roman Empire 
(Foucault, 1977), or the confessional practice of the Catholic Church. Examples of 
modem technologies could be the 'time manager' of the 1980s or competence interviews 
in the workplace (Andersen 2003). 
4. Te/os 
The final criterion is the fact that self-activity needs to have a direction or goal 
leading and extending beyond the activity itself. The applicable question is: 
• In what way does the self-technology provide the individual with a particular te/os 
for life? 
In . conclusion the self-technology can be understood as prescnptions for activities 
through which the individuru, having received itse1f through subjecting, is prepared to 
reach a point of transformation so that it can give itself to itself in order to attain a desired 
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personal goal or condition. Self technologies are postulated as techniques through which 
the individual can transform itself from a state of being responsible for duties into astate 
of assuming responsibilities. Thus the individual's development is put on the agenda and 
slhe accepts responsibility foi:' it. 
According to self-technology analysis the world of self-activities is divided into 
subjecting and subjectification, promoting this way a sensitivity to the practices through 
wbich the self caU upon itself and initiate itself in order to muster its own creation. The 
concept of 'subjecting', wbich was a subconcept in archaçological discourse analysis, 
increases in importance and becomes one aspect of the fundamental analytical way of 
seeing (Andersen 2003: 26). 
6.5 Bhagavad Gîti classes (or sermons) 
In many ways what looks like a Sunday sermon is a regular Bhagavad GIta class. The 
significant difference is that the weekend audience is much larger compared to a class 
attendance during the week. Usually the classes start with the Invocation to Srimad 
. Bhagavatam: 
Om namo bhagavate vasudevaya 
o my Lord, the all-pervading Personality of Godhead, 1 Qffer my respectful obeisances 
unto You. 
When·the time frame allows that, the devotees and the visitors also chant Jaya Radha-
Madhava. Bhaktivedanta was very fond of this song and sang it just before bis lectures. 
Bhaktivedanta said that this song is "a picture of Vrndavana. Everything is there -
Srimati Radharani, Vrndavana, Govardhana, YaSoda, and all the cowherd boys 
(www.harekrishna.comlcollbooksIRP/SVAljrm.html) ... Here is the text of the song: 
Jaya Radba-Madhava 
(Glory to Radba and Madbava) 
by Srila Bhaktivinode Thakura 
jaya radha-madhava kui\ja-vihari 
gopi-jana-vallabha giri-vara-dhari 
yasoda-nandana braja-jana-ranjana 
yamtma-tira-vana-cari 
Krishna [Madhava] is the lover of Radha. He displays many amorous pastimes in 
the groves of Vrindavana, He is the lover of the cowherd maidens of Vraja [the 
gopis], the holder of the great hill named Govardhan, the beloved son of Mother 
Yashoda, the delighter of the inhabitants of Vraja, and He wanders in the forests 
along the banks of the River Yamuna (everything2.com). 
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The geographic location ofVraja is the region of central northem India, in which the 
pilgrimage town of V rndavana - depicted in' the Rasa Lfla ("Dance of Divine Love") as a 
small agricultural village - is situated. The name Vrndavana means "the forest of,Vrnda 
or Tulasf' (Krishna's favourite plant and the Goddess who embodies it). The setting of 
the Rasa Lfla is in this world but not exactly of this world. The divine realm of Vraja 
manifest in this world and known as Gokula is identical with its divine counterpart, the 
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"heavenly Vraja," known as Goloka. Vraja is a world in which every personality, 
inc1uding all plants, trees, and animals participate in and fully experience the love 
between Krishna and the cowherd maidens (Schweig 2005). 
The spiritual realm of Vraja is described as a place that c1early contrasts with the 
world as we know it. It is a mystical world ofbeauty; the ground in Vraja is covered with 
devotional jewels named cintiIma1Ji, each "a fabulous gem supposed to yield to its 
possessor all desires." Even the trees are not ordinary, and are called kalpa-taru, or 
'"wishing trees." Vraja is of extraordinary abundance: the trees produce fruit during every 
season, cows give milk unlimitedly, and the water is nectar. Here all walking is dancing 
and all talking is singing, and time is only an etemal present within which varieties of 
divine events occur. The world of Vraja is devotionally alive as every object and soul 
exists only for the sake of the Beloved Lord. Every being and everything in this spiritual 
setting is full of knowledge and bliss, and gives off splendour like the various lwninaries 
of the sky (Schweig 2005: 125). 
After the initial chanting, the preacher usually asks the visitors whether sorne of them 
are attending for the first time and the next question is how they,leamed about the temple. 
After a brief exchange they are welcomed into the class and the lecture (or sermon) 
begins. The preacher starts with the announcement of the topic, which is most of the time 
a chapter of the Bhagavad GUa or SrImad Bhagavatam. Then selected verses are recited 
in Sanskrit and expounded conforming to the purports of Bhaktivedanta. The comments 
do not deviate in any way from the text of the guru and the examples given are more or 
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less elaborate depending on the experience of the preacher and how articulate he is. The 
same lecture is conducted simultaneously for three different classes in English, French, 
and Russian. 
The presentation mainly contrasts the material and spiritual aspects of life. 
Materialistic and consumerist attitudes and modes of life are criticised and condemned, 
while the alternative given is Krishna Consciousness and Bhakti. 
The whole purpose of Iife is to go back to the Lord Kn;I].a, about what most people 
are largely unaware. 5000 years ago KrP,iI].a gave instructions how to follow him. Ali 
the Vedic literature and seers were absorbed in serving Kr~-':Ia, but today we foJJow 
Hollywood personalities. 
4th of March 2007 Bhagavad-GUa Lesson 
Every second of our Iife, every action should be measured at the end. It is Iike 
shooting an arrow - we cannot know the consequences, so we have to be very, very 
careful. Devotee is Iike a holy place - wherever he goes he creates auspiciousness by 
not creating bad karma. For humans there is a door opened for salvation, but the 
animais and other living beings are stuck here in this material existence. 
Ilth of March 2007 Bhagavad-Gita Lesson 
The material world is a sober place, but instead of being sober people seek to be 
entertained in this world, to be intoxicated. People prepare materially very weil for 
their future; they accumulate lots of material things, but in the end are totally 
unprepared for their death. 
15tb of April 2007 Bhagavad GUa Lesson 
Regular chanting of the mahlimantra is recommended and encouraged as the 
proper way of practicing Yoga for the Kali Yuga (the Oark Age). The "greatest (mahà) 
prayer formula (mantra) for deliverance" is virtually a "sonic re-enactment of the Rasa 
Mru:tçiala, consisting of a series of alternating names of God in the vocative case, both 
calling out for and praising the presence of the divine. When the mantra is recited 
repeatedly in meditation or song, it worshipfully enthrones the Soul of the soul within the 
heart of the devotee, forming a sonic mar:ujala (Schweig 2005: 179). 
The circuitous arrangement of the words of this mahàmantrtl consists of an alternating 
pattern between an equal number of feminine (as hare) and masculine (as Kr$1JQ and as 
Rama) names of the divine. The sacred thirty-two-syllable mantra appears as follows: 
Hare 'Kr$1JQ, Hare Kr$1JQ, Kr$1JQ Kr$1JQ, Hare Hare, Hare Rama, Hare Rama, Rama Rama, Hare 
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Hare. The pattemed movement of eight pairs of feminine and masculine names of the 
divine can be observed in the mantra. Within four of the pairs (the first, second, fifth, and 
sixth) the feminine and masculine names appear altemately. In the other four pairs (the 
third, fourth, seventh, and eight) two masculine names appear together in one pair, 
followed by two feminine names in the next pair. Thus' the dance like movement can be 
observed both within and between pairs (Ibid.) 
Additionally, the mantra begins and ends with feminine names, enclosing the 
masculine names, just as the Gopïs engulf Kr1?t:la when they encircle him during the 
commencement of the Rasa dance. When practitioners recite the mantra over and over, 
the divine names form a circular pattern imitative of the ex change between the feminine 
and masculine partners in the Rasa dance. It can be se en, then, that the presence of the 
Rasa Mru:tc;iala is archetypal in VaÏ.'?t:lava practices (Ibid.) 
The way out of the burning heU of our desires is to chant the Hari Nama (the Lord's 
name). It is indispensable to chant at least the minimum required 16 daily rounds. The 
proper chanting should be done on beads made of the tulasï plant. This plant is considered 
to be a great female devotee of Kr1?t:la, even a consort of VÏ.'?I:m, who bas taken the bodily 
form of a plant that is worshiped on a daily basis in.v aishnava temples and homes. Her 
minty leaves are used to garnish food preparations for sacred offerings, and are found 
decorating the feet of sacred images of Kr1?t:la. The wood of expired tulasi plants is carved 
into beads that are wom around the neck by Vaishnavas and also used as a rosB.ry for the 
recitation of God's names'(Schweig 2005: 129). 
The materialistic way of life is represented by blind consumerism and endless pursuit 
of sense gratification. More importantly, though, there is a corresponding mentality that 
has to be addressed and eventually defeated. 
Prabbupada was very tolerant towards otbers. He knew tbat wbat can belp people 
out of tbeir misery was Krisbna Consciousness. Cbanting is not difficult and belps a 
lot, wbite our foolisb civilization is just speeding on tbe bigbway of material 
acbievements. 
Ist of April 2007 Bbagavad GUa Lesson 
Spiritual life is not only acquisition of knowledge; tbere is a practical dimension, a 
practical application of tbat knowledge, of spirituality. Tbat practical dimension is 
mantra. Mantra means man - mind, mental, and Ira - to liberate from tbe mental. 
15111 of April 2007 Bbadavad GUa Lesson 
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The audience is repeatedly reminded that the material life is illusionary and tends to be 
ultimately unsatisfactory. People naively believe that they will be able to satisfy their 
desires, but the wicked market economy always invents new products and subversively 
creates new "needs". By participating in that vicious system people only fuel the ever 
burning fire of their own desires. 
We need physical, emotional and spiritual satisfaction. Only I<f!?l]a is able to satisfy 
ail our needs. We can pay our bills, we can shop, we- can drive our cars and have a 
sense offreedom, you know ... we can go everywhere. We can get a better cell phone, a 
faster internet connection, but we aJways discuss eating, sleeping, mating and 
defending - ail of our sophistication is about that. 
1Stb of April 2007 Bhagavad Gita Lesson 
Everything belongs to K~l]a; to claim the opposite is to steal, to deceive ... It is Iilre 
finding a wallet on the street. You know that it does not belong to you and if you keep 
it for yourselfyou are a thief. 
Who owns my body? We claim ownership over houses, cars, furniture, bank 
accounts, but who owns our bodies? One day they will be taken from us. 
Und of April 2007 Bhagavad Gita Lesson 
. We have to always ask ourselves what the best way to serve Kr~l)a could be, and how 
to help others do the same. The best way suggested is to a1ways think and 'talk: about 
Kr~l)a, and associate with other devotees. 
It is very unfortunate to witness the others' misery. Karma changes but in the 
meantime devotees are very concemed with others' sutTering. Prabhupada witnessing 
in the night how children fight with stray dogs for food leftovers, with tears that came 
in his eyes said that nobody within 8 miles distance from the ISKCON temple should 
be left hungry. Everybody should be able to eat at the temple. 
11111 ofMarch 2007 Bhagavad Gita Lesson 
You have to be always attentive to K~l]a; it is not difficult when you love K~l]a. It 
is the sa me like working for your family and kids - you do that and it is not difficult 
because you love them. If you love K~l]a you win do what is required. That is why we 
chant on the streets, distribute books, do service in the temple ... and so on. 
Sinful reactions gradually recede, but we have to always strive to get to the spiritual 
platform; we have to tune ourselves to the holy vibrations of love for and associate 
with other devotees, because you will become a thief if you associate with thieves. 
Thieves are also able to draw you to their level of consciousness. So that association is 
very important - devotees are inspiration for each other. We have to be careful while 
giving our pure association to the other, because at the same time we should avoid 
associating with materialistic goals and attitudes. 
1 st of April 2007 Bhagavad Gita Lesson 
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Another important point usually discussed by the preachers is the impartiality of 
Krishna Consciousness towards other religions and faiths. Different people are viewed as 
sharing the same nature and originally belonging to one and the same God. Differences 
between people are only illusionary and conditional on misconceptions and poor 
understanding of God's nature and material realities of life. What devotees need is 
tolerance, understanding, and love for others who do not share the same beliefs. 
We ail belong to God; everything around us belongs to God. We are ail brothers and 
sisters. We can have different ways of worshipping, but these are different levels of 
understanding ofGod; the sa me as tbere are schools, colleges and Universities. 
We have to make God our priority. Kr!?I;1a is Iike a pet name, Iike a friend - not Iike 
a diluted impersonal God. Srila Prabhupada opened the treasure trove of love; 
Bhakti attracts Bhakti. 
lst of April 2007 Bhagavad Gïta Lesson 
Maya is serving Kr!?I;1a also like his devotee. Ali religions worship the same god. But 
they have to be authentic: to have scriptures, to bave gurus - the process of 
worshiping should be there. 
There is no need of hostility among religions. There is no need to destroy and tear 
apart somebody worsbiping God, to blame tbe otber being sinful, or demonic, or 
impure. The church, the mosque, the synagogue, the temple are in spirit one and the 
same place. When 1 bave a nice day 1 forget God, but when 1 have a bad day, or suffer 
1 remember and searcb for God. 
8th of April 2007 Bhagavad Gïta Lesson 
Teaching Bhagavad GUa classes (or preaching) is one of the nurnerous ways to serve 
the deity, but as a devotee would say, not everybody "qualifies" to perform that duty. The 
access to the ritualised discourse depends on initiation, in depth knowledge of the 
scriptures, and recognised advancement in the practice of Bhakti Yoga. In the ISKCON's 
temple of Montreal there are approximately four or five devotees that take turns in 
leading the classes, but once in a while special guests visiting from other. temples do the 
service. These are devotees considered as the most advanced in the devotional practice 
and many ofthem knew Bhaktivedanta personally. 
The last minutes of the class are dedicated to the questions of the audience and when 
all of them are answered, the topic of the next les son is announced and everybody moves 
to the hall where the ritual meal (prasadam) is served. Usually the preachers enjoy the 
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attention of sorne of the more inquisitive visitors or devotees, so that the theological and 
philosophical discussions on Bhakti Yoga linger till the end of the prasiidam. 
6.6 Conclusion 
According to the results of the questionnaires, the profile of the contemporary 
Krishna Consciousness followers changed significantly over the last two decades. 
Devotees tend to be more mature, with ethnic and educational backgrounds that are more 
diversified. The history of their religious adherence. prior to joining the ISKCON 
movement is also richer. In addition to the predominant Protestant affiliation of the 
devotees in the 60s and the 70s, nowadays there are lots of adherents coming from 
Orthodox, Roman-Catholic, and Hindu background . 
. Professional skills of ISKCON's devotees are more sophisticated, reflecting their age 
variety and life experience. Most of the respondents are relatively new recruits and only a 
small part of them have opted to live permanently at the temple, while the majority is 
happy to visit once a week. Contemporary ISKCON's devotees tend to be celibate, which 
does not necessarily mean monks. The broader meaning of celibacy includes fidelity to 
one partner (monogamy) and sexual life subordinate to the needs of procreation only. 
While b~ing fixed and weIl established in their intimate relationships, devotees show 
remarkable social mobility. They travel a lot to ex change visits among the different 
temples and to participate in the organising of their big annual festivities. Surely India is 
the favourite destination and there is no one among the Krishna followers who would not 
be desirous of visiting Vrndavana. 
Krishna devotees do believe that the ideal society is a realistic project and that there 
is an underlying "structure of the universe according to which everything functions". To 
get as close as possible to the ideal equilibrium the society should be based solidly on the 
Vedic principles of van:tasramadharma or broadly speaking on '"the laws. of nature". 
Every individual should act responsibly and according to hislhers innate "nature and 
capacities". The idea is not to impose an order of strict subordination, but to balance the 
need of hierarchy and efficiency with the one of personal growth and happiness. 
When asked for the alternatives that ISKCON is able to offer to mainstream society, 
the devotees respond with criticism on the consumerism and the materialism of modem 
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life. According to their views people in the modern world are largely deceived and 
frustrated and this is perfectly logical, because "it is impossible to be happy in the 
material world". The example one of the devotees gave me was with the alarming suicide 
rate in the province of Québec, which is "not exactly a sign of happiness," he said. 
Another devotee commented that Krishna Consciousness is an "eye opening" and ''the 
real stuff," therefore it could not be an alternative, given that it is the only thing that 
works. If they have to name an alternative after all, this is their sanatana-:dharma - the 
eternal religion. This is the only religion able to elevate and purify the materially 
conditioned sou!. 
In order to get elevated and purified the devotee should be actively involved in the 
process of Bhakti Yoga and undergo certain personal transformations. Prior to initiation 
s/he should meet the minimum requirements of the basic four precepts discussed earlier in 
chapter 5.2. Next s/he should be always looking for ways to expand her or his services for 
the Lord I<rl?:r:ta; for example to help with the temple maintenance, to serve as pujtiri (one 
who attends to the deities at the altar), to participate in the sailkïrtans, tq chant more daily 
rounds of the mahilmantra etc. 
In principle the requirement and the expectation for a Krishna Consciousness devotee 
to get purified and e1evated agrees with the antique practices of epimeleia heautou and 
gnothi seauton , which aim at attaining a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, 
perfection, or Immortality (Foucault 1988). According to Foucault (2005) spirituality 
postulates that the subject as such is unable of having access to truth without actively 
seeking an individual transformation (subjectivation) through "giving oneselfto oneself'. 
The aim (te/os) of the individual transformation is to remove the subject from its current 
status and position - could be either elevating of the subject, or truth coming to him in an 
act of enlightenment. Foucault (2005) named that particular displacement of the subject 
eros while the labour and the ordeal of that conversion received the designation askesis. 
Both eros and askesis can be easily recognised in the practice of brahmacarya, which is 
considered as especially rewarding in the Krishna Consciousness movement. 
Conclusion 
Deux excès: 
exclure la raison; 
n'admettre que la raison 
Blaise Pascal 1999 
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The pioneer of French sociology August Comte expounded in his highly influential 
Cours de philosophie positive (1830-42) that knowledge passed through three phases, the 
theological, the metaphysical, and the positive or scientific. With the dawning of the 
scientific age the traditional fonns of religion declined and Comte devised a Religion of 
Humanity, which would perfonn for the· modem world those necessary functions of 
providing meaning, ritual and a basis for morality, which had once been the province of 
the churches. 
According to the summary of recent historical scholarship given by McLeod (2000), 
the extent, chronology and causes of secularisation ren,tain unclear. Despite the increasing 
wariness among historians of modem religion about the use of the tenn 'secularisation' 
and its status as the supposed key to modem religious history, there is a relative 
agreement upon the basic approaches of identifying the process of secularisation. In 
Gennany and France, though much less frequently in England, many historians argued 
that the tuming point was the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. The approach more 
favoured by British historians focuses on the lndustrial Revolution from about 1800 
onwards. Historians of ideas and literature highlight various developrnents in science, 
. philosophy and the study of.religion around the middle of the nineteenth century, with 
Darwin usually bèing identified as the central figure, while the fourth approach focuses 
on the period since about 1960 (McLeod 2000: 4). . 
Authors like Cox (1965, 1977), Wilson (1966), Luckmann (1967), and Berger (1967) 
shared a commitment to the 'secularisation thesis', holding that the dwindling social 
significance of religion is an inevitable consequence of the processes of social 
development in modem societies. Professional specialists take over more and more of the 
roles previously perfonned by the clergy. Science replaces theology as the principle 
source of authoritative knowledge, while growing pluralism leads to a sophisticated 
relativism, in tenns of which the moral absolutes prescribed by the various religions lose 
their binding force. As Harvey Cox (1965) claimed, "religion was privatized" and while 
remaining important perhaps to sorne individuals its influence on public institutions 
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belongs to the past. At least this is how the secularisation thesis looked during the 1960s 
and 1970s. 
From the later 1970s onwards, though, with the political mobilisation of evange1icals 
in the United States, the role of the churches in sorne of the revolutions in the former 
Eastern Bloc countries, and the advance of the militant Islam, the number of doubters of 
the orthodox status of the secularisation thesis correspondingly increased. These 
developments called into question the assumption that religion would inevitably be 
privatised and marginalised in modem societies. In the United States, sorne sociologists 
of religion like Stark and Bainbridge (1985), Iannacone (1991) and Finke (1992) rejected 
the concept of secularisation altogether. In Europe the tendency has been to suggest that 
secularisation and the complexity of religious change were rather oversimplified (Martin 
1978, Casanova 1994, Davie 2000). Meanwhile there have been other sociologists, most 
notably Steve Bruce (1996), who have reaffirmed and refined the secularisation theory, 
essentially in the form advanced by such authors as Bryan Wilson in the 1960s (McLeod 
2000). 
The popular opinion, widely shared in the West, that we are in control of our lives, is 
most probably due to the processes of modem secularisation. That involves the 
underlying conviction that we are inherently able of purposefully applying our will in 
order to bend the life circumstances in our advantage. ISKCON maintains the opposite -
we are not, and we cannot be in control of our lives. We are already materially 
conditioned and controlled byour past karma (the chain of actions and reactions built 
through our previous incarnations). There is only one who is able to control Life and he is 
the Supreme Controller - Lord Krl?t:la. 
The important consequence following from this arrangement is that in order to have 
access to sorne control we have to surrender absolutely to the Lord. The best control 
available to humans is to serve Krl?t:la. For one unfamiliar with the Oriental philosophical 
tradition a claim like this might sound like an oxymoron. Another similar example could 
be that "Sans ara is Nirvru:ta" (or that the endless chain of rebirth and suffering itself is our 
very liberation from that chain). Paradoxical as it might be, the logic is there and it is 
quite sound. 
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Why surrender fIfst of all? To begin with, when one goes to his Guru, according to 
the Oriental tradition the same one needs, yearns and expects to be instructed and led; not 
the opposite - to instruct and to lead the master. Thus, the disciple owes obei sance to his 
Guru. It is like in the Army. One swears an oath, which means unconditionally accepts 
the authority of the higher commando In principle the army commander is not an empty 
suit. The higher the rank, the higher the qualifications should be; otherwise the award for 
any deficient leadership in battle is certain death. It is not accidentaI at all that many 
monastic orders in the past had a military structure like the order of the Christian 
Templars, or the famous Shao-Lin temple in China, just to name a few. Similarly the 
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battle for Krishna Consciousness and spiritual advancement requires sorne self-discipline 
and conforming to strict rules. The life of a brahmacllrin is not in any way different from 
the life of any other monk. 
As far as scientific rigour is concerne d, there are no particular reasons to consider the 
Science of Yoga as less rigorous than any other scientific discipline. We hardly need to 
go back to the Vedic times to realise that in our historical past, science and religiori were 
not compartmentalised yet and they were actually aspects of one who le. Given that even 
in its Hollywood style application, Yoga is able to produce unquestionably beneficial 
effects; one can logically expect better results to follow a genuine dedication to the 
process. To put it in another way - the principles of Yoga are nothing less than operative. 
When we compare Bhakti and modern secularism it is evident that the very idea of 
discursive rigour varies. While modern secularism encourages discussions and free 
exchange of opinions, Bhakti neither promotes an exploration of the zillion of 
possibilities (their number is limited to four modes of love relations to Kr~:Q.a), nor 
recommends compiling a litany of all opinions on the subject matter. Citing is highly 
recommendable, but only as far as it isconforming to the scriptures and paramparll 
(discipular succession). 
Regarding the procedures for discourse control identified by Michel Foucault (1971), 
my conclusion is that they fit adequately the analysis of ISKCON discourse. Certainly the 
ISKCON's discourse does not satisfy Foucault's definitions for a "discipline" and a 
closed "discourse society", but it does so perfectly well for all the other aspects of 
discourse control. As far as discursive violence is concerned, nowadays ISKCON appears 
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as relatively restrained. Apart from the usual Mllyllvadr issue and the overstated contempt 
for formaI academic education, 1 did not witness anything comparable to the outright self-
righteous disdain demonstrated by Bhaktivedanta: 
In MontreaI a Bengali gentlemen inquired, "Swamiji, you are using very strong 
words - 'fools and rascaIs.' Can it be explained otherwise?" 
And 1 replied, "No. These are the only words that you are aIl rascaIs and 
fools" [Laughter.] (Bhaktivedanta 1996: 15). 
As more important appears the problematic of "representation of men" and the "being 
of man" (Foucault 1970), as far as they become "clearly separate issues once we consider 
discursive and cognitive functions of language, once we raise the question of discourse, 
of its ontologicaI privilege and epistemologicaI powers" (Racevskis 1983: 57). According 
to Foucault (1970) man exists as an element of discourse. Since this existence lS due to a 
radicaI change in the epistemologicaI configuration of Western discourse, man is simply 
to be viewed as the product of a historicaI contingency. Although we may fmd it difficult 
to imagine this, Foucault reminds us that there was a time "when the worId, its order, and 
human beings existed, but man did not." Our thinking bas been conditioned by forces 
beyond our conscious control and yet we "believe ourselves bound to a fmitude which 
belongs only to us, and which opens up the truth of the world to us by means of our 
cognition" (Ibid.: 322). This illusory mode of producing the truth about ourselves and the 
world characterizes, as we have seen, an anthropologicaI process and is a function of the 
episteme that governs our mode of cognition (Racevskis 1983: 58). 
To Foucault, Classical thought was incapable of self-representation, or in other words, 
man was incapable of perceiving himself as subject and object at once, as simultaneously 
representing and being represented, as an entity present to himself in. the process of 
representation. The presence of man was recognised in a Linnaean like mode, but 
deprived of any reflexivity: 
Before the end of the eighteenth century, man did not exist... Of course, it lS 
possible to object that general grammar, naturaI history, and the analysis of weaIth 
were aIl... ways of recognising the existence of man.... But there was no 
epistemological consciousness of man as such (Foucault 1970: 308-309). 
With Kant, the modem age is inaugurated. But as soon as the metaphysicaI seaI on 
the correspondence between language and worId breaks down, the representational 
function of language itself becomes a problem. Foucault develops his basic idea that 
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modemity is charactenzed by the self-contradictory and anthropocentric form of 
knowledge proper to "a structurally overloaded subject (a fmite subject transcending itself 
into the infmite) in a wide arc that stretches from Kant and Fichte to· Husserl and 
Heidegger" (Racevskis 1983 :69). 
As it is evident, both Classical and Modern thought (being contradictive and 
anthropocentric) do not satisfy Foucault's need of sound knowledge regarding man's 
nature (or the nature of man's cognitive abilities). Foucault's genealogical inquiry into the 
history of the western "self-technologies" and the "hermeneutics of the self' is an 
interesting symptom of an ever growing need for holistic knowledge - one that is 
transforming its subject in the process of self-realisation. 
We can always ask the questions: What is frrst - our need to know or our need for 
self-realisation? Do we need to know in order to change ourselves or do we need to 
change ourselves in order to know? What kind of knowledge is more valuable - the 
personal (transformational) one, or the objective (impersonal) formaI scientific 
knowledge? Answers are not readily available and when they present themselves they are 
not universal. As one devotee put it: "It takes 40 years at least, 30-40 years ... It's a slow 
process. It is not happening tomorrow. It takes sorne time ... (p. 102)" The opinion 
expressed by the American myth theorist Joseph Campbell (1988) regarding the choice of 
attitude towards the process of acquiring knowledge is in the same vein: 
Each religion is a kind of software .that has its own set of signaIs and ... will 
work. It will work but suppose you have chosen this one. Now for person really 
involved in religion and really building his life on it, you better stay with the . 
software that you have got. For a chap like myself who likes to play with "cross 
software" ... 1 can run around, but 1 will probably never have an experience 
comparable to that of a saint (Bill Moyers & Joseph Campbell 1988). 
Foucault insists in his L'ordre du discours (1971) that in order to restore discourse to 
its status of event and to finally divest the signifier of its sovereignty, we. need to start 
with questioning our will to truth. He understood that task as applying a method based on 
the four main principles: renversement, discontinuité, spécificité et extériorité. According 
to the principle of renversement, the figures perceived as positive, like author, discipline, 
or will to truth, should be recognised as negative in their function of interrupting and 
dispersing of the discourse. The principle of discontinuité requires that the discourse 
1 Dl 
should be treated as discontinuous practices that are touching and intersecting among 
themselves, yet ignoring and excluding each other. 
The third principle of spécificité is especially sensitive to the problematic of both 
theistic and secular discourses on Krishna Consciousness. Foucault (1971) formulated 
that principle as a precaution against reducing a discourse into «un jeu de significations 
préalables», and against the assumption that the world presents to us «un visage lisible 
que nous n'aurions plus qu'à déchiffrer», that are practices pertaining to the secular 
discourses. The world should not be perceived as a tool especially designed to facilitate 
our learning process, or to assume the existence of «providence prédiscursive qui le 
dispose en notre faveur», which is something so typical for theistic discourses. 
Foucault (1971) recommends always observing the principle of extériorité, which 
means not to focus on the hidden interior of a discourse, or on the nucleus of sorne 
thinking manifested in it, but to rather start from the surface and the regularity of the 
discourse and move towards its external conditions of possibilities. The first and the last 
principles recommended, namely renversement and extériorité, closely resemble on one 
side the tested mathematical method of proving a theorem by assuming its opposite, and 
on the other side a desperate wrestling with a Zen-Buddhist /cijan. Nevertheless, they both 
seem challenging and promising. 
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